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Abstract 
Abstract 
Even though the return to education appears to be significantly positive, 
some talented young people do not attend post-compulsory education. 
Since education has been widely acknowledged as a key factor to 
production in today's information based economy, it is vital to find out the 
determinants that affect individuals' educational investment decisions. 
One of the possible affecting factors is uncertainty, which has been 
addressed three decades ago by some economists, but until now not much 
progress has been made on how to examine the factor of uncertainty by 
empirical observations. The thesis aims to design a testable optimal 
education choices model under uncertainty by using option pricing theory 
and examines it using British panel data. In addition, we are also 
interested in the impact of non-pecuniary utility on education choices and 
will examine this impact using a conditional logit model. In the second 
part of the thesis, we focus on the influence of a particular source of 
uncertainty, namely the supply and demand conditions in labour market 
(i. e. overeducation) to individuals' education choices. With the intensive 
expansion of higher education in China in recent years, the question of 
whether its graduates are being oversupplied to the labour market arises. 
The thesis employs a Chinese graduate survey to discover the role of 
overeducation on individuals' education choices and corresponding wages. 
Finally, I analyze the policy effect on individuals' education choices. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Educational choice is a very important task for both young people and the 
nation, since it concerns individuals' life-time career development as well 
as a nation's productivity and international competitiveness. For each 
individual, the level of education will determine his or her access to the 
labour market and their corresponding wages. The distribution of 
education and the stock of education accumulation are strongly related to 
a country's economic status and to economic indicators such as its 
unemployment rate, prosperity and equity. Education is thus of great 
concern to each nation's government, as well as to each individual. 
Educational choice is also a very complex undertaking, since in reality it 
involves a number of possible uncertainties and risks. Winston (1999) 
states the difficulty as: `People investing in human capital through a 
purchase of higher education don't know what they are buying and won't 
and can't know what they have bought until it is far too late to do 
anything about it. ' The statement describes individuals often do not know 
the subjects they are really interested in, whether they have the capability 
to be successful in them or what their expected future return will be if they 
invest in studying them. In addition to the uncertainties and risks involved 
in the education investment, education is also a good that cannot be 
insured against or resold. The insurance market is reluctant to insure the 
return to education because of these uncertainties as well as problems of 
moral hazard and adverse selection. Belfield (2003) argues that "Adverse 
selection has students remaining in education for too long: moral hazard 
may mean students choose easy courses rather than those with the highest 
return". All these attributes contribute to the fact that educational choice is 
a very difficult decision. 
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Levhari & Weiss (1974) analyze the uncertain nature of the input (e. g. 
ability and quality of schooling) into educational investment and uncertain 
output (due to, for example uncertain future demand and supply 
conditions in the labour market) in a two-period model with exogenously 
determined labour supply. They estimate the optimal level of investment 
for schooling by maximizing current utility which composed the current 
and future consumption. They show that an increase in uncertainty about 
the return to human capital investment decreases the level of investment 
under plausible assumptions about risk preferences and the risk-return 
technology. 
Williams (1979) estimates the uncertainty from four separate sources: 
uncertain productivity of education, stochastic depreciation of existing 
skills, unknown future wages for given skills, and risky returns on 
marketable assets in a continuous times model. He finds given some 
restrictions on personal preferences, the introduction of uncertainty 
produces more complete and more accurate predictions about observable 
variables. With risky returns to education, both time allocated to training 
and labour earnings are on average less peaked over the life cycle, which 
is similar to the results derived by Levhari & Weiss (1974). Williams also 
concludes with the increasing of human capital, dollars allocated to 
consumption and marketable assets are also growing accordingly. In other 
words, human capital accumulation can affect the investment of physical 
capital and consumption. 
However, Kodde (1986) reports the empirical evidence contradicted their 
prediction and indicate that increased earnings uncertainty increases 
human capital investment. Snow & Warren (1990) provide an explanation 
for Kodde's empirical results by extending the Levhari-Weiss model and 
incorporating future labour supply as a choice variable. They argue that 
the marginal rate of return to human capital investment depends not only 
on the amount invested, as in the Levhari-Weiss model, but also on future 
labour supply. As a result, the return to human capital decreases with an 
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increase in future income since the increased income reduces future labour 
supply. 
Despite these contributions of the risky attribute on the return to education, 
not much progress has been made during the past three decades on how to 
examine the implications on education choices of such uncertainty. As 
recently as this year, Hartog & Vijverberg (2006) employ mean-variance 
theory to estimate individuals' optimal education strategy. Their model 
shows that individuals cannot decrease the risk of education choices by 
diversifying their skills. A shift of high school curriculum from being 
specific to more general increases variance for both male and female. If 
individuals cannot diversify their skills, the education choices model does 
not satisfy the basic assumption of the mean-variance theory and it is thus 
invalid to use this theory to analyse educational choices. However, using 
an alternative approach of financial theory to choices under uncertainty is 
a way to figure out a more attractive model for estimating educational 
choices under uncertainty. 
Motivated by this idea, I will use option theory to evaluate the uncertainty 
inherent in human capital investment. The use of option theory to estimate 
education choices under uncertainty was first suggested by Hogan & 
Walker (2005), who constructed a continuous-time stochastic option 
model to estimate the optimal time at which to cease education. Although 
they derived a closed form from the real option model, the solution 
includes a confluent hypergeometric function, which cannot be examined 
by empirical evidence. In order to fill in some of the gaps in the empirical 
evidence on education choices under uncertainty, I use the simple and 
testable form of the Black-Scholes option model. 
From the cell of table 1.1 we can see that not much literature discuss the 
uncertainty factor in the context of education choices and examined by the 
empirical observations. In this thesis, we will discuss drop-out risk and 
other risk including knowledge depreciation, relative position in the wage 
distribution etc. in the context of education choices in chapter 2 and 
examined by empirical evidence in chapter 3. Chapter 4 and chapter 5 will 
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analyze the effect of uncertainted future supply and demand condition to 
individuals' education choices. 
In brief, this thesis addresses the uncertainty problem in educational 
choices and seeks to derive an optimal education investment path for each 
youngster by using the option theory and treating education as a 
consumption good as well as an investment good. As part of utility, 
education can produce current and future consumption value, such as the 
enjoyment of reading a poem. Regarding the investment character, 
individuals are expected to acquire a higher return, which increases with 
the amount invested in education. The investment character of education 
is quite similar to buying a series of call options which provide 
individuals' the right to secure or give up a certain level of qualification 
based on their expected earnings. In order to receive the benefits they have 
to pay the costs of the option, which is equal to the tuition fees, living 
expenses and forgone earnings. Based on this idea, we estimated the value 
of investing in education by using an option model. The estimation results 
suggest both uncertainty and non-pecuniary utility can explain the 
behaviour of school attendance. In addition, uncertainty is more important 
to academic qualification attendees than technical qualification attendees. 
In the second part of the thesis, we investigate the influence of a particular 
uncertainty namely the risk of overeducation, on each individual's 
expected wages and education choices by using the pecking order theory. 
With the world-wide expansion of higher education, more and more 
graduates are being oversupplied to the labour market and employed in 
non-graduate jobs, which is classified as overeducation. Even though a 
great amount of empirical evidence on overeducation has been provided 
for most countries, there is no complete theory to explain the reasons for 
overeducation. We apply the signal theory and assignment models into the 
pecking order theory to explain the possible reasons of overeducation and 
then provide the empirical estimates of key equations of the model b`- 
making use of an extensive survey of Chinese graduates. The regression 
results show unalterable personal characteristics (such as gender, 
registration belongings) and ability proxy, especially university rank affect 
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both getting a graduate level of job and the corresponding wages in the 
same direction. However, some variables (e. g. partymembership, family, 
background, work sector) will play contradict role on getting a graduate 
job and high wages. 
Since we consider the effect of job characteristics to individuals' 
education choices (i. e. assignment effect), the marginal return is no longer 
equal to the average return (i. e. the return to education is not constant, but 
decreasing with the time being). Therefore, the long trend of the supply of 
qualified labour to the market and education policy is quite critical to 
individuals' education choices. In the final part the thesis we research the 
social return to education in order to analyze the future education policy 
and the supply trend of qualified graduates to the market. 
In Brief, five main contributions to the existing literature will be offered in 
the thesis. Firstly, I employ the Black-Scholes option model to estimate 
the optimal schooling under uncertainty and provide empirical estimation 
results. The previous literature on educational choices either examined the 
education choice model under certainty or discussed some limited aspects 
of the theoretical impact of uncertainty on educational choices. To my 
knowledge, this contribution is the first empirical evidence concerning 
British young people's education choices under uncertainty. Secondly, the 
thesis provides a comprehensive description of all the potential variables 
or conditions that may affect individuals' schooling choices, including 
uncertainty, non-pecuniary utility, information set, discount factor, etc. 
and provides empirical evidence on the impact of non-pecuniary utility 
and the discount factor by using the multinomial logit model. Through 
comparing the multinomial logit model with the Black-Scholes model, we 
can find out whether non-pecuniary utility and uncertainty play a role 
in 
individuals' education choices. Thirdly. the thesis develops the signal 
theory and assignment models to provide a comparatively complete reason 
on overeducation. Fourthly, the thesis provides the first empirical study on 
the important emerging problem of Chinese graduates overeducation. The 
empirical regression results expose some interesting 
findings on what may 
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affect an individual's risk of overeducation, the impact of overeducation 
on wages and the relative attractiveness of investing in different levels of 
higher education qualifications. Fifthly, the thesis takes Lucas's (1988) 
endogenous economic growth model as a starting point and then develops 
its human capital increasing rate by considering the physical capital 
investment growth rate. This is accomplished by first investigating the 
socially optimal amount of human capital investment in China. 
The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 analyses educational choices 
under uncertainty by using the Black-Scholes options model and the 
multinomial logit model. Chapter 3 provides the empirical evidence on 
educational choices under uncertainty by using the NCDS data set. 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 discuss the effect of overeducation on 
individuals' education choices based on China's graduates. Chapter 6 
estimates the social return to education and what the socially optimal 
amount of human capital investment is in China in order to provide some 
policy suggestions on individuals' education choices. Chapter 7 concludes 
the thesis. 
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Table 1.1 Risks and uncertainties discussed by current literature 
ABCD 
Drop-out risk 
Card (1999) y 
Hartog et al (1989) yy 
Altonji (1993) yy 
Future supply and demand 
condition (overeducation) 
Levhari & Weiss (1974) 
Battu et al (1999) 
Chevalier (2003) 
Dolton & Vignoles (2000) 
Y --- 
- Y-- 
- Y-- 
- Y 
Other risk including knowledge 
depreciation, relative position in 
the wage distribution etc. 
Levhari & Weiss (1974) Y--- 
-- Kodde(1986) Yy 
Williams (1979) Y--- 
Pereira & Martin (2001) Y 
Harmon et at (2001) ---- 
Snow & Warren (1990) _y-- 
Hartog & vijverberg (2006) -y1,1, 
Hogan & Walker (2005) 
--Y_ 
Note: A represents the literature which discuss the uncertainty factor of the return to 
education from the theoretical model; B represents the literature which examine the 
return to education under uncertainty by empirical observations; C represents the 
literature which discuss the uncertainty factor in the context of education choices 
from theoretical model; D represents the literature which examine the uncertainty 
factor in the context of education choices by empirical observations. 
16 
Chapter 2 Education Choices under Uncertainty 
Chapter 2 Education Choices 
under Uncertainty 
2.1. Introduction 
Education, in terms of human capital, can be viewed as an investment of 
current time and money in return for future expected higher payment 
(Freeman, 1986). Education can also bring the enjoyment of reading a 
poem, awareness of health problem and high standard social behaviour. 
However, Mayston (2002) points out that invest in human capital in the 
form of additional training or further education or other significant 
changes in career direction may involve a large element of sunk cost that 
cannot easily be recovered if wrong decision choices are made. Once a 
career choice has been made, the flexibility of the individual to costlessly 
reverse their initial choice is lost, suggesting every step move in education 
choices should be careful. 
Due to the significant effects of education choices on individuals' career 
development, education or career choices received widespread attention in 
both theoretical and empirical literature. An early educational choice 
model focused on economic and policy aspects of individuals' preferences 
over schooling and work alternatives, exemplified by Kohn et al (1976) 
and Fuller et al (1982). In their papers, students' enrolment decisions 
regarding college are viewed as choices among a discrete set of schooling, 
and nonschooling alternatives. A multinomial logit model expresses the 
probability that a given student will select a given alternatives. The effect 
of tuition fees, scholarship, living expenses, opportunity costs and 
academic performance on students' evaluation of alternative choices was 
calculated properly. Keane &\ 'olpin (1994,1997) systematically analyze 
the individuals' selection process among five alternatives- working as a 
while collar, working as a blue collar, studying, staying at home and 
serving in the military. They employed a structure model described all the 
Chapter 2 Education Choices under Uncertainty 
possible choices and their values in each period and assume individuals 
will choose the one which can maximize the wages utility function. 
Oosterbeek & Ophem (2000) derive a schooling choice equation from a 
Cobb-Douglas utility function that considers individuals' discount rate on 
schooling. They used a maximum likelihood function to estimate the 
factors that may affect individuals' education choices. 
Though the educational choice model has experienced considerable 
progress, most of the literatures on college choices do not consider 
uncertainty: they view the individual as able to choose a future level of 
education with no uncertainty. However, when consider enrolling in any 
type of schooling, the individual faces considerable uncertainties. Firstly, 
the individual cannot assess whether (s)he can complete the education, in 
other words drop-out risks. Secondly, (s)he has imperfect knowledge and 
information of the value of his(her) abilities, the quality of the schooling 
and the trend for future demand and supply conditions, which will affect 
his(her) relative position in the post-education earnings distribution and 
the value of the education. 
For a very long period time, there have been only a few innovative 
contributions to the literature that discuss the uncertain return to human 
capital investment. To my knowledge, Altonji (1993) is the one of the 
very few who models education choices under uncertainty and examines 
how variables, such as family background, tastes for school, ability, sex 
and high school curriculum influence individuals' choices on education 
and ex-ante rate of return, but he leave the task of estimating and test the 
structural model to later researchers. Hartog et al (1989) develop a 
dynamic model and treat schooling choices as a sequence of dichotomous 
decisions. The paper only tackles the reasons and probability for dropping 
out during the sequential study after correcting self-sclection bias. 
However, none of them gives empirical evidence on education choices 
under uncertainty. 
In the most recent years, scholars have sought suitable financial theory to 
examine the uncertainty from two directions. One is portfolio theory (e. g. 
Is 
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Hartog & Vijverberg, 2006). Hartog & Vijvverberg employ mean-variance 
(M-V) theory to estimate individuals' optimal choices by linking the 
curriculum of a school program with a Dictionary of Occupational Titles 
and labour market wages. The empirical evidence in their model shows 
there is an upward sloping M-V frontier between variances and expected 
wages. Their model shows individuals cannot decrease the risk of 
education choices by diversifying their skills. A shift of the high school 
curriculum from a specific to more general one increases variance for both 
male and female. Their empirical results and the nature of human capital 
determine the restriction of their estimation methods, since it is almost 
impossible to diversify the human capital once they entered the labour 
market. The other direction is option theory (e. g. Hogan & Walker, 2005). 
A continuous-time stochastic model was used in their model to estimate 
the optimal time to cease education. Once individuals decide to exercise 
the option, they cannot return to school at a later date. For a number of 
reasons this approach seems to be less convincing. Firstly, they borrow 
the results of Dixit & Pindyk (1994), which include complicated forms 
and hypergeometric functions and it is hard to interpret the exact affecting 
power and relationships. Secondly, their model does not allow individuals 
to re-enter the school, which is too restrictive, especially for higher 
education. In our NCDS data set, more than 20 per cent of individuals 
receive further formal education after they entered the labour market. 
In this chapter, I will also use real option model to evaluate individuals' 
education choices. In contrast to Hogan & Walker (2005), I treat 
individuals investing in education as buying a series of European call 
options, each of which will be exercised in the following working years. 
The value of the option is the expected excess return by investing more on 
education, which can also be extended as the excess utility from investing 
more on education. Individuals will invest in education if and only if the 
costs of education (option costs) are smaller than the value of the option. 
Individuals will exercise the option (i. e. secure a level of qualification) if 
the wage differential is large than the exercise price. 
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In brief, three major contributions to the existing education choices model 
will be advanced. Firstly, our evaluation is based on ex-ante wages, 
instead of ex-post wages (such as considered in Keane & \Volpin. 1997). 
In addition, our estimation is not based on the return to each year as in 
Altonji (1993), but qualification level and adjusted by the probability of 
dropping out. Following the Webbink & Hartog (2004) empirical work 
that graduates can predict their wages, we model the ex-ante return by all 
the potential affecting variables (e. g. individuals' secondary school 
curriculum, academic attitude, IQ, family background). 
Secondly, this is the first empirical testable option model to analyze the 
education choices under uncertainty. Through researching the nature of 
education investment, I have designed the Black-Scholes (B-S) models to 
analyze the net payoff from investing more in education. The model not 
only overcomes the untestable characters of uncertainty brought forward 
by Levhari & Weiss (1974), but develops the estimation method of Hogan 
& Walker (2005), namely our model allows individuals' to make 
education choices at each separate stage. 
Thirdly, this chapter brings a comprehensive description of all the 
potential variables or conditions that may affect individuals' schooling 
choices including uncertainty, discount factor, non-pecuniary utility, 
information set, etc. and compare the education choices under certainty 
and under uncertainty. Through comparison I can highlight the importance 
of uncertainty, discount factor or non-pecuniary to individuals' education 
choices. Within my understanding, it is the first attempt to contrast the 
types of education choices. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the 
basic education choices model and related factors on education decisions. 
In section 3, we analyze the uncertainty involved in educational choices 
and develop a B-S education choices model. Section 4 discusses the 
limitations and the connection to econometric models. 
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2.2. Basic Educational Choices Model 
2.2.1 Four possible educational choice 
We construct a basic educational choice model under certainty to describe 
individuals' possible decision choices at each stage in the context of four 
alternative choices. These choices are working, studying in academic 
college, studying in technical college and staying at home. 
A basic structural framework can be used to analyse the present value of 
the rewards which individual i expects to receive from their life-tine 
earnings as a result of their making the choice k, where these rewards are 
assessed in terms of their associated expected utility: 
T 
E[ý (I +9' (U(Yk! )) I I(01 
ý-r 
(2. t) 
where 9; is the individual's discount factor. U(Y; kj) means individual i's 
utility in period 1 depending on the available net income Y; ki at time 1 as a 
result of making the education choice k. The four alternative choices will 
be assumed to be working currently in the labour market, studying in 
academic qualification, studying in technical qualification and staying at 
home, with the values of k=1,2,3 and 4 respectively. I(t) is the 
information set available to the individual at time t, which consists of all 
factors, known to the individual, that affects current utility or the 
probability distribution of any of the future utility. 
The individual's decision process can be described as follows: given their 
information set I(t) at time t, the individual considers each of the four 
alternative choices and uses them to calculate the projected future current 
rewards and thus the four alternative specific value functions, and chooses 
the alternative that yields the highest present value of their utility. In order 
to solve this question, we need to work backwards to evaluate the reward 
of each choice in the last period T, T-I,... and then select the best choice 
at present t. 
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choice 1: working (k=1) 
If individual i chooses to work directly after compulsory education, at 
time t+l (the period after compulsory education) he will get: 
h1 
k(, +1) - 
ak +f kX i+s (2.2) 
where In Y+, is the log of net wages for the choice of working. X; is 
individuals' personal character including schooling, work experience, sex, 
race, marital status, union membership, region etc. E, is the disturbance 
term for choice 1, which may also affect individuals' wages, but is 
assumed to be independent of X;. In the later part of this chapter, we will 
mainly discuss the nature of E and how to estimate it. 
Choice 2 and 3: continue study (k=2,3) 
If the individual plans to continue study in the next period, he may get a 
higher return in the later working period after t1 period's study, given by: 
In Yk(r+ri) 
- ak + /_'k 
Xi + Ei23 (2.3) 
The disturbance term C; 23 in equation (2.3) will have a high variance than 
e, in equation (2.1), which will be discussed in detail in the next section. 
However, before graduation, whilst studying they will bear the costs of 
tuition fees (W). If SC denotes the scholarship that talented students might 
obtained, the net income (Y) in the period of continue study can 
be 
expressed as: 
; k(1+1) _ (SC; 
(t<T-1)(k=2,3) 
(2.4) 
k=2 means academic college was chosen in period t and 
k=3 moans a 
technical college was selected. Scholarship, tuition 
fee and living 
expenses may be related with academic quality, 
individuals' ability and 
family background. Good college or university will charge more 
for 
12 
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tuition, but can be counteracted by excellent academic performance 
through scholarship. The same amount of tuition fee and living expenses 
to students coming from various family backgrounds may be significantly 
different. 
choice 4: home production(k=4) 
The per period reward function for staying at home is given by: 
xk Yik(i+1) _- `ýt+l + ei (2.5) 
where 4 is the income-equivalent value of staying at home. One can 
explain it as resulting from more leisure time at home and/or the 
household cost-saving in not having to hire a baby-sitter, cleaner, cook or 
gardener. Individuals will tend to select this option only if the opportunity 
cost of leisure is low, when women give birth to a child or when the 
economic value of staying at home production, such as from avoiding 
high child nursery fees, is almost equal to the wage from working outside. 
ý, 
+, was generally represented 
in our empirical studies by the basic wage 
of those who underwent only compulsory education. 
2.2.2 Ex-ante return to education 
A key factor in the analysis of educational choices under uncertainty is 
whether ex-post or ex-ante returns to education should be considered. 
Previous studies have mainly analysed the ex-post returns to education 
choices. Though heterogeneity within individuals and consequently within 
their returns has been emphasized in economic research for several 
decades now', not much knowledge, and especially empirical evidence, is 
known on ex-ante return to education. Knowledge of the ex-ante risk of 
educational investment requires a comparison of lifetime earnings under 
the alternative of not undertaking the educational investment with the 
expected lifetime earnings from all potential exits once the 
individual has 
made the educational investment. Since this 
information is almost 
I one of the earliest contributions being Willis and 
Rosen(1979) 
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impossible to acquire objectively, individuals have to make the decision 
based on their subjective estimation of their own characteristics and 
current labour market information. 
Nevertheless if we can estimate the distribution of the disturbance term in 
equation (2.3), and the associated coefficients on their personal 
characteristics, including their educational qualifications, it will provide 
guidance on how individuals might make optimal education decisions 
under uncertainty, albeit by making the best use one can of the 
information contained in the ex-post returns on possible education choices. 
We will consider here first in particular the uncertainty that is associated 
with the drop-out risk from the chosen educational programme, as 
dependent upon individual personal characteristics, institutional 
differences and other residual uncertainty. 
Following the basic human capital principle, we revise the Mincerian log 
linear equation by controlling the education level instead of schooling, 
since the unequalled return to each year of schooling. 2 The ex-ante wages 
is given by equation (2.2) if individuals select choice 1 directly after 
compulsory education. However if individual i choose choice 2 or 3 at any 
time between t (the time just finishes secondary education) and T (end of 
lifetime), he has the risk of dropping-out during education. As showed in 
the previous footnote, the gap between graduate wages and the drop-out 
wages is not trivial, so that we need to refine Y,. k(l+1) in equation (2.3) as 
Y,,, (, +º) 
in equation (2.6) if individuals choose choice 2 after compulsory 
education in order to consider the drop-out risk. The expected wages in 
period t+1 considering the drop-out risk can be expressed as: 
ELYm(r+>)11(t)1= Pm, LYm(, +ºD 
11(t)] + (1- Pm(1+>))LYim(r+I)jI (t)] (2.6) 
Weisbrod(1962) pointed out the return to school is not linear, such as the reward to the first y car 
of college is not the earnings differential between individuals with 12 and 13 y ears of schooling 
and the reward to graduate and dropout cannot be explained by one year of schooling differential as 
well. 
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where pm is the probability to graduate from qualification m. Y;, n(, _, ) , 
Y,. 
m(, +, ) and 
Y, (,,, ) denote wages, graduate wages and drop-out wages at 
time t+1 for qualification m conditional available information at time t, 
respectively and assume Ym<<+, > > Y, mU (t+, ) 
Altonji (1993) estimates the graduation probability through maximizing 
individuals' earnings, that is to say, agents will drop out from current 
education as long as further education cannot bring extra income. Hartog 
et al (1989) explain the two interactive forces behind the drop-out 
decisions: a push effect and a pull effect. The push effect emphasizes that 
the individuals cannot meet the requirement of certain qualification due to 
incompetent or lack of motivation. The pull effect explains the individuals 
are drawn our of school as they discover that the labour market offers 
them more favourable returns with a shorter education than initially 
expected. B-S model will take into account the pull effect and thus we 
only consider the push effect in our graduation probability model. Duncan 
et al (2003) also states that the push effect alone cannot explain the 
empirical observations, there are other reasons may prevent the 
explanative power of theoretic model, e. g., financial constraints, 
uncertainty, psychological reasons3, which from another angel show the 
reasonability of our model. 
The above analysis yields the graduation probability for qualification m4 
as: 
Pig ,= Pln, 
A. + Pirrýl' + PýmD. +K (2.7) 
Individuals' abilities A; shows each student's current and potential skills 
and talents in a wide range of aspects, such as ability with computers, 
ability with words, and being athletic, artistic, musical, patient, 
responsible. P; represents individual i's family background, which plays an 
' pupils may have insufficient human capital and ability at the enrolment time to college or 
university. But in order to satisfy amour-propre or peer pressure, they may choose to attend college 
or university. 
4 
: Assume qualification m is higher than compulsory education 
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important role in student i's financial condition. D; is self-effort, which 
expresses subjective intention or interests on study. The last term K is the 
constant term, which captures the unobservable factors. Johnes & 
McNabb (2004) estimate a similar equation as (2.7), but involve 
comprehensive variables, such as peer effect, institution effect, and 
subject effect. They confirm the importance of family background on 
individual's drop-out rate, but derive different effect of ability for 
equation (2.7). They found ability can play a positive as well as negative 
role on the probability to drop-out. No matter whether individuals' ability 
is above or below the average ability, it will affect the drop-out probability 
negatively. We will examine this equation in chapter 3. 
Even if we estimate the graduation probability, there is another 
unpredicted risk involved in deriving the distribution of ex-ante returns, 
namely the economic risk between the period of decision making and the 
time to enter the labour market, which include the uncertain nature of 
demand and supply for a particular field of graduates, uncertain 
technological innovation, uncertain economic climate and uncertain 
education and economic policy. Uncertainties of this kind are to some 
extent also faced by stock or other financial assets, which inspires us to 
use financial models to estimate the ex-ante return under uncertainty. 
2.2.3 Utility of Income and Consumption value (egns (2.8)- 
(2.10) were developed by Prof. D. J. Mayston) 
In order to pursue our analysis of individual education choice under 
uncertainty, we can incorporate a degree of risk aversion for individual i 
by making use of the utility of income function: 
U(Yk(t+1)) - Yk(+1)10 - P) (2.8) 
where p(<, > 1) is the individual's coefficient of relative risk aversion. If 
? ik(1+1) is 
lognormally distributed, we may show from Aitchison & Brown 
(1963), that 
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E(U(Ykýtý )) = exp((1- P)'ik(! +l)) exp(O. 
5(1- P)2 U2 ik(r+ti) ) /(1- P) (2.9) 
where Vik(, +I) 
E(ln Y, k(, +1)) and ýkýý+, ý var(ln Yk(, +1)) (2.10) 
Equation (2.9) still, however, has income as the only determinant of the 
individual's utility, which may not provide a good fit to real life. To 
attempt to better describe the reality, we will extend the utility function by 
including non-pecuniary benefits and write the overall return in the next 
period as: 
Vik(r+1) = E(U(Y, k(r+1))L. f (m)]z; (2.11) 
f, (m) is a non-pecuniary benefits function which increases with the 
qualification m and can also be interpreted as the consumption value of 
schooling and relates both to the present consumption (e. g. the pleasure of 
attending school) and to future consumption (for instance enjoying 
reading poems). Present consumption value includes the enjoyment of 
study as well as effort costs. The future consumption value includes 
improving the quality of life, personal reputation, job security and so on. 
Mayston (2002) lists 18 variables that may affect a person's quality of life 
or job satisfaction including the mental stress or pleasure experienced 
during the travel, interest involved in the work tasks, time spend with 
children, working conditions, etc., implying non-pecuniary benefits may 
affect individuals to make their decisions on education. 
Xi is each individual i's subjective weighting on the consumption value of 
education or their "tastes for schooling", which depends on information 
set available at time t. People from a good family background with high 
academic ability generally attach a high value to x; , 
increasing their 
probability to attend college and university. Individuals with low 
academic ability or from a poor family background can experience a very 
high effort costs and are reluctant to attend extra schooling. Assume 
school preference x; is a linear relationship of self interest on study, 
family background and ability. It yields 
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x; = u. (Ei +P,. +A. )=ft, E. +p2I +1u3Ar (2.12) 
There is a dichotomous relationship between f, (m) and U(Y). On the one 
hand, with increasing wages, people can spend more money on health care 
or mental and physical relaxation, thereby increasing in a multiplicative 
way the utility f (m) that they obtain in (2.11) from the education they 
obtain from higher qualifications. However, this tendency may be 
mitigated to some extent by the greater pressure, energy and time 
consuming nature of the work that may be associated with earning the 
higher wages. 
After considering the non-pecuniary utility function and four possible 
alternative choices, the present life-time utility function can be revised as: 
T 
V, k = (1+B; )-rE(U(}; k(, +I))[. 
(m)]X 
r=r 
(k =1,2,3,4) 
(2.13) 
where their expected utility of income depends on the choices k in each 
stage. Individuals are expected to choose the optimal k at each period to 
maximize V in equation (2.13). In the next section, we will analyze how 
to solve this problem. 
2.3 Deriving the Optimal Education Choices 
Under the basic model, we assume the labour market is an efficient market. 
As defined by Fama in 1965 for financial markets, this involves large 
numbers of rational, utility-maximizers actively competing, with each 
trying to predict future market values of individual securities, and where 
important current information is almost freely available to all participants. 
In an efficient market, competition among the many intelligent 
participants leads to a situation where, at any point in time, actual prices 
of individual securities already reflect the effects of information based 
both on events that have already occurred and on events which, as of now, 
the market expects to take place in the future. 
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Now we apply this concept to the labour market. Each individual in the 
labour market is a rational expected utility-maximizer that they consider 
their current consumption as well as their life-long benefits conditional on 
their information set. Market wages reflect all the available information, 
such as labour supply and demand for this job, firms' financial situation, 
required skills and so on. Complete information set (e. g. available jobs, 
wages) is access to everyone and there is no ethnic and sex discrimination. 
Individuals with the same qualifications and skills will get the same 
rewards. 
In order to simplify the complicated alternative choices, I draw an easy-to- 
understand visual graph (see Figure 2.1) to show all the choices, 
probabilities and consequences in an education choices decision tree. The 
decision tree provides a highly effective structure within which you can 
lay out options and investigate the possible outcomes of choosing those 
options. They also help you to form a balanced picture of the risks and 
rewards associated with each possible course of action. 
From Figure 2.1, we can work out the decision process clearly. 
Individuals normally finish compulsory education at age 165 (time t) and 
confront four potential choices 1,2,3, and 4. To make an optimal choice 
in period t+l, a rational investor should estimate the rewards in period T 
conditional on the information set I(t) and the choices in each previous 
period for each possible education choice set and select the one that can 
maximize individuals' benefits. The decision choice for period t+2 is 
similar to period t+1, which require agents to calculate the expected return 
in time T conditional on the information set I(t+l), k and select the best 
one. 
2.3.1 Factors affecting educational choices 
Within the decision tree in Figure 2.1, there are two factors which we will 
examine first which play a role in educational decisions. These are the 
` Assuming that the minimum school leaving age is 16 and all the individuals finish the 
compulsory education 
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information set, I(t), that is available to the individual decision maker at 
time t and their discount factor on future levels of expected income. I will 
examine these two factors here in a more detail. 
2.3.1.1 The information set 
In this section, I will show how the limited information set, I(t), that is 
available to the individual decision-maker at a given time t affects their 
educational decisions. We will assume in particular that the information 
set will influence the individual's subjective estimate, gkml(t), of their 
probability of graduation with qualification m if they opt to study for this 
qualification in a college of type k =2,3. The subjective probabilities of 
the two states of the world, of graduating with this qualification or failing 
to graduate after studying for it, can then be represented by [g; k,,, <(<), (1- 
gikml(t))]. If we assume the financial returns to individual i at time 1 from 
these two states of the world are Y; klm and Y, khmO respectively if they study 
for qualification m in a college of type k=2,3. and the non-pecuniary 
benefits are f, (m) and flo (m) respectively, the subjective expected 
utility that the individual expects to receive from opting to study for 
qualification m is given by: 
V,., (m, k, I (t )) 
T 
(1 + 9; )-r {g; 4,,,, r(()EU(Y4,1, n 
)[J' (m)]X' + (1- g1/,, J(1) 
)EU(Y ik/mO )[f 
o 
(m)]X' } 
r=, 
(2.14) 
Given the information set, 1(t), the individual will then choose the 
qualification m they want to study, and the college type k=2,3 at which 
they wish to study, in order to achieve: 
(1(t))=maxV,., (m, k, I(t)) V, it 
inA 
(2.15) 
with associated educational decisions by individual i of mi(l(t)) and ki(l(t)) 
that are clearly contingent upon the information set I(t) that is available to 
the individual at time t. 
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If the information set I(t) which they have available to them at time t is 
imperfect, their subjective probabilities gikml(t) of graduation may differ 
from their true underlying probabilities g; krn. Their expected utility, using 
these true underlying probabilities, that is expected to result from the 
educational choices they have made on the basis of the imperfect 
information set I(t), may then fall short of (2.15), such as through their 
overestimating their true probability of graduating. We may then have: 
T 
Vit (m, k) 
_ 
LO rf 
gikmEU(Ykrm )fl (m) 1, + (1 - gikm 
)EU(Y. 
krmo 
)[f 
lo 
(m)]} 
r=r 
T 
Vi! (I(t)) = 'Yi 
i 
lgrkm/(I)EU(Yik/m 
)J 
1 
(M)Xi + (1 gikm/(1))EU(Yiklm0 )IJ 10 
(m)I X! 
=l 
(2.16) 
for m=m; (I(t)) and k= ki(l(t)), and where Oi -1 + B; . The 
individual may 
then regret making these educational choices and would may have made 
different educational choices, m; ( £2) and k1(. (2 ), if they had had this 
more perfect information set fl, namely those which are the solutions to 
the optimisation: 
V;, = max V., (m, k) m, k 
(2.17) 
Improving the information set, I(t), that is available to the individual in 
making their educational choices will then have a positive benefit of the 
increase it achieves in 
Vj(m' k) for m=m; (I(t)) and k= ki(l(t)), up until 
the point where this information set is perfect and 
(m' k) =V However, 
if the improvements in the information set are costly to a secure, these 
positive benefits must be weighed against the costs of improving the 
information set, with an optimum occuring where the marginal benefits 
are equal to the marginal costs (see Mayston, 2002). 
2.3.1.2 Discount factor 
We have already incorporated risk aversion into our analysis of education 
choice under uncertainty through the coefficient of relative risk aversion 
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pin equations (2.8) and (2.9). Constancy of the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion across individuals itself implies that absolute risk aversion 
declines with income (see Pratt, 1964), as one might expect intuitively. 
The discount factor B; in (2.1) reflects the individual's subjective rate of 
time preference, that also affects their educational choices. Thaler (1999) 
suggests that individuals from higher-income families will have a higher 
propensity to save because their discount rate will be smaller than the 
people from poor family background. In addition, more affluent families 
may have more ability to borrow money at a lower rate of interest, as well 
as more accumulated savings of their own, than poorer families. In this 
thesis, I follow Willis and Rosen (1979) and Oosterbeek and Ophem 
(2000) by assuming that the discount rate 0; associated with the subjective 
rate of time preference depends upon their social background 
characteristics tu; and a parameter vector b, ; hence 
9; = -b, r; (2.18) 
The coefficients b, and the taste for schooling parameter x; can be 
estimated from a multinomial logit model of how individuals select a 
particular regime, as discussed below. 
2.3.2 Multinomial logit model (eqns (2.20)-(2.24) were 
developed by Prof. D. J. Mayston) 
The solution of the optimization problem (2.15) can involve considerable 
complexity of computation. Many scholars discussed various ways to 
solve this type of problem6. Here, for the sake of simplicity, I assume the 
unobservables el' are conditionally serially independent. If choice m is 
chosen in time t, the present Value should follows, 
" Sec Miller (1984), Pak-es (1986), Keane fi «'olpin (1994) 
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Pr[V (t)II (t)] = Pr[Y7,, 1 + 
BE max(V(t + 1)II (t))] m 
>_ Pr[Yk, + BE max(V(t + 1)II (t))] = Pr[ Vk (t) I (t)] (2.19) 
m k, k =1,2,3,4 
Equation (2.19) is derived from Figure 2.1 and also explains the selection 
process. Choice m is chosen in period t if and only if its reward in period t 
plus the highest utility in period t+1 is the highest among the four choices. 
The selection is an iterative process and we employ the same rule to select 
j in period t+1, t+2, ..., T. The solution of equation (2.19) involves 
massive mathematics calculation. In this thesis, I only consider four 
choices (academic college, academic degree, technical college and 
technical degree), which changes the dynamic model of Keane and 
Wolpine into a comparative static model' so that individuals only need to 
consider a limited steps. In the empirical estimation, I then simplify the 
comparative selection process of Figure 2.3 into a static model of 
individuals' optimal highest qualification, that is to say individuals should 
stop at which level, academic college, technical college, academic 
university or technical university? Please refer to Figure 2.4 for the logic 
of the estimating process. 
This problem can be solved more directly by a conditional logit model. 
McFadden (1974) estimates the probability that a specific choice m is 
selected at time t, if and only if its return is conditional on the information 
set at t is higher than any other possible choices. We can also derive the 
conditional logit model more directly from our above analysis of 
education choices under uncertainty by considering the continuous time 
version of equations (2.1) - (2.14), where we replace the discounting term 
(1+ B; )-' in (2.1) - (2.14) by its continuous analogue e-B'` , together with 
the simplifying case where t=0 and T goes to infinity, and assume a 
constant rate of growth rp; is individual i's expected earnings in each time 
period, such that: 
K kr = ýVrýo +cprl and Q, kJ = or 
2o (2.20) 
7 See Figure 2.3 for detail. 
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Equation (2.13) using (2.9) and (2.10) then becomes: 
30 
Vk= JE(U(k, ))f (k) e-e"dt = 
JE(U(}ký ))f (k)X' eccº-P>ý, -e ýýdl 
t=o io 
= E(U(Yk0 ))f (k)z' /(Br - (1 - p)9, ) (2.21) 
The multinomial logit model may be derived from our above analysis if 
we assume that across different individuals i (2.21) is subject to a 
proportionate stochastic term S; k in addition to the systematic influences 
on Vk , such that they determine their education choices by seeking to 
maximise: 
1k Sikk (2.23) 
If each In S; k is independently and identically distributed according to a 
type 1 extreme value distribution in standard form, it follows from J. S. 
Cramer, An Introduction to the Logit Model for Economists, Edward 
Arnold, 1991, p. 51, that the probability of individual i selecting choice k 
is given by: 
Pr[k; = mll (t)] = 
exp(ln V,,,, ) 
4 
1 exp(ln V, k ) k=1 
(2.24) 
2.4. Real option model 
In order to create and sustain a superior economic performance for 
individuals in a competitive society, attending postsecondary education 
may well be one of the best choices for agents. Palacios-Huerta (2003) 
shows that university education has the highest return, modest variance 
and superior liquid investment. According to British government's White 
Paper (2003), those who have been through higher education in the UK 
earn on average 50% more than those who have not. A recent report (2002) 
addresses that people with a higher education qualification are less likely 
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to be unemployed. In addition, as analyzed in previous section, schooling 
can increase individuals' future consumption value and quality of life. 
Nevertheless, a number of academically talented young people do not 
attend a post-secondary institution. 8 
Some economists analyze that financial constraints or parental education 
may prevent students attending university. Kane (1994) and Ellwood & 
Kane (2000) report that the reluctance to attend college mainly results 
from borrowing constraints. Acemoglu & Pischke (2001) suggest that 
family income has a significant effect on college enrolments. Others9 
argue that parental education has an important impact on schooling choice. 
As we have argued above, investment in human capital may be affected 
by differences in time preference rates due to differences in parental 
income, particularly if capital markets are imperfect and individual 
families face borrowing constraints which prevent them from equating 
their marginal time preference rates to a common market rate of interest. 
However, another key factor which may deter individuals from investing 
in human capital is the existence of uncertainty in the income they may 
receive from different educational qualifications, with risk aversion to 
such income variations varying with parental income in the way we have 
discussed above. As Williams (1979) notes, differences in educational 
attainment between individuals due to differences in financial wealth are 
commonly attributed to the uncertainty in the likely returns on educational 
investment. 
Chen (2003) argues that the main reason discouraging high school 
graduate from investing in higher education is that wage volatility 
significantly increases by pursuing a four-year university degree compare 
to a two-year college qualification. Altonji (1993) finds that the fear of not 
finishing the degree requirements is discouraging students from attending 
college. These theoretical and empirical articles demonstrate that 
Chen(2003) provides statistic data from NLSY that high school graduates between the ages of 
32 
and 40 in 1997 with a scholastic ability test score in the top quartile, around 
16 percent did not 
attend college. 
9 Sec Cameron and Heckman(2001), Cameron and Taber(2000), Keane and «Volpin(2001) 
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uncertainty can explain a significant part of the reasons for education 
choices. 
Primary and secondary education is compulsory in all the developed 
countries and most of the developing countries. During this period, people 
will learn the basic common knowledge and skills, which are called 
generalized education and all these knowledge and skills are transferable 
and can almost be used in every field. However, people with only primary 
and secondary education are relatively disadvantaged in processing new 
information and adjusting to technological change that demands higher 
skills, so that they may confront higher unemployment risks. However, 
the uncertainty facing more highly educated people is dichotomous. On 
the one hand, people will learn more non-transferable skills and spend 
more time on it that, as Mayston (2002) has argued, becomes a sunk cost, 
exposing them to larger risks of technological shock and the obsolescence 
of these more specific skills; on the other hand, educated individuals have 
a comparatively high analytical and solving problem ability leading to a 
low unemployment probability. In addition, more educated workers are 
able to perform a wider range of tasks and are generally easier to be 
trained in new skills than less educated workers. 
As the decision tree in Figure 2.2 emphasises, educational investment is a 
sequential choice process and the extent of the above two dichotomous 
aspects is unequal at different levels of education. In this choice process, 
we may identify three main sources of risk that may affect their academic 
choices. 
Firstly, individuals may have imperfect information about their own 
abilities to absorb, understand and apply the education they receive that 
affect their drop-out risk. Due to the existence of the "sheep effect" under 
which wages are linked to qualifications obtained rather than education 
received, individuals may not get a corresponding return of the investment 
they have made before they drop out, but still have to bear the costs of 
tuition fees and forgone earnings. 
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Secondly, individuals may not have enough information about their 
abilities relative to those of their peers' abilities. and hence about their 
relative and absolute position in the distribution of post-education 
earnings. Since the range of ability within the same education level 
increases after higher education expansion 10, the distribution of wages for 
the same qualification becomes wider and wider. Candidates are more 
concerned about the personalized expected return before making 
education decisions, suggesting that we should focus on the ex-ante 
distribution of future wages after graduation rather than the ex-post return 
as the key factor to educational choices. Despite the importance of ex-ante 
returns to educational choices, its nature and the empirical estimation are 
much less developed than that for ex-post returns. 
The third source of risk individuals may confront comes from market risks, 
technological innovations and the risks of knowledge depreciation that 
may affect their future earnings from any given educational qualification. 
Due to the high speed of technology innovation, what students learned in 
school may not be used in the future careers resulting structure 
unemployment. A good example of this uncertainty is semiconductors. 
With the invention of computer and other communication technology, 
semiconductor can be used in a more and more broad way. However, 
many students in the semiconductor specialty may still learn the outdated 
knowledge of applying it to a radio resulting them hard to find satisfied 
jobs. 
2.4.1 Real option model 
Our multinomial logit model on optimal educational choice that is 
outlined in Figure 2.4 considers drop-out risk and risk aversion that 
depend upon parental income, but not market risk. However, as we noted 
above, market risk, and especially wages volatility, may be critical to 
individuals' educational choice. We therefore utilise another educational 
choice model to consider such kinds of risks. Investing in education is 
10 Higher education \\ as expanded in the world Iev eI. Higher education attendees are significantly 
increased no matter in the developing country or developed country. 
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similar to buy a call option, which gives them the right to make use of the 
qualification later in the labour market if it is beneficial for them to do so. 
Rational individuals will invest in education if the net payoff from 
investing in a certain level of education is larger than not investing in this 
level of education. The optimal choice can be expressed as: 
max[EY, e c Yo ý i(1+1) I (2.25) 
where C represents the option costs including forgone earnings, tuition 
fees and living expenses. EY , +1) and are the expected earnings of 
investing and not investing in a certain level of qualification for individual 
i in period t+l, respectively. Since expected wages Y follows a lognormal 
distribution, which has been demonstrated by Mincer (1974), allows us to 
assume the increment of wages follows a stochastic process": 
dY=y,. Yim dt + UYim dz (2.26) 
Equation (2.26) is also called Geometric Brownian Motion process with 
drift. y; in equation (2.26) is the expected growth rate of 1' for individual i, 
which determined by economy-wide factor. 6 is the disturbance or 
uncertainty variable affected by macroeconomic variables. dz is a Wiener 
process. 
Let R(Ym) = EY,. m -C. According to equation (2.26) and the Bellman 
equation, maximizing S2 in equation (2.25) is equivalent to 
OR(Y,. m )dt = E(dR; ) (2.27) 
Someone may argue that the growth rate of logarithm wages do not follow a stochastic process, 
which depends on ability and other personal characters. Yes, this assumption of stochastic process 
is very strict for wages equation. However, in reality there are very few variables follow the GMB 
process, which requires Markov property, independent increments and changes that are normally 
distributed. Even the most liquidity product stock cannot satisfy the last condition (see Dixit and 
Pindyck, 1993). Evaluate an education investment opportunity is quite similar to assess an 
investment opportunity for a real business, that both of them are lack of liquidity and cannot be 
easily sold. When an investment opportunity for a company was estimated, the value of the 
company was always assumed to follow a GMB process. Whereas, the value of the company may 
also be affected by CEO performance, the product of this company, the prospect of this industry etc, 
not a purely stochastic process. This simple stochastic assumption allows us to put more effort on 
the nature of the uncertainty and avoid the difficult mathematic problems. 
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Equation (2.27) says the value of option's change rate equals to the 
expected return from investing a very short period of schooling. Expand 
dR; using Ito's Lemma, and we get 
dR; = R' (Y,. )dY,. +1 R"(Y. )(dY. ) 2 
(2.28) 
Substituting equation (2.26) for dY into this expression yields (note 
E(dz)=0), 
E(dR; ) = yYiR' (Y, )dY,,. +1 6ý (Y, )2 R"(Y,. )dY,. (2.29) 2 
Equation (2.29) now becomes12 
yY, 1R'(Y1)+ 21 62(y)2R"(Y,. 
)=OR; (2.30) 
In order to solve equation (2.30) or distinguish the wages equation from 
other security, we need to specify two boundary conditions and an initial 
condition. 
The boundary condition can be obtained by the nature of human capital 
investment. If no investment happened, the net payoff will be zero, which 
is denoted by 
R(Yio)=0 (2.31) 
If one's ability is beyond average, the optimal value of education 
investment equals 
(1-t) yo 
(, +, ))dl -C 
(2.32) 
and R(}; ) in equation (2.32) must be larger than zero. Finally the smooth 
pasting condition'3 to ensure R(}', ) wvcrc continuous and smooth at critical 
value Y, which follows, 
12 Equation (1.21) can also be derived by contingent claim analysis, sec Merton (1971) for detail. 
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R (Y,. )=e (Y, c(+º) - (2.3 3) 
One could solve equation (2.33) under three boundary conditions by the 
standard methods of Fourier transforms or separation of variables, but this 
would involve massive mathematics calculation. I plan to use the solution 
derived by Black-Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973) to evaluate the 
options. The B-S model is expressed in a simple testable way, but 
imposing strong assumptions. One of the most important assumptions is 
that the option must be exercised in a fixed date. But individuals' life-time 
earnings will benefit from educational investment, not on a certain 
exercise date as assumed by B-S model. Considering these facts, I set up a 
series of European call option model. Presume investing on education as 
buying a series of call options, which can be exercised in a sequential 
number of years to secure agents' earnings are larger than a certain level 
( Ye 
,. (m_I) 
) on each year. For example, agents investing on bachelor 
education were treated as buying 44 shares of European call options and 
each of which will be exercised in the following each year after 
graduation. The numbers of options assumed to be bought were calculated 
by the age of retirement (65 in UK) minus the age of graduation from 
higher education (average 21 in UK). 
Another assumption in B-S model is the fixed exercise price. Since wages 
were assumed to follow a GMB stochastic process, we have to adjust the 
wages differential instead of wages as the underlying assets of B-S option. 
To the same individual i, his wages growth rate for qualification m and 
qualification m-1 will be very similar, since the ability and economic 
environment are the same. Therefore the wage differential method is a 
good way to solve the fixed exercise price. The exercise price in the B-S 
equation cannot be zero and we will use a very low price L (e. g. I pound) 
to proxy exercise price. Based on the analysis above, the option price 
1' Smooth pasting condition is a ven strong assumption for education investment. In order to use 
standard Black- Scholes model I ha\c to assume the return to schooling is the same across years 
and do not consider the sheepskin effect. 
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R(Ymr) in B-S equation can be written as an expression of education 
choice as, 
N 
R(Ym) _ 
ý, (ye (r+ý) r ý'i(m-1)(! +I))(1 + /Im - r)'N(xý) - 
LN(x2) (2.34) 
l=0 
N(x) =1 
Lexp(_x2)dx 
where 27r 2 and 
x- 
ln[(Ymý, 
+, ý -Y. (m_, )(t+, ))(l+ý and 
a 
- Yam >><<+1))(1 +- r)' L] - orzr 2-x- 6-J7- x- 
1n[(Y, m(, 
+>) 2 v 7- - 
Q 
Am is the average wage growth rate and r is the interest rate. Thus 
1+A,,, -r represents the discounted wage growth rate. L denotes the very 
low exercise price and equals 1 in our empirical studies. c is the standard 
deviation of uncaptured factors that may affect wages, T is the duration 
period of this contract, which is equal to 1 year in our case. 1 corresponds 
to the year of the contract, which takes the value of 1,2, ... , N. 
N equals 
to 44 on the choice of whether to attend university. 
Equation (2.34) explains the option in the context of education choices. 
Namely the investment in an additional qualification to what the 
individual already has involves a bundle of N call options, which give 
individuals the right to work at the wage corresponding to that 
qualification if exercised at the future date. The call option will be 
exercised at the future exercise date iff the wage differential exceeds the 
exercise price. Individuals should compare the benefits of investing in 
qualification m, T(Y,,,,, ) , with the education costs 
(C) before making any 
education decisions. It should be noted that the cost of education should 
be separated into N shares, when one assesses the value of T(Y, m, 
). 
This estimating method overcomes the fixed exercise date limitation of a 
Single European option model and provides much more freedom of 
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education choices. Comparing to Hogan & Walker (2005), this model 
allows individuals make education choices at each separate stage based on 
the available information at that time. In addition, individuals could break 
several years between studies and choose all types of education routes by 
combining both academic and technical. The logic of the option model on 
optimal educational choice was explained in Figure 2.5. 
2.5 Limitations and Connections with Empirical 
Work 
Although this model can satisfy the multi-purpose estimation, it involves 
several very strong and unrealistic assumptions. Firstly, the model 
requires that the distribution of wages growth rate satisfies a drifted 
geometric Brownian motion, while the wages may not follow this process. 
Secondly, B-S model assumes the financial assets can be continuous 
hedged, but it is impossible to be realized for human capital. We have to 
assume individuals' are risk neutral, which is a pretty strong assumption 
for education choices. 
In next chapter, I will use empirical observations to examine the education 
choices model by considering the risks and not considering the risks in 
order to find out which provides a better fit to the empirical data. The 
results will imply whether uncertainty plays an important role in education 
choices. 
To estimate the optimal investment from the real option model, we only 
need to work out Y; n, (, +, ), 
Y,. ý,,, _1)ý1+1ý and 
6. The beginning wages Y, (m_, x$+, ) 
without receiving a further education and expected wages after receiving a 
further education };;,, (, +, ) will 
be evaluated by equation (2.2) and (2.6) 
separately. Volatility 6 can be collected from historic data. 
The evaluation of the multinomial logit model is mainly based on 
individuals' utility function, which is composed by ex-ante wages as well 
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as non-pecuniary return. The later will be represented by family 
background and individuals' interests or willingness on study. 
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Figure 2.1 Education choices decision tree 
Tme T 
E(U I I(t); 
E(U;, l 1(t)) 
E(U., 11(t)) 
E(U., I I(t) 
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Figure 2.2 Decision tree for education investment 
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expected learning subjects WO* 
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the expected learning subjects 
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Technica 
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Student aged 1 Technical schon 
Uncertainty: obsolescence of the 
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or no interest or not good at 
the expected learning skills 
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Figure 2.3 Possible selection process after compulsory 
education 
Compulsory education 
GCSE/O-level/Foundation GNVQ/NVQ 
level I 
work Academic Technical 
college college 
Acoll II TechC II work 1I AFD II TechD II AFD !I work 
11 
AColl GCE `A' level, 
TechC TEC / BEC Certificate or Diploma, ONC/ OND (or 
SNC/SND), Advanced/ Final /Part II or III, Polytechnic 
(or Central Institute) Diploma or Certificate, 
RSA - Stage 3 
AFD University or CNAA First Degree 
TechD HNC/ HND (or SHNC/SHND), TEC / BEC Higher or 
Higher National Certificate or Diploma, Professional 
qualifications, Nursing qualifications 
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Figure 2.4 Modelling optimal educational choices under uncertainty using a multinomial logit model 
C: The expected wage given the 
individual's characteristics if they 
do graduate, using an ex-post 
analysis of the dataset, under the 
assumption that the parameters are 
constant over time 
D: The risk of the individual not 
graduating, given their individual 
characteristics, estimated using 
probit analysis 
G: Taste of schooling was determined by 
individuals' study attitude, parents' weekly 
reading time, parents' attention on their children's 
study and average secondary school score 
B: Expected wage given the 
individual's personal characteristics 
allowing for the risk of not 
graduating 
E: Differential risk aversion and 
time preference as reflected in their 
personal discount rate, as dependent 
on their parental income 
F: The consumption value of 
education, varying with the length 
of education and individuals' taste 
of schooling 
A: optimal educational 
choice under uncertainty 
analyzed using 
multinomial logit analysis 
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Figure 2.5 Modelling optimal educational choices under uncertainty using a real option analysis 
C: Estimation of the expected value 
of the wage differential based on 
the difference of the expected 
wages of each individual if they 
undertake the educational 
investment and if they do not 
undertake the educational 
investment from NCDS data set. 
The variance per unit time for the 
Black-Scholes formula was 
estimated from the mean volatility 
during the working life for each 
qualification from NCDS data set. 
B: Black-Scholes 
option valuation 
formula applied to 
repeated options 
A: Optimal educational 
choice under uncertainty 
analyzed using real 
optional analysis 
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Chapter 3 Empirical Evidence 
on Education Choices under 
Uncertainty 
3.1. Introduction 
We analyzed the education choices model in a great detail in Chapter 2 by 
using two methods, namely B-S option method and multinomial logit 
model. However, we do not yet know whether they are suitable for our 
empirical dataset. This chapter aims to test the two models and ascertain 
which model explains the empirical data better. After comparing the 
educational choices from the series options model and the multinomial 
logit model of education decisions, we can also shed light on the 
following questions: Does market uncertainty play a role in explaining 
education choices? Will non-pecuniary benefits affect individuals' 
schooling choices? and Are current education decisions optimal? 
Alongside answering the above questions, we find quite a few innovative 
empirical findings from our dataset that is composed of six waves of the 
longitudinal dataset National Child Development Survey (NCDS). The 
main contributions of this chapter can be summarized as follows: Firstly, 
it will estimate ex-ante wages, which complements current research on 
British ex-ante wages estimation. William & Gordon (1981)'s innovative 
work shows individuals prediction on their future earnings follows a 
parabola shape. Webbink & Hartog (2004) use real wages observations 
confirms students can predict their future earnings subjectively. These 
empirical findings strengthen our confidence on assessing individuals' ex- 
ante wages objectively through individuals' characteristics. Previous 
empirical evidence on discrete choice structure was mainly based on ex- 
post wages under certainty, which cannot avoid the problem of selection 
bias. They (e. g. Keane & \Volpin, 1997: Oosterbeek & Ophem, 2000) 
attempt to model post-secondary choices conditional on past decisions of 
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students and schools. Our model predicts the ex-ante return conditioning 
on individuals' secondary school curriculum, academic attitude, family 
background as well as graduation probability. The difference test between 
ex-ante and ex-post wages demonstrates that our estimation method is 
quite close to the real value. 
Secondly, this chapter is the first empirical study to examine the optimal 
educational choices under uncertainty. By employing the B-S option 
model, we overcome the untestable attrition of uncertainty in human 
capital investment as advanced by Levhari & Weiss (1974) and Williams 
(1979) and can estimate individuals' optimal education choices under 
uncertainty. NCDS dataset recording of individuals' comprehensive 
personal characteristics and employment information at ages 6,11,23,33 
and 41 satisfies our quite demanding data request. 
Another contribution of the chapter is to estimate sequential education- 
going behaviour in both academic and technical institutions. Dearden et al 
(2002) state the design of education and training in both academic and 
technical qualifications are determined by the relative benefits of each. It 
is meaningful to discuss them separately based on individuals' real 
situations. To my knowledge, it is the first empirical work to tackle this 
problem. Appendix A depicts all possible education paths that individual 
may take to a certain level of qualification. Developing the standard 
multinomial logit model, we can describe various educational paths that 
are depicted by Appendix A under uncertainty. The series of option 
models can also evaluate the separate probability of achieving each 
qualification level. 
Fourthly, the comprehensive information in the NCDS allows us to first 
explore some empirical evidence that has been predicted 
by theoretic 
models a long time ago. The life-time earnings will be 
less for those who 
acquired qualification later in their lives. In addition, those who entered 
tertiary education with several years experience generally come 
from poor 
family background. Since our multinomial logit model also considers 
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individuals' different discount rates, we can also predict the situation with 
several years' break between schooling 
Finally, we manage to estimate the effect of non-pecuniary utility on 
individuals' education choices. This is also the first study to evaluate 
utility by some empirical variables, such as ability, family background and 
individuals' attitudes towards study. Through adding a discount rate and a 
non-pecuniary utility function, we find that the estimation results are 
closer to the reality and effort costs of study do discourage individuals 
from attending education. 
The following part of the chapter is organized as follows: section 2 
describes the data, descriptive statistics and ex-post wages regression. 
Section 3 provides the regression results for ex-ante return. The 
corresponding results from the multinomial logit model and real option 
model will be analyzed in section 4 and section 5, respectively. Section 6 
discusses the limitations of empirical data and further extensions. 
3.2. The Data 
3.2.1 Data description 
We will employ NCDS to assess the micro factors that may affect 
individuals' expected returns. The NCDS data set is a continuing, multi- 
disciplinary UK longitudinal study, which examines 17,000+ babies who 
were born in a particular week in March, 1958. Follow-up surveys of the 
whole cohort were carried out at ages 7,11,16,23,33, and, most recently, 
in 1999 at the age of 41. The study includes the detailed information about 
parental background, secondary school curriculum and ability in early 
waves and about earnings and other employment information in later 
waves, which allows us to assess the behavioural and cognitive 
development of the children as well as labour market behaviour. The 
detailed family background variables include parents' highest 
qualification, socio-economic background and everyday newspaper 
reading time. It also records respondents' examination information, such 
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as the total number of GCSE grade A-C, the math and English score at 
GCSE and A-level. The study even surveys the parents' interest in 
children's education and respondents' willingness to stud`, by means of 
the question of when and why they plan to leave school. Since the 
respondents were born in the same year, it helps us to control the general 
economic environment and cohort effect. All the individuals in the data 
set face the same education policy, the same demand and supply 
conditions in the labour market, the same wage levels, which allows us to 
pay more attention to the effect of uncertainty on wages. In addition, the 
dataset inscribes wage level and qualification level at their 30s and early 
40s, when they entered a stable period and such kinds of data are not easy 
to obtain. 
After connecting the six waves' survey together and deleting the 
observations that did not report all the necessary information, the sample 
size sharply decreases to 581. The variables that will be used in this 
chapter are summarized in Table 3.1. 
Insert Table 3.1 
Table 3.2 describes the respondents' characteristics of ex-post education 
distribution by the father's occupation, education and family culture 
environment when the children are seven years old, secondary school 
curriculum and individuals' monthly ex-post wages at age 41. As 
expected, higher qualifications correspond, on average, to more 
favourable family background and better examination scores in the 
statistic description. However, for the technical degree and technical 
college, family background may not seem to be such an obvious factor. 
Current job earning variables also suit the logic of the assumption that the 
mean increases with the level of increase in education. For the same level 
of education, the wages for academic qualifications are higher than for 
technical qualifications. One possible reason is that the academic 
qualifications require higher ability and initial human capital, which may 
determine the employees' later performance in the labour market. 
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Insert Table 3.2 
3.2.2 Ex post wages analysis 
In order to estimate ex-ante wages, an estimate is needed of the effect of 
individuals' characteristics on ex-post wages. General human capital 
theory (Becker, 1962 and Mincer, 1974) explains that people forego their 
possible earnings (including all costs of schooling) and accumulate skills 
and knowledge in school in return for receiving higher lifetime earnings. 
The expected wages are 
EYV =a+a, s; + a2T, +a37 2 +s; (3.1) 
where s represents schooling and T is experience. According to this 
equation, individuals with the same qualifications and experience should 
earn the same wages, which is not the case in reality. Many scholars argue 
about the large constant e. , which expressed the unexplained 
facts 
attributed to individuals' heterogeneity, especially ability. 
In this chapter, we will control for the qualification level14 and some job 
and personal characteristics, such as gender and ability. Although the 
return to some job characteristics variables is significant, they are 
balanced in a competitive labour market. Individuals can trade off leisure 
time, job security and other welfare or benefits with a higher salary. To 
find out the return to each individual character, we regressed the following 
equation: 
ýtýinm = wnrpi + i71 
Al 
rn 
+'/2Zinm + 
1730] 
+ ei (3.2) 
where tiº, inm is individual i's natural log wages for qualification m and type 
of education n. m=1,2,3 express A-level, first degree and post degree, 
n1,2 denotes academic and technical, respectively. Individuals are 
1' using qualifications instead of actual years as a measure of human capital can avoid repeated 
years, inefficient years and drop-out \ ears. (see Sloane et al, 1999 for 
detail) 
Appendix B lists how do we group the showcard qualifications into technical degree, university 
degree, technic ; \-level and academic college. 
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expecting to earn Ewnm , the market rental price for qualification m and 
type of education n without experience, which can be represented by the 
average natural log wages at the same level. The idea to employ natural 
log of real wages instead of real wages comes from the Nlinccrian 
equation and the basic human capital model (e. g. Becker, 1962). A, 
represents individual i's demographic characteristics include gender, 
family background and ability. In this chapter, family background was 
represented by father's social class (fsc); the Best Grade of Maths (Guth) 
and English in O-levels (GEng) were used to estimate ability. Fsc, GMath 
and GEng were classified into several levels in order to reflect the 
affecting power of each level to their future wages. Surely test 
performance at ages 7 or 11, which is given by NCDS is a better estimate 
of ability, however they do not play a significant role on their later wages 
and I have to use O-level scores to estimate ability. 
Z is a vector denoting other job characteristics variables, for instance the 
size of the firm, company location, type of organization. Oi represents the 
standard occupation code. All the occupations were grouped into 9 sectors 
according to the showcard of the NCDS. They are managers and senior 
officials (occu 1), professional occupations (occu2), associate professional 
and technical occupations (occu3), administrative and secretarial 
occupations (occu4), skilled trades occupations (occu5), personal service 
occupations (occu6), sales and customer service occupations process 
(occu7), plant and machine operatives (occu8) and elementary 
occupations (occu9). 
One may notice that we did not add a quite important variable, experience 
into this estimation. Ben-Porath (1967) states that life-time wages 
trajectory is diverged by qualification: the higher the academic 
qualification, the higher the return to experience. Since we control the 
qualification level in our estimation method and all the respondents are in 
the same age group, the return to experience for the same cohort within 
the same level of qualification may not be diverged. In addition, the return 
to experience in our series of the option model is not that important. I use 
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the average growth rate for each qualification to represent the return to 
experience. 
Of course, there are other variables that may affect individuals' wages, 
such as teaching quality, university reputation, union membership and 
labour contract. We group it all into the constant. Table 3.3A is derived 
from regressing lnwages in the equation (3.2) when individuals are at the 
age of 33. The reason we use the wages at age 33 instead of at 23 or 41 is 
that the wages at age 33 are quite typical during the life-time. In addition, 
the regression results show that there is little effect of personal 
characteristics on individuals' wages at age 23, but quite a significant 
effect on wages at age 33 and 41. Since we will use these wages to 
estimate the life-time wages, it is more suitable to use wages at age 33 
instead of 23. 
The regression results in Table 3.3A show that gender plays an important 
role in all levels of education. Being a male may contribute up to 30.7 per 
cent to the wages of technical college level graduates. Besides gender, the 
most important factor in individuals' wages determinants is the best 
English and mathematics grade at O-level, which corresponds to the 
findings of Dolton & Vignoles (2002). However GMath and GEng play 
various roles for different qualification level. Generally good GMath and 
GEng will affect future earnings positively for all kinds of qualification, 
except technical degree; but poor GMath and GEng will play a negative 
role for academic university only. This implies individuals with poor 
academic background will not be in an advantaged position even if they 
enter the academic university. 
Insert Table 3.3 
In a similar way to the findings of Webbink & Hartog (2004), there is no 
relationship between family background and future wages. The type of 
organization and firm size may have various effects on individuals' wages 
for different qualification. Working in the central government may 
influence university graduates' wages negatively, but have a positive 
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impact on postgraduates' wages. Compared to working in a small 
company, large company employees generally earn more than those who 
are self-employed or employed by small companies in the UK. The 
statistics shows that post degree and first degree holders generally occupy 
the occul to occu4 occupational categories and individuals with a lower 
qualification generally have a lower social class of occupation. Managers 
or professional occupations will only have a positive return to higher 
degree holders. 
3.2.3 An ex post analysis of educational choices 
Chen (2003) and other authors argue that financial restrictions can be a 
main factor that blocks individuals from attending university and they also 
employ all kinds of models to explain their ideas. However until now no 
empirical study has examined this problem. Detailed questions in the six 
waves of the NCDS dataset allow us to examine whether family 
background plays an important role in students' education choices and 
who will attend universities after several years of experiences. 
Table 3.4 15 gives us the answer as to why some talented individuals do not 
attend higher education directly. Regardless of the first degree or higher 
degree, those who attend universities after a break of several years have 
mathematics and English grades that are average higher than those who 
attend universities directly. But those who attend universities after a break 
up of several years have an average unfavourable family background than 
those who attend universities directly. This confirms Chen (2003)'s 
findings that financial restrictions constrain some talented youngsters 
attending higher education. It is also quite interesting that the average 
secondary score of the higher degree is lower than that of the 
first degree, 
which suggests that second best students want to remedy their 
disadvantage through receiving more education. 
Table 3.4 Individuals' characteristics comparison 
15 This table and the following analysis did not consider the students 
trom Scotland, since their 
education and examination system is 
different. 
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GMath GEng Fsc Fce lsa fsch Samp 
Size 
Acquired first 2.22 2.16 3.6 2.6 3.8 20.2 193 
degree before 
23 
Acquired first 2.21 2.12 4.4 3.1 3.6 18.6 40 
degree after 23 
Acquired 2.27 2.23 3.7 3.4 3.2 19.9 13 
higher degree 
before 23 
Acquired 2.17 2.20 3.7 2.9 3.4 17.8 64 
higher degree 
after 23 
In addition, we are interested to find out whether attending universities 
later will affect their wages. In order to answer this question, I summarize 
respondents' wages at ages 23,33 and 41 for those who attend university 
directly and those after a break up of several years (see table 3.5 below). 
The results demonstrate the basic human capital theory of Becker (1964) 
and Ben-Porath (1967) that those who get qualification in their earlier life 
enjoy a higher level of average wages than those who get a qualification 
later. 
Table 3.5 Hourly Wages Comparison 
wages8l wages9l wages99 
Acquired higher education 2.01 8.08 13.97 
before 23 
Acquired higher education 1.79 7.45 13.25 
after 23 
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3.3. Ex-ante Return under Uncertainty V 
Since individuals make education investment decisions before entering the 
labour market, ex-ante wages will have more guidance than ex-post wages, 
In addition, Freeman (1971), Dominitz & Manski (1996) and Webbink & 
Hartog (2004) show that individuals can predict the structure and size of 
the future wages accurately based on their own secondary education mark, 
family background, academic interests, etc. The evidence gives us the 
theoretical background to model the ex-ante wages according to available 
information. According to Webbink & Hartog (2004), gender, grade in 
secondary education and degree of faculty play a role in prediction and 
also in ex-post wages while family background does not. Students from 
wealthy families do have a higher attendance rate for higher education 
according to our statistics. Since we group the family background into 
different ranks, it may give us more accurate information on prediction 
and will be considered in the wages analysis. 
The estimation process is as follows: we first examine the effect of 
personal idiosyncrasy on future return by ex-post wages (equation 3.2) for 
each level and type of qualification, which has been done in table 3.3A. 
The process of classifying individuals into a particular regime may 
generate a selection bias to the effects of individuals' characteristics on 
wages. A multinomial logit model was used in table 3.3B to examine the 
selection bias. In other words, whether there is a significant impact of 
individuals' characteristics to individuals selecting a particular regime. 
The results show only NOAC plays a significant role on the selection 
process and the selection bias of other variables are not significant. 
Secondly, we estimate the ex-ante wages by summarizing all the products 
of coefficients that we regressed in step one and the value of each 
characteristic. 
NCDS data did not record whether individuals drop out during their stud` 
or not, so we do not have perfect observations to represent the probability 
to graduate. And so the probability to graduate will not be considered in 
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the empirical analysis. Since the dummy variables on academic 
background can reflect individuals' with different abilities' expected 
wages, this will not significantly affect our estimation results. 
The estimated results of the ex-ante return were reported in Table 3.4. 
From Table 3.4 we notice that the estimated return can predict expected 
wages very well. The coefficients of the estimated return for most of the 
variables have the same direction and size as the coefficients of realized 
return. Parents' social background and secondary English grade play a 
more important role in estimated return than in realized return. In addition, 
the estimated return is not distributed as polarized as realized return as we 
expected, since some parts of wages are the compensation for high 
consumer price index, high job demands or insecurity. 
We then compare the lnwages differential between objectively predict 
lnwages and realized lnwages by equation (3.4). 
w-we =(a-ae)+(ß-ßß, )A,; +(Y-Ye)X, +(s-e, ) (3.3) 
where a is the constant, ß and y are the coefficients for ability and 
individual character X respectively. The subscript e means predicted 
wages. We include the father's education, individuals' motivation, 
occupation and gender into individuals' characteristics. Most of the 
estimated variables go in the same direction as the real results. The 
predicted wages for students who will work as managers and senior 
officials are higher than the average, as is the case in reality. The third 
column in Table 3.6 shows that the estimated return can predict 
future 
return very well. Most of the variables are explained 
by the estimated 
return, except for the average secondary mark and extrinsic motivation. 
We assume that individuals with higher secondary marks are 
less likely to 
drop out and earn a corresponding level of wages. However, 
in reality, 
average secondary marks have no relations with 
future wages. 
Insert Table 3.6 
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Our prediction method overcomes the subjectivity of self-prediction that 
Webbink & Hartog (2004) discussed in their pioneering work, such as 
students from higher income families tending to predict higher salary than 
they actually earn and students from science subjects expecting more 
income than they can realize. However, our objective predicting method 
may not have as much information as the subjective method does. 
3.4. Optimal Choices from the Multinomial Logit 
Model 
In the theoretical analysis of chapter 2, individuals will select the optimal 
educational choice by computing backwards to the starting decision from 
looking at the expected payoffs in the outer branches and then moves 
inwards. In other words, individuals educational choice in next period (t+1) 
is based on the expected utility of all kinds of choice in period t+2, the 
choice in t+2 is selected according to the maximal utility in t+3 ... Since 
the selecting process was based on qualification instead of years as 
analyzed by Keane and Wolpine (1997) and only four possible 
educational choices were considered in this chapter, I can simplify 
individuals dynamic selecting process as a static model of individuals' 
optimal highest qualification. In other words, which qualification is 
individuals' optimal highest qualification, Acoll, TechC, AFD or TechD? 
In this sense, individuals optimal educational choices can be estimated by 
a standard multinomial logit model. The optimal choice mit is chosen if 
and only if the choice mit can provide the highest utility to individual i 
and is expressed as: 
Pr[k; = mnJI (t)] == 
exp(ln Vi.,, ) (3.4) 4 
1 exp(In 1, k ) 
k=1 
In chapter 2, the utility for each choice includes future income as well as 
the consumption value of greater education. The consumption value in 
different choices has different possible values and may also vary across 
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individuals. If we take the logarithms of equations (2.10) and (2.21), we 
get 
In V, k =1n E(U(Y, ko )) + x; In f (k) - ln(B; - (1- p)tpk) (3.5) 
where x; =, u; (E; +J +A, )=u, E; +p2I +j3AÄ 
B; = -b, ir; 
The logarithm of the expected income utility In E(U(Yk0 )) was 
represented by the expected logarithm of ex-ante wages in eqn (2.10) that 
we discussed in the previous section. f, (k) is the consumption value, 
which increases with qualification level. "Taste of schooling" x, is 
assumed to be a linear function of individuals' self interest on study (E; ), 
family background (p; ) and ability (A; ). E; can be represented by logarithm 
of self preferred school leaving age, pi is denoted by the logarithm of 
family culture environment and ability A, is the logarithm of number of 0 
level grade A-C. In this thesis, f, (k) only refers to current consumption 
value, since the future consumption value (e. g. better living condition) is 
hardly observed and can be replaced by wages. I use minus tuition fees to 
represent current consumption value. Wages growth rate cp,,, can be 
estimated by the average annual growth rate in the mean of the log of 
annual earnings for each qualification. 
In order to estimate equation (3.4) and (3.5), we have to work out the 
value of 9; and X,. Card (1999) gives the exact forms for discount factor 
and consumption value considering individual's heterogeneity in a 
covariance and variance form. However, these forms are too difficult to 
be 
measured by econometricians. Oosterbeek & Ophem (2000) estimated the 
discount rate by assuming current schooling choices are the best 
educational choices and use maximum likelihood function to estimate the 
discount rate. In this thesis, we have to assume individuals' current 
qualification level is the best education choices. Through a 
logic model, 
we can work out '. r, , P2 , U3 and 
br 
, which when multiplied 
by each 
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individual's characteristics will be the discount factor and consumption 
value for each individual. 
In the model, the effect of family background and personal ability will be 
applied to the taste for schooling parameter (x; ) and the discount rate (0, ) 
separately. Oosterbeek & Ophenm (2000) said even if two vectors have all 
their elements in common, their regression coefficients can still be 
identified. To make identification not solely dependent on the functional 
form, I also randomly assign different elements to x; and 9; . The family 
culture environment and the father's social class were allocated to ; r, and 
B, 
, respectively. 
Table 3.7 lists the mean value of the discount factor and taste of schooling 
for diversified qualifications. Consistent with our expectations, the 
estimated value of discount rate rises when the qualification decreases and 
for the same qualification level, the value for the technical type is a little 
higher. The school preference tells the same story, namely that the mean 
increases with qualification level and those who attend university have the 
highest value. 
Table 3.7 Estimated mean consumption value and discount rate for 
each qualification 
AColl TechC AFD TechD 
Discount rate 0.026 0.028 0.019 0.021 
(0.016) (0.021) (0.032) (0.051) 
School preference -0.148 -0.330 0.011 -0.179 
(0.098) (0.119) (0.003) (0.029) 
3.4.1 Education choices without considering consumption 
value 
Firstly, we will estimate the multinomial logit education choices model 
(equation (3.4)) without considering the consumption value. In other 
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words, the utility is represented solely by earnings as shoved in equation 
(3.6). 
In V, k = In E(U(Y,. ko )) - ln(6, - (1- p)ý,, ) (3.6) 
After substituting equation (3.6) into equation (3.4), we obtain the 
estimation of individuals' optimal educational choice. Through counting 
the exact number in each qualification estimated by equation (3.4) and 
(3.6), we derived the Figure 3.1. 
Figure 3.1 Distributions of Postsecondary Activity Choices without 
considering non-pecuniary utility 
Figure 3.1 describes the predicted results for all levels of education from 
the multinomial logit model. The predicted attendance is a little bit higher 
than the actual figure for both academic and technical qualification. The 
third and fourth column for each qualification are the about overeducated 
and undereducated percentages compared to the predicted optimal results, 
respectively. This figure can examine the difference between predictions 
and actual results as well as whether we group the people that belong to 
other qualifications into this particular qualification (e. g. prediction 
accuracy). If our optimal prediction is accurate, there are 17 percent more 
individuals who should attend university. The prediction about technical 
attendance is comparatively inaccurate and much higher than real results. 
According to our theoretical model, individuals will attend either 
academic or technical college since they can acquire higher wages by 
doing that. However, in reality there are all kinds of reasons to discourage 
63 
Chapter 3 Empirical Evidence on Education Choices under Uncertainty 
individuals from attending higher levels of education. We are then 
interested in finding out whether considering consumption value can 
increase the accuracy of prediction. 
3.4.2 Education choices considering consumption value 
Predicted low college attendance and comparatively high university 
attendance in Figure 3.1 may partly show that wage is not the only factor 
affecting education choices. In this section, we take into account the 
consumption value to see whether the function after adding this variable 
can provide a better fit. 
Substitute equation (3.5) into (3.4), will derive the predicted attendance 
for each qualification, which is showed in Figure 3.2. Compared to the 
results without considering consumption value, the prediction is much 
closer to the realized results, especially for technical qualifications. That is 
to say, the low attendance of technical qualification can be partly 
explained by respondents' low consumption value. 
Figure 3.2 Distributions of Postsecondary Activity Choices after 
considering non-pecuniary benefits 
0.6 
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3.5. Educational Decisions under Uncertainty in a 
Real Option Model 
Though adding individual utility functions into the multinomial logit 
model largely improves the accuracy of prediction, the predicted 
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attendance is still higher than actual attendance. It is interesting to figure 
out whether uncertainty can explain the difference. Following the 
discussion of chapter 2 and estimated ex-ante wages in part 2, we can 
finish this task by the real option model. 
Expected ex-ante return will enter the real option model from two aspects, 
one is education costs and the other is exercise price. In this model, we 
will compute each individual's net payoff of an investment opportunity in 
each year based on available information at that time. We assume that all 
the individuals will obey the law and finish the compulsory secondary 
schooling. Therefore the schooling decisions are between whether to 
attend A-levels or not and whether to attend universities or not. The 
percentage of individuals who attend post tertiary education is quite small, 
hence we will not consider it. For each level of education, individuals 
could choose academic or technical education. As analyzed in chapter 2 
we treat investment in education as buying a series of European call 
options with a fixed one year contract and the real option model on how to 
choose an optimal education level m is adjusted to yield 
N 
H(Ym) 
- 
(ye e 
m(l+I) - 
Yr(m-I)(/+I))(l + Am - Y)' 
N(xl) 
- 
L/ 
v 
(x2) (3.8) 
1=0 
N(x) =Ij exp(- 
1x2 
)dx 
where 
2; r 2 and 
ln[(ye, (r+1) -Y, (m-º)(! +ý))(1+ 
2-r)' /L]+U2z/2 
and X1 - 
1n[(Y. mcr*>> - Y, ým ý>v+ýý)(ý + 2- r)` 
l L] - U'- r/2 
6ý 
'm(1+1) 
where is the expected beginning wages 
for qualification m and 
individual i, 'ýný is the annual increasing rate for qualification m and r is 
the interest rate. cs is the mean volatility during the working 
life for each 
qualification ni, which is distributed from 
0 to 1. Here 6 is calculated by 
the weighted average wages and is the same 
for people sharing the same 
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qualification. Weighted average wages for qualification m was estimated 
by the beginning wages at age 23 and deflated wages at age 33 and 41. 
And the deflated wage at age 33 and 41 were processed by the average 
annual wages growth rate for each qualification m. 
Since the NCDS records individuals' wages at ages 23,33 and 41, we can 
use the life-time average wage volatility to denote 6 instead of annual 
wage volatility. Period 1 equals 0,1,2, ..., N and the value of N depends 
on m. N=46,44 for A-level and first degree separately. 
For simplicity, the education costs were estimated by foregone wages only. 
N 
Through comparing the value of I: T (Y, n) with option costs 
C, we derived 
r=0 
the Figure 3.3.16 The estimated results reported in Figure 3.3 are 
surprisingly similar to the actual results in both direction and size for 
academic attendance. Since we do not consider the tuition fees and living 
expenses in our estimation, the predicted results of first degree attendance 
is a little bit higher than the actual situation. What is more, in our 
prediction, around 10 percent of individuals did not attend university 
directly after A-levels, which cannot be estimated by Hogan & Walker 
(2005). 
Figure 3.3 Estimated distributions of postsecondary activity choices 
by wages real option model 
Figure 3.3 was obtained by comparing ind üviduaIs' expected \\ ages for different educational 
choices and assumed individuals \vill select the one which can maximize their expected 
income. 
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The B-S wages estimating method can predict uncertainty and the 
associated wage distribution very well, but cannot figure out the type of 
education (i. e. academic or technical education) and individuals' 
preference. From the statistics in section two, we know that individuals 
from different family backgrounds may have different discount rates and 
consumption value for investing in education resulting in various 
educational choice routes. We have then tried to substitute the wages in 
equation (3.8) by utility function and re-evaluate the value of option to see 
whether this will provide a better fit for technical qualification. 
The estimation results in Figure 3.4 for technical qualification is 
significant improved after considering current consumption value or effort 
costs. However, adding consumption value has not much effect on the 
results for academic qualification. 
Figure 3.4 Estimated distributions of postsecondary activity choices 
by utility real option model 
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Finally we draw the Figure 3.5 to compare the four estimation results with 
the actual one. From Figure 3.5 we can conclude that those estimation 
methods considering consumption value give a better fit than those did not 
and those considering the uncertainty provide closer results than those did 
not. In other words, the estimation method by the utility real option model 
is the one which is the closest to the actual attendance. In addition, these 
results imply that the main concern for individuals who choose academic 
qualifications is wage volatility, while those who select technical 
schooling put more weight on the effort that will be spent on study and 
have a high discount rate. 
Figure 3.5 Three estimation methods comparison 
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3.6. Conclusions 
This chapter tries to examine the education choices by using the real 
option model and multinomial logit model that we discussed in chapter 2 
separately through the NCDS dataset. In order to realize that goal, we first 
evaluate the ex-ante wages for each education choices. The predicted 
wages are quite close to the realized wages through considering family 
background, individuals' ability and academic attitude. The estimated ex- 
ante wages were used in both the B-S education choices model and the 
multinomial logit choices model. 
Firstly the education choices model was evaluated by the multinornial 
logit model without considering the non-pecuniary utility function. The 
prediction results have some distance with the actual results, especially for 
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technical qualification. After adding consumption value and effort costs 
into the regression model, the percentage of attending education is quite 
close to the real results. This suggests that non-pecuniary utility does 
affect individuals' career move. We then examine the effect of uncertainty 
on education choices by the B-S without considering utility value model. 
The prediction results are quite similar to the real results for the academic 
qualification, but not the technical one. This suggests that volatility is not 
the main reason to stop individuals from being educated for technical 
qualifications but is the main factor to discourage individuals from 
attending academic qualification. Following this, wages were substituted 
by utility value in the B-S model and the prediction was much improved 
for technical qualification. 
The multinomial logit model and the B-S model both have their 
advantages: the first can consider individuals' diversified discount rate 
and the second can manage to estimate the effect of uncertainty on 
education choices. By comparison, the B-S utility model provides a better 
result on capturing individuals' behaviour for both academic and technical 
qualification attendance. This implies uncertainty and utility play a very 
important role on education choices. 
One important finding in this empirical study is even if we consider all the 
necessary factors, the attendance of technical qualification is still lower 
than the optimum level. The predicted comparatively high attendance can 
explore two problems: one is not everyone is a rational investor and 
farsighted. The other is the asymmetric information in labour market. 
Students from poor family background have few ideas on the advantages 
of obtaining qualifications and would not like to invest in education. 
Despite the contribution of the chapter to current research, there is a long 
agenda in predicting education choices. In our empirical education choices 
model, we can either predict education choices under uncertainty without 
considering discount factor or education choices under certainty by 
considering discount factor. Later research should try to release the 
assumption of risk neutrality in the real option model and combine 
both 
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the uncertainty and individuals' preference in their education choices 
model. Besides, we cannot depict a vivid picture of life-time career moves. 
In other words, the estimating method did not capture individuals' 
behaviour in each year and did not consider the type of education (full- 
time or part-time) and the continuity of education (i. e. whether broken up 
or suspended for several years between studies). This should be designed 
in later education choice models. Another area that needs to be devoted is 
specialty. How to estimate or even suggest individuals' college and 
university majors and relate it to both individuals' prospects and the 
country's strategic development direction may be the subject of future 
study. 
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Appendix A 
Compulsory education 
GCSE/O-level/Foundation GN'VQ; tiVQ 
level I 
stop College 
(Academic) 
stop University 
Vocational- 
related 
Higher 
vocational] 
y-related 
college 
Occupational 
(Vocational) 
Occupational 
trainning 
stop 
71 
Chapter 3 Empirical Evidence on Education Choices under Uncertainty 
Table 3.1 Variable description 
variable Description 
Fee Family culture environment, which is estimated by the 
weighted average of two separate variables (i. e. mother and 
father's spare time reading newspaper and father's attention to 
child's study) and two variables share the same weight 
Mother and father's spare time reading newspapers were used 
to estimate this variable. 2. yes, most days. 3 yes, occasionally 
4. hardly ever 
Father's attention to Child's study. 1. care a great deal 2 care 
3 care, but not much 4. do not care 
Fsc Father's social class when child is 7 years old. Fsc 1=1 if 
social class= I, Fsc2=1 if social class=11, Fsc3=1 if social 
class=III, Fsc4=1 if social class= IV or below. 
Fsch Father's school leaving age 
Noac Numbers of O-level grade A-C from 1 to 11 
GMath Best grades obtained in Maths at O-level. GMath l=l if 
individuals got grade A, GMath2=1 if individuals got grade B 
or C, GMath3=1 if individuals got grade D or below. 
GEng Best grades obtained in English at O-level. GEngl=1 if 
individuals got grade A, GEng2=1 if individuals got grade B 
or C, GEng3=1 if individuals got grade D or below. 
Lsa age likely to leave school study 
Hquali8l Highest qualification obtained before 1981 
Hquali9l Highest qualification obtained before 1991 
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Table 3.1 variable description-continued 
AHD University or CNAA higher degree (including master and 
doctorate) 
AFD University or CNAA first degree 
APdpl University or CNAA post graduate diploma 
Adpl University or CNAA Diploma or certificate (including 
teaching Cert. ) 
Acoll Academic college (e. g. 3 A-level graduates) 
TechD Vocational or technical degree 
Techdpl Polytechnic diploma 
TechC Technic A-level 
Pricom Private company 
Cengov Central government 
La/lea Local authority/ Local education authority 
Natindu National industry 
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Table 3.2 Statistics description of individual characteristics 
Value Fce Fsc Fsch GMath GEng Ex-post wages 
Label in 1999 per 
hour 
AHD 2.17 4.03 21.25 1.80 1.76 16.50 
0.03 0.3 0.3 0.10 0.08 2.67 
APdpl 2.20 4.11 19.54 2.60 2.34 15.98 
0.09 0.06 0.19 0.15 0.07 1.99 
AFD 2.19 4.01 18.62 2.23 1.99 17.78 
0.02 0.09 0.29 0.05 0.04 2.59 
Adpl 2.25 4.13 18.16 2.74 2.03 15.94 
0.06 0.07 0.24 0.18 0.10 1.83 
TechD 2.20 4.46 17.6 2.86 2.65 16.01 
0.04 0.13 0.38 0.13 0.15 2.01 
Techdpl 2.28 4.46 17.99 2.38 2.44 15.87 
0.07 0.21 0.65 0.07 0.15 1.79 
Note: the second rows of each cell are std. Err. 
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Table 3.3A Regressing results from log hourly earnings 
AColl TechC AFD TechD AHD 
Gender 0.260 0.307ww* 0.244 0.277 0.150 
0.103 0.046 0.023 0.102 0.098 
Noac 0.011 0.021 -0.005 0.094 -0.001 
0.025 0.017 0.004 0.034 0.060 
GEngl 0.037 0.135 0.036 0.115 0.047 
0.019 0.089 0.029 0.101 0.022 
GEng2 0.054 0.019 -0.015 0.246 0.021 
0.079 0.027 0.016 0.135 0.091 
GEng3 0.041 0.395 -0.006 0.059 0.001 
0.087 0.298 0.017 0.071 0.099 
GMathl 0.036 0.101 0.057 -0.102 0.036 
0.025 0.013 0.017 0.009 0.002 
GMath2 0.031 0.224 0.119 0.247*ww 0.190 
0.024 0.190 0.199 0.111 0.017 
GMath3 0.039 0.185 -0.037 0.116 -0.097 
0.017 0.100 0.019 0.099 0.079 
Fsch -0.033 -0.033 -0.018 -0.081 0.027 
0.043 0.027 0.011 0.143 0.024 
Fce 1 0.064 -0.243 0.120 0.074 -0.002 
0.049 0.233 0.039 0.141 0.015 
Lsa -0.027 -0.291 -0.017 -0.321 0.063 
0.036 0.147 0.035 0.141 0.039 
Fsc 1 0.075 0.094 0.044 0.015 0.002 
0.057 0.105 0.027 0.016 0.007 
Fsc2 0.029 0.048 0.049 0.039 0.011 
0.021 0.029 0.041 0.049 0.091 
Fsc3 -0.046 0.060 0.019 0.031 0.021 
0.051 0.045 0.037 0.013 0.030 
Fsc4 -0.015 0.049 -0.031 0.026 -0.029 
0.009 0.051 0.020 0.019 0.022 
Pricom -0.130 0.424 -0.007 0.763 
0.016 
0.151 0.194 0.064 0.321 0.100 
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Table 3.3 A Regressing results from log hourly earnings -continued 
Cengov 0.146 -0.159 -0.278' -0.264 0.285 
0.107 0.103 0.148 0.318 0.317 
La/lea -0.139 -0.152 -0.092 0.103 -0.129 
0.221 0.146 0.091 0.087 0.216 
Natindu -0.101 1.636 -0.039 -0.165 -0.233 
0.261 1.887 0.007 0.075 0.175 
occul -0.185 0.067 0.286 0.492 0.344wýw 
0.181 0.119 0.059 0.271 0.128 
occu 2 -0.051 -0.133 0.051 -0.342 0.185 
0.081 0.241 0.046 0.324 0.143 
occu 3 -0.146 -0.342 -0.072 -0.523 0.303 
0.131 0.298 0.073 0.325 0.172 
occu 4 -0.183 -0.095 -0.27499 -0.432 -0.195 
0.345 0.102 0.131 0.324 0.007 
Adj. R2 
0.1684 0.1756 0.2364 0.1934 0.1143 
obs 
67 106 194 39 13 
Note, NCDS wave2 (1963), wave3 (1974) and waves (1991) were employed in the regressing 
process. Wave 2 and wave 3 provide family background and students ability proxies; wave 5 
reveals the wages information and highest qualification obtained at age 33. 
indicates significance at the 10% level '* indicates significance at the 5% level ***indicates 
significance at the 1% level 
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Table 3.3 B Multinomial logfit model selector 
AColl TechC AFD TechD 
Gender 0.689* 0.053 0.314 0.422 
0.388 0.666 0.378 0.633 
Noac 0.228** 0.146 0.157*** 0.162* 
0.094 0.107 0.060 0.100 
GEngl 0.337 0.262 0.340 0.612* 
0.286 0.350 0.214 0.318 
GEng2 0.396 0.261 0.311 0.632 
0.313 0.213 0.343 0.592 
GEng3 0.388 0.259 0.327 0.611 
0.356 0.251 0.298 0.509 
GMathl -0.224 0.171 0.127 0.139 
0.240 0.273 0.163 0.261 
GMath2 0.221 0.170 0.129 0.137 
0.232 0.158 0.113 0.131 
GMath3 0.223 0.173 -0.131 -0.141 
0.191 0.179 0.127 0.119 
Fsch 0.030 -0.029 0.043** 0.013 
0.033 0.049 0.021 0.037 
Fce 0.267 0.257 -0.049 -0.310 
0.230 0.258 0.161 0.302 
Lsc -0.266 -0.495* 0.423* -0.402 
0.276 0.283 0.226 0.288 
Fsc 1 -0.364 0.115 -0.034 0.050 
0.282 0.272 0.156 0.275 
Fsc2 0.335 0.125 0.039 0.049 
0.299 0.111 0.059 0.191 
Fsc3 0.279 0.153 0.013 0.061 
0.265 0.121 0.009 0.049 
Fsc4 0.398 0.171 0.041 0.065 
0.313 0.159 0.121 0.061 
cons 
-2.748 -2.386 0.043 -1.938 
2.071 2.131 1.368 2.122 
Loglihood 
-69.791 -124.454 -256.786 -57.341 
Pseudo R2 0.1121 0.0998 0.1420 0.1009 
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Table 3.6 Regression analysis of estimated and realized return 
Realized return Estimated return Difference 
Coeff. Std. err Coeff. Std. err Coeff. Std. err 
constant 3.247*** 0.992 3.257 0.763 0.106 0.189 
gender 0.276*** 0.076 0.3095** 0.008 0.013 0.014 
fsch 0.106 0.004 0.009 0.006 -0.002 0.011 
Fscl 0.027* 0.019 0.028*1* 0.006 0.017 0.017 
Fsc2 0.018 0.017 0.019*** 0.009 0.013 0.019 
Fsc3 -0.022 0.019 -0.021*** 0.011 0.016 0.016 
Fsc4 -0.021 0.019 -0.022*** 0.013 0.019 0.011 
Secondary education 
Noac 0.035 0.021 0.055*** 0.006 -0.027*** 0.011 
Gmath 1 0.231*1* 0.055 0.491*1* 0.026 0.057 0.109 
Gmath2 0.139*1* 0.039 0.377'** 0.041 0.086 0.191 
Gmath3 -0.111 0.123 -0.211 
"' 0.019 0.099 0.101 
GEng 1 0.111 0.067 0.046*** 0.013 -0.003 0.742 
GEng2 0.121 0.054 -0.031 0.009 0.091 0.499 
GEng3 -0.101 0.039 -0.029 0.003 -0.071 
0.191 
Motivation 
Extrinsic 
(fce) 
0.102 0.031 -0.116 0.103 0.015* 0.040 
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Table 3.6 Regression analysis of estimated and realized return- 
continued 
Intrinsic 
(lsa) 
0.051** 0.028 0.059.. 0.007 -0.009 0.049 
Occupation 
Occ1 0.193a 0.105 0.421*** 0.027 0.197 0.217 
Occ2 0.093** 0.094 0.161 0.172 0.176 0.101 
Occ4 -0.048 0.111 -0.085u** 0.021 0.009 0.121 
Occ5 0.063 0.052 0.047 0.029 -0.031 0.028 
Occ6 -0.189 0.241 -0.015 0.027 0.053 0.239 
Occ7 -0.288* 0.239 -0.008 0.028 0.313 0.251 
Adj-R 0.219 0.589 0.071 
Obs 581 581 581 
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Chapter 4A Particular 
Uncertainty on Education Choices 
-- some evidence from Chinese graduates" 
Co-written with Prof. David Mayston 
4.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, we will analyze a particular and also a very important 
uncertainty on individuals' education decisions-overeducation (i. e. he 
has more education than is required to do his job). In chapter 3, we 
considered the uncertainty in individuals' education choices from personal 
characteristics and macroeconomic risk aspect, separately. But we do not 
consider the effect of economic growth, economic structure and job 
characters to individuals' demand for education (i. e. supply and demand 
condition). However, individuals' education choices are not only affected 
by their own personal characteristics, but the anticipated capacity of the 
economy to absorb graduates into productive employment and their peers' 
qualification level. That is to say how many percents of individuals have 
the same quality as themselves can find the same level of jobs in the 
labour market (i. e. whether there is an overeducation problem in the 
labour market). 
Given the magnitude of China's current production of graduates, with a 
net entry rate to tertiary education at 39% annum in 200318. the emerging 
problem of overeducation merits the attention of economists and policy 
makers. Notwithstanding China has experienced an impressive rate of 
economic growth in recent years, its growth rate of 12 per cent in GDP in 
2004 is far outstripped by the expansion rate of its higher education 
system, as we illustrate in table 4.1. Against the background of the current 
17 Thank Prof. David Nlavston's contribution on Pecking order model. The data was provided by 
Changjun Yue from Peking university. 
UK is 48°c and US. \ is 6 3°ä for comparison (see Chevalier, A., 2003 for detail) 
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expansion rate of higher education and economic growth rate, the 
probability of overeducation becomes an essential issue for individuals to 
make education decisions. In this chapter, we analyse the determinants 
that may affect an individual's risk of being under- or over-educated. 
Though a significant amount of discussion and empirical work were 
developed on overeducation, there is not a complete theoretic model to 
explain the reasons that individuals will be overeducated. Therefore, in the 
first part of this chapter, we fill in this part of blank by developing a 
pecking order theory model based upon the assignment approach of 
Sattinger (1993). Our framework used for the analysis is that of a pecking 
order model in which each individual's characteristics, including their 
educational achievement, contribute to their relative attractiveness in the 
job selection process compared to other individuals who they are 
competing against in the competition for jobs, through an index of their 
attractiveness in which each of these individual characteristics has a 
relative weight. The number of jobs available at a given level is 
determined by demand side factors, such as the level of government 
expenditure, GDP growth and so on. In the pecking order model, 
employers choose for the jobs at the highest level of individuals whose 
individuals characteristics make then the most attractive to hire for the 
umber of top level jobs employers are offering. 
In the second part of this chapter, we analyze the determinants of getting a 
graduate level of job from a Chinese graduate survey by ordered logit 
model. And then analyze whether the labour market was separated by 
gender, industry sector and geographic area through a single index 
function. 
4.2. Pecking Order Analysis -this section and 
equation (5.9)-(5.14) was developed by Prof. D. J. 
Mayston 
Signalling theory (e. g. Spence, 1973) considers the case where individuals 
have an incentive to invest, and over-invest, in education when their 
\t 
Chapter 3 Empirical Evidence on Education Choices under Uncertainty 
educational level is used as a signal to convey information to their 
potential employers about their future productivity, even though the 
education may not itself directly raise their productivity. Individuals with 
high ability and/or high productivity will then seek to acquire more 
education in order to signal this fact to potential employers. However, at 
the same time, some low ability individuals will also seek to receive more 
education in order to give a good signal to the employer and acquire high 
wages. Spence (1973) said, `Systematic overinvestment in education is a 
distinct possibility because of the element of arbitrariness in the 
equilibrium configuration of the market. ' He also showed some 
observable, but unalterable factors (e. g. gender, race, nationality) may 
drive individuals to be overeducated in order to try to compensate for 
these unalterable factors. 
Spence (1973) explained the reasons that may cause individuals to be 
overeducated from personal characteristics independently of the 
availability of jobs. In other words, he assumed the return to education is 
fixed by the long run supply behaviour of individuals, which cannot 
explain the empirical observations that the return to high school graduates 
have declined relative to the return to college graduates. Sattinger (1993), 
on the other hand, sought to explain the distribution of earnings as arising 
from the market economy's solution to the problem of assigning workers 
to jobs. This chapter applies the assignment approach using a pecking 
order theory to explain the reasons that cause some individuals to face the 
risk of being overeducated. The pecking order model examines a logical 
process of sorting individuals into the available jobs that we later seek to 
estimate empirically using an ordered probit model. Sorting in the 
employment decision, however, needs to be distinguished from modelling 
the education process as itself involving a sorting process according to 
non-educational characteristics of the different individual involved. As 
noted by Weiss (1995, p. 134) "In sorting models, schooling is correlated 
with differences among workers that were present before the schooling 
choices Nvere made; firms make inferences about these productivity 
differences from schooling choices, and students respond to this inference 
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process by going to school longer" (see also Johnes, 1998). The following 
pecking order model combines all factors which employers can assess as 
being related to individuals' productivity, whether they are directly related 
to such productivity or are more indirectly related to them -via other 
underlying factors. 
The demand for graduates is derived demand. It is derived from the 
demand by employers for individuals whose skills and other 
characteristics can complement the specifications of the jobs they are 
seeking to fill. Each job j is assumed to have a set of job specifications at 
time t given by the vector Zj, -(Zj1t,..... Zjmt), which specify the work which 
the job entails. How well that job is carried out depends upon the skills 
and other characteristics of the individual who occupies the post 
associated with the job. Each individual i is assumed to possess a vector of 
characteristics X; t=(X; 1t,...., X; nt) at time t that includes n-1 objective 
characteristics, such as their educational qualifications, as its first n-1 
elements. Its last element is a stochastic term Xint e u,, that reflects other 
less objective characteristics of the individual, such as their enthusiasm, 
which the employer can assess by less formal means (e. g. interviews), and 
which also contribute to the individual's ability to make an enhanced 
contribution. 
The value of the output from the job will depend also upon the demand in 
the product market for the output of goods or services which the job 
produces. The main drivers of the level of demand at time t for such 
output across all jobs for whom graduates may be candidates include 
economy-wide factors Yt=(Yt1,..... Yts). such as the country's level of GDP, 
its growth rate, its foreign exchange rates with its major trading partners, 
and its rate of population growth. 
We assume that if individual i occupies job j at time t the value of their 
output is given by the Cobb-Douglas function: 
ý± 
Chapter 3 Empirical Evidence on Education Choices under Uncertainty 
sn 
Cr ah bk V. 
l= Cl1trj 
Yrt fl Xih! fi Zjk1 
r=1 h=4 k=1 (4. t) 
where the ah, bk and c, are positive constants, with ah=1, and the w, and 
y! are positive stochastic terms that vary across each t and j respectively 
according to independent standardised lognormal distributions. 
Each employer is assumed to face a wage function of the form: 
w1, =W , 
(Xill. 
"". 
Xin, ) 
(4.2) 
that specifies the wage that must be paid at time t to recruit individual i 
with characteristics X; t=(X; 1t,.... I X; ht). The employer for job j is assumed 
to select the individual i who will occupy the post according to the 
individual's characteristics Xi, in order to maximise the net value Vsc - wit 
to the employer of having such an individual perform job j. Since for each 
j EJ , the 
individual characteristics X; ht influence V;, t in (4.1) via the 
index 
n 
fl X iii with ö V11, / 0C,, >0 
h=1 
(4.3) 
employers will evaluate each individual according to their overall value of 
C;, and are willing to offer a higher wage to individuals whose overall 
value of C, t is greater. For each small increase in C;,, the employer 
for job 
j would be willing to pay an additional wage premium up to an amount 
I/ aci 
equal to In '. In a competitive labour market, the N\, agc w; t will be 
bid up to be an increasing function of C1 , with 
Sm 
1 rar (cýºý'it 
It = 
(t ; 
ýl 
/ c"yC) = t, Jj, where 1i- co, rr ' 
J1, = Y, Z, A, 
r=1 4 -I 
S4 
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(4.4) 
for the job j which individual i performs. Moreover, since 
(alv. lac. ai. >0 `U' 1' employers with jobs whose specification level is 
higher according to the index Jjt will be willing to offer a greater 
additional premium to individuals who possess superior characteristics 
according to the index C1 than employers with jobs whose specification 
level is lower according to the index Jet. In a competitive labour market, 
employers with jobs whose specification level is higher according to the 
index Jet will succeed in recruiting individuals with superior characteristics 
according to the index C1. The top z individuals according to the index of 
individual characteristics C1 are then recruited to the top z jobs according 
to the index Jjt of job specifications for all 0< z< cz, where Q is the total 
number of jobs in the economy at time t. We will assume for simplicity 
that the total number of jobs, including those in subsistence agriculture, at 
each time t, with all individuals assumed to have access to at least a 
subsistence job. We then have 
0, (C) =(p1(Jj, (C;, ))for all C >0 and hence Jj, (C;, )=(p, -'ß, (C1, ) (4.5) 
where Jjt(C; t) is the level of specification 
for the job to which an individual 
with a level of characteristics C;, is recruited, 4, is the distribution function 
at time t for C; t across the population of 
individuals of working age, and cp 
is the distribution function at time t for Jet across jobs in the economy. If 4, 
and cpt are both lognormal distribution functions, (4.5) implies: 
J1f (C;, ) = Ca, /or("4 , where . 
4, = exp(O, - Oc, (cr ,/ cc, 
)) 
(4.6) 
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where 6Jt and Oct are the mean values of lnJj, and 1nC, , and aJt and ac, 
are their respective standard deviations, at time t. 
Equation (4.3), (4.4) and (4.6) imply a wage function of the form: 
w; r(Xi, ) = B, 
11 XQ; ' +ý where ßh, - ah17,, lUt = 1+(a', /a , 
). B, = l'l. - Ir 
/ 'U, 
h=1 
(4.7) 
where ý is a constant of integration, which equals zero if the reservation 
wage given by the employment benefit rate is zero and subsistence jobs in 
agriculture are available to all (see Sattinger, 1993). With unemployment 
benefits in China less than one per cent of the wage level of many new 
graduates, we will assume that these conditions hold, and hence set c= 0. 
In a pecking order model, individual characteristics X; t=(X; 1,...., X1) play 
an important part in wage determination, as in equation (4.7). However, so 
too do the parameters, 6Jt and 6jt, of the distribution of job characteristics, 
alongside the parameters, 6c, and 6cß, of the overall distribution of 
individual characteristics in the population at large, as in equations (4.6) 
and (4.7). In previous chapters, we discussed the uncertainty 
of 9 ,, and c., through macro economic variables and 
9c, through 
individuals' characteristics, whereas the uncertainty of cc, is not 
mentioned. One direct factor affecting cc, is the extent of overeducation, 
which will be analyzed in the next section in detail. 
Pecking order theory also has an important role to play in the analysis of 
the incidence of overeducation and undereducation across different 
individuals. In analysing the incidence of ov, ereducation and 
undereducation of graduates with different levels of degree qualifications, 
we will assume that jobs can be categorised into one of five levels. Level 
I =_ 4 corresponds to those requiring PhD-level skills, 
I=3 to those 
requiring Masters-level skills, 1= 2 to those requiring undergraduate 
degree-level skills, 1=1 to those requiring college-level skills, and I=0 to 
O 
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those requiring none of these skills. Higher level jobs at time t will be 
assumed to involve higher levels of specification according to the index Jj, 
J, ' will denote the minimum level of the job specifications index Jj, for 
which skills of level 1 are required, and below which only a lower level of 
skills is required. 
Since from (4.4), (4.5) and (4.7) for any job j for which individual i is 
selected: 
(dc i ;, ) _ (a2V Ii acaJ;, )1(82Wit i ac) >0 (8) 
a pecking-order process will apply to the selection of individuals 
according to their overall quality given by the linear function: 
q., =lnC1, =xi, a+s; (4.9) 
where Xü (xi1t'... 'X1(n-1)i) = (in ln X1(n-1)t) Q= (a1 ý..., Qh-1 ) 
c; = In , t; . Individuals with a 
higher quality according to their q; t rating in 
the pecking order of individuals in the population will attain a higher 
value to their C;, index of individual characteristics that enhance their 
employability, and hence secure a higher specification job according to 
the index Jjt in (4.8). In particular, in order to secure a job of level 1>0 
or above, individual i must have a quality level 
of of u, r)(ln 
J, -ear) + ecr 9;, 9, = (0-C, (4.10) 
Employers thus set a 'hurdle' level q, ` at time t for the minimum quality 
qit of individual i to whom an offer is made of a level I> O job. This 
hurdle level, moreover, depends upon the parameters of the distribution of 
job specifications in the economy and the distribution of individual 
characteristics in the population, both of which may change over time. 
\' 
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In the probit model form of the pecking order analysis, we will assume 
that . 6; , 
is a stochastic variable that is normally distributed with a mean of 
zero and a standard deviation of one across the population, independently 
of x1. The probability of any individual i with objective characteristics 
given by x; t being offered employment at time t at level I>0 or above is 
then given by: 
P, º 
(x; 
º) = 
Pr(q; 
º > qo' 
1 x; º) = 
Pr(x,. 
ºa + e; > q" 
) 
(4.11) 
=1_Pr(e< <_x11a+q")=1-N(-x1, a+q")=N(x, ra-q°') 
where N is the cumulative standardised normal distribution function. 
From (4.5), (4.6) and (4.10), the total supply of individuals who satisfy the 
minimum quality hurdle q, " is given by: 
Sr(q, "') = q, (1- N((qo' -O , )/acr)) with ÖS, /agor <0 (4.12) 
From (4.5), the total demand Dgl , by employers at time t 
for individuals to 
fill jobs of level 1>0 or above is given by: 
Drr = ilr (1- pr (Jr' )) (4.13) 
with the minimum quality hurdle q, °1 set in (4.10) to equate the supply, 
S, (q, ') to demand D,, , at each 
level 1>0 and above at each time t. Such 
equality implies also that 
S!, S, (q, °')-S, (9Or+1)=D,, -D1 11 =D;; 
for 1=1,2,3 and 
Sqý = J, Aqr 
Da, D (4.14) 
i. e. an equality between the number of individuals 
S,, , who are available 
within each quality range and the number of 
jobs employers are seeking to 
fill at each level of employment. 
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Figure 4.1 The critical job level in pecking order theory 
q o4 t 
q o3 t 
qt o2 
qol 
0 
The analysis of the incidence of overeducation by pecking order theory 
can be examined also through Figure 4.1. On the horizontal axis is the 
level of demand D,, , which exists 
in the economy at time t for employers 
to fill vacancies of level I>0 and above, for each job level £>1,..., 4. The 
curve in Figure 4.1 is the supply of labour curve corresponding to 
equation (4.12) above, that shows on the horizontal axis the quantity of 
labour that will be available in the labour market of quality q, °1 or above at 
time t, for each such quality level. The curve is downward-sloping 
because the quantity of labour that is available declines with a rise in its 
minimum quality level. The quality levels q°`,....., q°4 are the maximum 
quality hurdle levels which can be set in the labour market by employers 
for all graduates to whom job offers are made, whilst still ensuring that the 
supply of graduates who meet these quality levels is sufficient to satisfy 
the corresponding levels of demand D,,,....., D41by employers to fill their 
vacancies. 
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Overeducation can arise in the above pecking order analysis from the 
possibility that an individual will have graduated with a qualification of 
level 1>0 (which we will denote by 8;,, =1), but still have an overall 
level of quality q1, that falls short of the minimum hurdle level q" . 
for 
being offered a job of level £. The associated probability of overeducation 
is given by: 
p, (x)=Pr(q,., <qý' x11 &äi =1)=Pr(x,, a+s. <q, ")=N(qr'-x, la) 
(4.15) 
where x is a vector of individual characteristics x;, that includes the 
individual having graduated with a qualification of level f>0. Similarly 
undereducation can arise in the above pecking order analysis if an 
individual has an overall level of quality q.,, that exceeds the minimum 
hurdle level, q,, for being offered a job of level f, even though they 
have not graduated with a qualification of level />0 (which we will 
denote by (5= 0). The associated probability of undereducation is given 
by: 
Prr (i") = Pr(9u >9 
Ixt, & 8,, = 0) = Pr(x°`a +E> qr f) = N(x 'a - 9, /) 
(4.16) 
where _' 
is a vector of individual characteristics x;, that includes the 
individual having graduated without a qualification of level e. 
The hurdle level q°! in equation (4.10) also depends on the standard 
deviation of job specifications o ,,, that 
itself depends upon the extent 
and nature of the variety of jobs on offer in the economy, and upon the 
standard deviation of individuals' characteristics ac, , as 
dependent upon 
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the distribution of levels of qualifications and other attributes amongst 
potential employees. 
An alternative distribution function to the cumulative standardised normal 
distribution function N in equations (4.11) - (4.16) is provided by the 
logistic function: 
G(x;, a) = exp(x;, a) /(1 + exp(x;, a)) (4.17) 
where the corresponding logistic, or Fisk (see Cramer, 2001, p. 15), 
density function is: 
g(x;, a) = exp(x;, a) /(1 + exp(x,, a))2 (4.18) 
with a mean of zero. When a is rescaled so that (4.18) has a variance of 
unity, the logistic and normal density functions, and their corresponding 
distribution functions, lie close together (see Cramer, 2001, p. 16; 
Davidson and McKinnon, 1993, p. 516). The logit distribution can be 
shown to result from a similar individual quality index as (4.3), but with 
the log of the latent variable e; = In 1r; distributed according to the type I 
extreme value distribution function in standard form (see Cramer (2001, p. 
5l): 
H (ln ;)= exp(- exp(- 
In 
1u. 
)) 
4.3. The Incidence 
Undereducation 
4.3.1 Data description 
(4.19) 
of Overeducation and 
This chapter employs the survey data conducted by a projcct19 in June 
2003, just before students' graduating in order to control the response rate. 
i9 The project \\ as conducted by, Peking University under the 
leader of Weifang %I In. The data ýº as 
provided by the associate prof. of Changjun 
Yue. The translated copy of the sur\ c` was attached in 
the appendix. 
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The survey was designed to use sample selection method and chose three 
provinces in each representative economic development area (the East, the 
Middle and the West). In each province, 6 higher education institutions 
were chosen, where there are 2 elite universities, 2 common universities 
and 2 polytechnic colleges. However due to the inequality of universities 
in each province and other practical problems, the investigated provinces 
and higher education institutions are as follows: Beijing (5), Shangdong 
(6), Guangdong(6), Hunan(6), Shannxi (4), Yunnan (17), Guangxi (1). 
Altogether, 7 provinces and 45 universities took part in the survey and the 
total sample number is 18722.20 Among these samples, 39.3 percent 
individuals acquired college or equivalent qualifications and graduates 
who obtained bachelor, master, doctorate occupies 57.1,3.0 and 0.6 
percent respectively. The proportions of males for these four levels of 
degrees are 52.7,65.4,59.2 and 73.9 percent individually. The gender 
ratio is almost balanced for each level of qualification, except doctoral 
level. 
As the investigation took place just before individuals' graduation, only 
40.7 percent respondents have found a job, 4 percent individuals plan to 
be self-employed, 15.1 percent candidates will continue study, 20 percent 
have other plans and 20.2 percent have not found a job. As the survey 
took place just before the graduation, the efficient sample of those who 
got offers may have selection bias. Heckman two-step selection method 
was employed in this chapter to control the selection bias. 
The most important variable overeducation in this chapter was designed 
by two questions. In the questionnaire students were asked, "What is your 
current qualification'? (Four possible selections are given from college 
graduate to doctorate) and what is the minimum formal qualification 
required in your contracted job? " (Six-point scale from junior school to 
PhD can be chosen by each respondent). Through matching the two 
10 Related questionnaire ww as attached in the Appendix A. 
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groups of answers, we get the statistics results of overeducation. which 
listed in table 4.2. 
Table 4.2 shows that there are around 20 percent graduates are believed 
they are overeducated in China's labour market, with corresponding 
percentages for college graduate, bachelor, master and doctor of 12.9,21, 
36 and 42 per cent respectively21. Thus, overeducation in China is more 
frequent among higher degree than among lower degree. This is consistent 
with Groot (1996), which shows the incidence of overeducation increases 
with the years of education required for the job, but in contrast with the 
studies of Frenette (2004) in Canadian labour markets graduates, which 
shows master degrees are the most likely to be overeducated and followed 
by college graduates. The overeducation studies 22 on the role of gender 
are mixed, with findings that vary across countries and survey data. In our 
data, the ratio of males to females for the bachelor's graduate is 1.89: 1, 
but the gender ratio for the overeducated graduates in the same 
qualification becomes 2.1: 1, implying that there are more men than 
women are overeducated in the undergraduate level. But the role of 
gender to overeducation needs to be examined in the later section. 
The evidence on the effect of field of study on overeducation differs 
significantly from the findings in developed countries, where there is a 
high variation in the rates across fields23. The distribution of overeducated 
(undereducated) graduates in China among major of subjects is almost 
equal, except for the case of agriculture, which is the easiest subject to be 
either overeducated or undereducated. Besides agriculture, graduates 
majoring in economics are more likely to be overeducated and law 
graduates have the highest probability of being undereducated according 
to the statistics. 
Our sample size for doctors is\ cry small, which may bias our estimation. 
Duncan and Hoffman (1981) shows there is no gender 
difference between overeducation: 
Rumberger (1981) explores women are more likely to be o%ereducated and 
Groot (1996), Sloane et 
at(1999) demonstrate men are more frequently to 
be overeducated. 
23 The evidence from western countries shows that graduates 
from science, engineering, medicine 
and law are less likely to be overeducated than other graduates. 
See appendix B tar detail. 
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4.3.2 The determinants of securing a higher level job 
As our dataset is a cross-section data, we cannot observe the duration of 
overeducation and whether the overeducation will decline with an 
increasing length of working experience. However, our data records each 
individual's comprehensive information on personal characteristics, 
academic achievement and employment information that allows us to 
examine what kind of factors may affect the level of job in which an 
individual finds employment, and their associated probability of over or 
undereducation. 
One approach to incorporating the level of an individual's qualification is 
through assigning 1 to indicate a college diploma or equivalent, 2 to 
indicate a Bachelor's degree, 3 to indicate a Master's degree and 4 to 
indicate a PhD. However, this introduces too simple a metric measure into 
the comparison of the effects of different levels of individual qualification, 
compared to the use of dummies for each level. Similar remarks apply to 
the variables corresponding to parents' education, parents' career, 
university ranking, qualifications in English, class of degree, and location 
of employment. The use of dummies can also tell which qualification 
levels have a significant effect on getting a job level 1. The results of log 
likelihood ratio test and associated chi-squared distribution were 
compared for these two kinds of variables measurement: the first 
involving adding dummies and the second involving a pre-specified rank 
order, such as 1,2,3,4. As expected, we found that the use of dummies 
improves the goodness of fit, and so have listed our empirical evidence 
based upon using them. 
In line with the pecking order analysis above, we also wish to allow the 
probability of over or undereducation to vary with the level of job 
involved, as well as with individual characteristics, in a way that depends 
upon the underlying supply and demand parameters in the labour market. 
An estimation model that ties in directly with the pecking order analysis 
and with these requirements is the ordered probit model. This yields 
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threshold hurdle levels of the single quality index for individual 
characteristics that vary with each job level in a way that can in turn 
depend upon the level of demand by employers in the economy to fill 
vacancies at each such job level. As we shall discuss in more detail in 
chapter 5, another advantage of the ordered probit model is that it can be 
tied in well with an analysis of individual choice under uncertainty for 
investment in education, by looking at the impact of additional education 
on the probability of achieving a job offer at each level. 
The ordered probit model enables us to cut the range of the individual 
quality index at four threshold hurdle points, in line with Figure 4.1 above, 
with level 4 again corresponding to jobs requiring a doctorate, level 3 to a 
job requiring a master's degree, level 2 to a job requiring a bachelor's 
degree, and level 1 to a job requiring a college diploma. The precise list 
of variables for individual characteristics on which data have been 
collected and which will be included are listed m table 4.3. 
We will initially include these as dummy variables alongside the vector of 
individual characteristics as determinants of the threshold hurdle levels for 
securing a job at each job level. This has the effect of including shift 
parameters for each geographical location and industrial sector alongside 
the same index for individual characteristics. An alternative approach we 
shall investigate later is to estimate potentially different single indices of 
individual characteristics for different geographical location and industrial 
sector within China. 
Since our data sample involves candidates who have already been offered 
and signed an employment contract, there may exist sample selection bias 
due to the respondents in our sample potentially having a biased 
distribution of the latent variable pi compared to the wider population of 
graduates. We therefore include the associated inverse Mills ratio based 
upon the two-step Heckman estimation procedure (Heckman, 1979) to 
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correct for such potential sample selection bias. The first step probit 
selection model was listed after table 4.4. 
Also of interest is whether or not there is an equal return on additional 
years of education, in terms of raising the probability of securing a job of 
a given level, throughout the range from college diploma to PhD. In order 
to test whether this return is constant or varies across this range, we form a 
nested model in which the variable lnschooling (abbr. lnsch) is defined as 
the logarithm of the total number of years spent in higher education years 
minus the logarithm of the number of years required for a college diploma. 
This can be shown to be a special case, and associated null hypothesis, 
where equal weights are placed upon the variables of lnbacheloryears 
(abbr. lnba) 
, 
lnmasteryears (abbr. lnma) and lnphdyears (abbr. lnphcf , so 
that the sum of the coefficient of lnba plus Inma plus lnphd equals the 
coefficient of lnsch, where lnba, Inma and lnphd are defined as follows: 
the logarithm of the total years to acquire a bachelor degree in higher 
education period over the total years to acquire a college diploma (i. e. 
lnba); the logarithm of the total years to acquire a master degree in higher 
education period over the total years to acquire a bachelor degree (i. e. 
lnma) and the logarithm of the total years to acquire a PhD in higher 
education period over the total years to acquire a master degree (i. e. 
lnphd). 
Many of the variables have the same significance level in both models. 
However, gender, university rank, university grade, and the inverse Mills 
ratio are all significant in the lnsch model, but not in the model that allows 
different coefficients on the additional years' variables at each level of 
higher education. The significance of inverse Mills ratio indicates 
selection bias is more serious in the former model. For the lasch model, 
the sign of gender is negative and significant, which means that females 
score significantly less highly than males in the pecking order for higher 
level jobs in this version of the model. In addition, being in a top 100 
university in China has a very significant effect on an individual's 
assessed quality index in the Insch model. This is in contrast to the 
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findings in Battu et al (1999) that graduating from a less selective 
university plays no part in explaining overeducation in UK. In the lnsch 
model, obtaining a lower class of degree, as indicated by grade 2 and 3, 
has a significant adverse effect on an individual's position in the pecking 
order for obtaining a higher level job. 
However, once the coefficients on additional years' education at each 
separate qualification level are allowed to vary, gender, university rank 
and grade, and the inverse Mills ratio are no longer significant. Whilst the 
coefficient on the combined lnsch variable is highly significant for both 
genders together and separately. Disaggregation of the schooling variable 
reveals that it is the coefficients on additional years at the masters and 
PhD levels, particularly for males, which have the most significant effect 
on boosting an individual's position in the pecking order. 
We may use the log likelihood ratio (LR) test to test whether or not the 
model with different possible coefficients on the variables for each level 
of education does offer a significant improvement in fitting over the 
model using the lnsch variable (c. f. Greene, 2000 pp. 152). For the 
combined gender model, the LR test yields the test statistic of -2 (1nR - 
1nU) = -2(-5445.9856+5437.9439) =16.083. The associated chi-squared 
statistic with 3 degrees of freedom is significant at any conventional level, 
so that we would reject the null hypothesis that the model using Inch 
does not offer a significantly better fit than one involving a different 
coefficient on additional years at each level of graduate education. That is 
to say the return to an additional year of schooling is different in terms of 
increasing the probability to obtain a qualification matched job for 
different level of qualification. However, the result does not apply to the 
male and female models separately, in other words, we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis at 5 percent significant level for the models of male and 
female separately. The diverse results of integrated sample to the separate 
sample for men and women only may due to the sample size limitation. If 
we separate qualification level as well as gender, the sample size for some 
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cells may be smaller than 30, which may influence the correctness of 
estimation. 
The variable Pmem associated with being a Communist Party member 
stands out from the personal characteristics' variables as being very 
significant in both models in increasing an individual's position in the 
pecking order for securing a higher level job. The roles of the variables 
related to parental career and parental qualifications are also very 
interesting. As one might expect, parents from the lowest social 
background are less able to contribute any information, wealth or other 
help for their children in finding a higher level job. Parents belonging to 
the lowest social rank (i. e. peasants or unemployed) are here found to 
have a significant negative impact on their children's position in the 
pecking order, other things being equal. However, so too are parents with 
qualifications beyond the master's level. One possible explanation of this 
interesting negative effect is that well-educated parents have a strong 
desire to let their children have a very good education. This may therefore 
cause their children to become overeducated compared to their underlying 
intelligence and abilities which are important factors in selecting 
individuals for job offers. A positive general coefficient on additional 
years in higher education may then be partially or wholly offset by a 
negative coefficient for children of those coming from families with high 
levels of education. In addition, the variable of parental career and 
parental qualifications may have the problem of multicollinearity, which 
in part may result some bias. 
The determinant factors may also depend on registration status and 
whether be a cadre. Respondents coming from countryside and not a cadre 
are less likely to find a matched job. Cadre in China is quite similar to a 
student representative or the student union president in UK, who generally 
organizes some art or sports activities to entertain the students' life. 
Through organizing some activities or unions, they may develop their 
leadership ability, which is appreciated by the recruiting companies. The 
candidates from countryside may be in a disadvantaged position owing to 
98 
Chapter 3 Empirical Evidence on Education Choices under Uncertainty 
a lack of outlooking and presentation skills, and which become more and 
more important in interview process. 
English skills are particularly important in job hiring decisions in the 
separate qualification level model, though not for female graduates. The 
counterintuitive effect of grad2 and grad3 to the probability to get a 
graduate level of job is because the employers in China pay little attention 
to the average mark in the university, since 50 percent courses (such as 
Marxism, Deng's theory, mental healthy, behaviour of a good university 
student) have nothing to do with individuals' specialties and abilities. As 
long as you work hard and can memorize all the necessary knowledge 
points, you can acquire a high score. Generally girls work harder than 
boys, but in a disadvantage position in finding a good job resulting the 
grade may have a counter intuitive effect. The effects of the degree subject 
of study on an individual's chances of a higher level job are also very 
interesting. In Western countries, students graduating in Physics, biology 
or mathematics are more likely to find a graduate a job, due to a relative 
scarcity of such graduates 24 . 
However, in China, students have less 
freedom of choices in selecting their subjects of study, with the numbers 
of graduates from all subjects more evenly balanced due to the centrally 
planned nature of their provision. In addition, employers may view the 
courses in these three subjects as too theoretical for their needs, with 
negative estimated coefficients on these subjects. In contrast, whilst 
graduating in the subject of Language tends to increase the probability of 
being overeducated in US, UK and Canada (Frenette, 2004), it contributes 
positively to find a graduate job in China, especially for females. In 
Western countries, graduates in arts subjects, such as languages, tend to 
have lower mathematical abilities than graduates in science subjects. 
However, in China mathematics is a compulsory subject in the entrance 
examination for all degree courses, so that this differential effect in favour 
of scientific subjects is less. The coefficients on law and medicine in 
2' See Dolton and Silles(2001), and Battu et al(1999) for detail 
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increasing the probability of securing a higher level job are positive, 
though only significantly so for medicine and for both genders combined. 
As well as individual characteristics, a number of characteristics of the 
employment itself have been included to assess whether or not these 
influence the probability of securing a higher level job. These include the 
geographical location of the employment, distinguished by whether it is in 
cities, towns, villages, in the middle, east, west or elsewhere in China. 
Work location is found to be very significant in influencing the chances of 
securing a higher level job, especially for the cities in the Workcity3 
group which have a very significant positive effect upon the chances of 
securing a higher level job. This is in accord with our expectation that 
large cities generally offer competitive jobs and salaries. The influence of 
the sector of the economy in which the job is located was also examined, 
with employment in an educational institution significantly raising the 
probability of the job being at a higher level. 
4.3.3 The ordered logit model 
We can compare the goodness of fit of the Insch ordered probit and the 
Insch ordered logit models (see Davidson & Mackinnon, 2003, p452). The 
associated LR test yields a test statistic of: -2(1n4- lnXu) = -2(- 
5380.3222+5445.9856) =131.3268. The corresponding chi-squared 
statistic with 1 degree of freedom is significant at any conventional level, 
so that the ordered logit model is found to give a better fit here than the 
ordered probit model. 
We can also compare the goodness of fit of the two versions of the 
ordered logit model, the first with the lnsch variable and the second with 
the more general formulation that permits different coefficients on years 
of education at different levels of higher education. The associated LR test 
yields a test statistics of : -2(lnXR- 1nXU) = -2(-5380.3222 + 5371.2414) = 
18.1616. The corresponding chi-squared statistic with 3 degree of freedom 
is significant at any conventional level, so that the more general 
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formulation is found to give a significantly better fit than the special case 
using only the lnsch variable. 
In addition, we can compare the ordered probit and ordered logit models 
using the separate Inba etc variables, as in the second set of columns in 
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 respectively. The associated LR test yields a test 
statistic of : -2 (1nXR - lnXu) = -2 (-5371.2414 + 5437.9439) = 133.405. 
The corresponding chi-squared statistic with 1 degree of freedom is 
significant at any conventional level, so that the ordered logit model is 
again found to give a better fit here than the ordered probit model. 
As can be seen from Tables 4.3 and 4.4, education is clearly amongst 
columns the most important variable in determining an individual's 
chance of securing a higher level job. The different coefficients on the 
influence for the three separate qualification levels also raise the question 
of how this model compares with inserting an increasing trend for the 
variable lnsch. Table 4.5 shows the results for both lnsch and separate 
qualification (e. g. lnba etc. ) of the ordered logit model from inserting a 
quadratic version of the lnschooling variable. The highly significant 
positive coefficient on the square of the Insch variable suggests that 
additional years of education have an increasing, rather than constant, 
return in terms of their relative impact on the probability of securing a 
higher level job. 
Then we compare the goodness of fit of table 4.6 with table 4.5 within the 
more general model with the separate education variables plus the square 
of lnsch. First we compare the first column of table 4.6 with the first 
column of table 4.5 under the restriction of the coefficient of (lnsch)2 
equals to 0 in table 4.5. The statistics of LR test is -2(lnR-InU)=-2(- 
5380.322+5371.3059)=18.032. The corresponding chi-squared statistic 
with 1 degree of freedom is significant at any conventional level, so that 
the improvement from inserting the additional squared term is highly 
significant. The Insch model for the male only satisfies the same attribute 
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as the combined group. While the statistics of LR test for female model is 
not significant. A quadratic lnsch model is not significantly better for 
female group. 
The goodness of fit is quite slim no matter when we compare the results 
within table 4.6 or compare the last three column of table 4.6 with the last 
three column of table 4.5. In other words, inserting additional squared 
term does not improve the fitness of the separate education level model 
(i. e. using Inba, etc) no matter for combined group or male and female 
separately. The ordered logit model using the years of education 
disaggregated by level of higher education in Table 4.5 therefore provides 
the best fit when compared to the above alternatives 
4.3.4 Gender and sectoral analysis 
Since a main focus for the pecking order model is a single index of 
individual characteristics, we can first investigate whether a significantly 
better fit can be obtained by using different indices of their remaining 
individual characteristics for male and for female graduates. 
We examined the log likelihood of both the ordered probit model and the 
ordered logit model for both lnsch case and separate lnba etc. variables 
case of how the combined gender model compares with the male and 
female split. According to the results, we could reject the hypotheses that 
male and female share the same coefficients under any circumstances. 
Take ordered logit model for example: the log likelihood ratio statistics 
are 125.2 and 117.59 for lnsch case and separate Inba etc. variables case, 
respectively, the chi-squared statistic with 47 and 49 degrees of freedom 
separately are significant at any conventional level. 
It is also of interest to examine whether job characteristics relating to 
geographical location and industrial sector are best modelled as simply 
having an additive effect alongside a common index of individual 
characteristics for each gender in determining the chances of securing a 
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higher level job offer, as in Tables 4.4-4.6, or whether they are better 
modelled as requiring a different index of individual characteristics for 
each gender for each different geographical location and each different 
industrial sector, with different possible relative weightings placed on 
these different individual characteristics in each case. Since ordered logit 
model gives a better fit, we only list the results from ordered logit 
regressions. 
Disaggregating the ordered logit analysis into different geographical areas 
in Table 4.7 provides an unrestricted model of which the model in Table 
4.9 with the same coefficients across all geographical areas is a restricted 
nested version. Due to the sample limitation, we use the logarithm level of 
dummy variable for each individual characteristics as in Table 4.9 instead 
of each dummy variable for each level as in table 4.4 and table 4.5 to 
guarantee the numbers in each cell larger than 10. We can therefore apply 
the corresponding LR test with a test statistic for males of. -2 (1nR - 1nU) 
_ -2 (-3591.9563 - (-2221.661 - 345.874 -967.513) = 113.816. Since the 
restrictions for the restricted model are the coefficients of all the variables 
for each geographic area are the same that makes 3 times 30 variables (all 
together 90) restrictions all together. This chi-squared statistic of 113.816 
with 90 degrees of freedom is not significant at 5% significant level, 
which means we cannot reject the single index function version of Table 
4.9 for males. 
Similarly for females, the corresponding test statistic is: -2 (1nR - 1nU) =- 
2 (-1774.9539 - (-1080.116 - 128.690 - 516.765) = 98.766. This chi- 
squared statistic with 90 degrees of freedom is not significant at any 
conventional level, which means we cannot reject the single index 
function version of Table 20 for females. The results of disaggregating the 
ordered logit model by industrial sector are shown in Table 4.8. 
Disaggregating the ordered logit analysis into different industrial sectors 
in Table 4.8 provides an unrestricted model of which the model in Table 
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4.9 with the same coefficients across all industrial sectors is a restricted 
nested version. We can therefore apply the corresponding LR test, with a 
test statistic for males of: -2 (1nR - 1nU) = -2 (-5419.527 - (-673.879 - 
1754.061 - 429.750 - 1479.321 - 989.859)) = 185.314. This Chi-squared 
statistic with 145 degrees of freedom is not significant at any conventional 
level, so that we cannot reject a common index on individual 
characteristics for all industrial sectors. This means though the important 
of different factors is different in each geographic area and in each 
industry sector, they generally satisfy the same rule. Labour market in 
China is not segmented by geographic area and industry sector in terms of 
overeducation. 
4.4. Conclusion 
The results reported in a large postgraduate survey suggest there are 
around 20 percent graduates are overeducated among all the fresh 
graduates from higher education and the percentage is increasing with 
qualification. The mismatches across genders are significantly different 
from the results by Frenette (2004) and Dolton & Vignoles (2000), with 
men are more easily to be overeducated. The distribution of overeducated 
graduates is almost equal in all the subjects, except agriculture. 
The most important facts that may prompt individuals into a high pecking 
order position are Party membership, university rank, English skills and 
be a cadre. That is to say, though the rapid expansion of higher education 
in the recent years, graduates from top ranked universities with a good 
English skills are less likely to find a mismatched job. Similar to the 
findings by Frenette (2004) that graduates from computer science, 
electronics have an advantage in finding a fit job, but so does the field of 
language, which contributes negatively in Frenette (2004). Parents' 
background plays a very interesting role in getting a higher level of job 
that Parents belonging to the lowest social rank (i. e. peasants or 
unemployed) are here found to have a significant negative impact on their 
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children's position in the pecking order, other things being equal. However. 
so too are parents with qualifications beyond the master's level. 
Gender, geographic area and industry sector play a role in explaining 
overeduation as well. Female graduates who are working in the east part 
of China and state-owned company are easily to be overeducated. 
However, the labour market in China is not separated by geographic areas 
and industry sectors, which examined by LR test in the final part of this 
chapter. 
This chapter also discusses the goodness of fits of several estimating 
methods on securing a high level of job. The results show the logit model 
gives a better fit than probit model and inserting a quadratic item of 
schooling does not improve the goodness of fit. In addition, there is not an 
equal rate of return on additional years of education, in terms of raising 
the probability of securing a job of a given level, therefore using separate 
Inba etc. instead of lnsch can improve the estimation results. 
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Table 4.1 The growth rate of GDP and higher education in China 
Year Total number of 
undergraduates 
(Units: 
thousand) 
Total number of 
post graduates 
(Units: thousand) 
New entrants of 
undergraduates 
(Units: thousand) 
New entrants of 
postgraduates 
(Units: thousand) 
Percentage increase 
of new entrants in 
higher education 
(oho) 
GDP 
(Units: Yuan billion) 
based on the price of 
1989 
Percentage 
annual increase 
of GDP 
(oho) 
1990 1970 93 579 30 -8.8 1799.02 -8.93 
1995 1956 145 875 51 11.5 3093.00 14.4 
1996 2858 163 907 59 4.3 3315.35 7.19 
1997 2998 176 1064 64 3.5 3537.56 6.70 
1998 3211 199 1011 73 8.4 3752.03 6.06 
1999 3901 234 1505 92 47.3 3986.10 6.24 
2000 5260 301 2078 128 38.1 4328.24 8.58 
2001 6797 393 2518 165 21.6 4675.12 8.01 
2002 8533 501 3002 203 19.5 5093.35 8.95 
2003 10435 651 3553 269 19.3 5611.02 10.16 
2004 13335 820 4473 326 16.7 6304.74 12.36 
2005 15618 979 5044 365 12.7 7219.88 14.52 
Source: China's education statistics bulletin and China's labour statistics bulletin 
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Table 4.2 Incidence of mismatch across education and subjects (%) 
Education 
level 
combined Males Females 
under acquired Over under acquired Over under acquired Over 
diploma 41.1 46.0 12.9 21.8 23.8 7.1 19.3 22.2 5.8 
Bachelor 12.4 66.5 21.1 8.7 42.4 14.3 3.7 24.1 6.8 
Master 7.3 57.0 35.8 3.8 33.5 21.8 3.5 23.5 14.0 
PhD --- 58.0 42.0 --- 43.5 30.4 --- 14.5 11.6 
Total 17.4 62.1 20.5 10.8 38.5 13.5 6.6 23.6 7.0 
Econ 18.9 58.9 22.2 10.3 34.5 11.6 8.6 24.4 10.6 
Law 22.0 58.3 19.6 12.9 27.9 11.0 9.1 30.4 8.6 
Art 18.6 64.1 17.2 6.9 25.0 9.0 11.7 39.2 8.1 
Medicine 17.2 65.5 17.2 7.6 31.7 5.5 9.6 33.8 11.7 
Science 12.2 69.6 18.3 8.5 37.8 12.8 3.7 31.8 5.5 
Engineering 16.8 64.7 18.5 13.1 50.0 14.9 3.7 14.7 3.7 
agriculture 8,3 63.5 28.1 7.3 43.8 21.9 1.0 19.7 6.2 
23 Also includes graduates from polytechnic college 
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Table 4.3 Variable definition 
Variable Description 
Gender female 
cadre be a student representative in the class or in the university 
pmem be a member of Communist Party 
ethic belongs to a Minority 
qualification-- base case college 
lnsch log or total years of higher education over college study 
lnba log of 4 years' bachelor study over 2 years college study 
lnma log of 7 years' master study over 4 years bachelor study 
lnphd log of 10 years' PhD study over 7 years master study 
father's career-- base case unemployment, retired or peasant 
pcarl father is a worker, retailer or a shop assistant 
pcar2 father is a professional technician or clerk 
pcar3 father is a manager, officer or government official 
father's qualification-- base case below junior school 
pqul father's highest qualification is Junior school graduate 
pqu2 father's highest qualification is senior school graduate 
pqu3 father's highest qualification is college graduate 
pqu4 father's highest qualification is bachelor 
pqu5 father's highest qualification is master or above 
registration status-- base case village 
reg 1 be born in a small town 
reg2 be born in a small city 
reg3 be born in a large city 
university rank-- base case polytechnic college 
rank 1 all the other university 
rankt top 100 university 
English qualification-- base case no English qualificaiton 
Eng 1 acquired the qualification of CET-4 
Eni 2 acquired the qualification of CET-6 
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Table 4.3 variable definition-Continue 
Class of degree-- base case below 75% 
grad 1 class of degree is from top 50% to top 75% 
grad2 class of degree is top 50%-25% 
grad3 class of degree is top 25% 
Working location-- base case the West 
East include Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Liaoning, 
Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, Jiangsu 
Hebei, Zhejiang, Hainan 
Mid include Hei longjiang, Jilin, Anhui, Henan 
Jiangxi, Huibei, Hunan, Chongqing 
Sector-- base case "other" 
gov work in the government or related bureau 
jon work in a joint-venture company 
stat work in a state-owned company 
edui work in an education institution 
Work place-- base case village 
wor 1 work in a small town 
wort work in a small city 
wor3 work in a large city 
Degree faculty-- base case "other" 
bio major in biology 
math major in mathematics 
phy major in physics 
elec major in electronic and computer 
cons major in construction 
soc major in sociology 
pol major in politics 
Ian major in language 
lit major in literature 
art major in art 
chem major in chemistry 
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Table 4.3 variable definition-Continue 
econ major in economics 
law major in economics 
med major in medicine 
man major in management 
lev l 
Threshold level I, the job require college graduate 
qualification 
lev2 Threshold level2, the job require first degree qualification 
lev3 Threshold level3, the job require master qualification 
lev4 Threshold level4, the job require PhD qualification 
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Table 4.4 Determinants of the probability of a job offer at different 
levels using the ordered probit model 
Var Ordered probit model Ordered probit model 
comb male female comb male female 
gender -0.251 -0.003 
0.045 0.079 
lnsch 2.648 2.514 3.404 
0.187 0.227 0.370 
lnba 0.602 0.703 1.383 
0.561 0.887 1.321 
lnma 1.910 1.775 2.591 
0.267 0.371 0.620 
lnphd 3.152 3.212 3.405 
0.504 0.605 0.995 
Pcar1 -0.194 -0.165 -0.254 -0.210 -0.176 -0.278 
0.048 0.061 0.082 0.049 0.061 0.083 
Pcar2 0.020 0.039 -0.007 0.018 0.039 -0.016 
0.048 0.060 0.082 0.049 0.060 0.082 
Pcar3 -0.043 -0.038 -0.073 -0.035 -0.031 -0.071 
0.060 0.076 0.101 0.060 0.076 0.101 
Pqu 1 0.029 -0.008 0.085 0.018 -0.017 0.072 
0.048 0.057 0.089 0.048 0.058 0.089 
Pqu2 0.083 0.059 0.131 0.068 0.046 0.112 
0.050 0.060 0.092 0.050 0.060 0.093 
Pqu3 0.101 0.097 0.105 0.083 0.083 0.082 
0.067 0.082 0.119 0.067 0.082 0.120 
Pqu4 -0.018 -0.068 0.066 -0.043 -0.084 0.034 
0.069 0.085 0.121 0.069 0.086 0.123 
Pqu5 -0.581 -0.431 -0.816 -0.617 -0.460 -0.850 
0.130 0.166 0.217 0.130 0.167 0.218 
cadre 0.070 0.067 0.124 -0.097 -0.076 -0.049 
0.039 0.048 0.071 0.058 0.083 0.129 
Reg t -0.12 5 -0.102 -0.168 -0.115 -0.093 -0.152 * 
0.058 0.071 0.105 0.059 0.071 0.105 
Reg2 -0.078* -0.143 0.071 -0.076 -0.139 0.084 
0.046 0.055 0.086 0.046 0.055 0.086 
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Table 4.4 Determinants of the probability of a job offer at different 
levels using the ordered probit model -continued 
Reg3 -0.077 -0.086 -0.012 -0.081 -0.088 -0.004 
0.049 0.060 0.089 0.049 0.060 0.089 
pmem 0.261 0.236 0.318 0.233 0.213 0.289 
0.039 0.050 0.066 0.040 0.052 0.068 
rankt 0.492 0.470 0.582 0.127 0.141 0.231 
0.083 0.107 0.141 0.125 0.187 0.261 
rankt 0.630 0.577 0.797 0.115 0.118 0.292 
0.096 0.123 0.169 0.164 0.247 0.359 
grad1 -0.099 -0.100 -0.216 -0.030 -0.035 -0.137 
0.073 0.082 0.170 0.075 0.088 0.177 
grad2 -0.184 -0.152 -0.420 -0.074 -0.050 -0.293 
0.071 0.081 0.163 0.077 0.094 0.181 
grad3 -0.180 -0.139 -0.426 -0.036 -0.008 -0.266 
0.074 0.085 0.166 0.083 0.105 0.193 
Eng 1 0.102 149vvý 0.002 0.206 0.232 0.110 
0.040 0.049 0.074 0.049 0.063 0.101 
Eng2 0.058 0.083 -0.024 0.201 0.204 0.135 
0.055 0.070 0.093 0.066 0.089 0.136 
Worl -0.060 -0.088 -0.081 -0.070 -0.107 -0.082 
0.164 0.201 0.291 0.164 0.202 0.291 
Wor2 0.172 0.212 -0.020 0.162 0.202 -0.023 
0.155 0.187 0.284 0.155 0.187 0.284 
Wor3 0.440 0.506 0.205 0.429 0.496 0.205 
0.153 0.184 0.282 0.153 0.184 0.282 
east -0.031 0.010 -0.125 * -0.037 0.007 -0.125 
0.039 0.049 0.067 0.039 0.049 0.067 
mid 0.031 -0.055 0.295 0.025 -0.060 0.295 
0.060 0.074 0.110 0.060 0.074 0.110 
Gov 0.022 -0.102 0.326 0.019 -0.103 0.327 
0.059 0.073 0.104 0.059 0.073 0.104 
Stat -0.046 -0.058 -0.042 -0.043 -0.057 -0.043 
0.045 0.056 0.082 0.045 0.056 0.082 
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Table 4.4 Determinants of the probability of a job offer at different 
levels using the ordered probit model -continued 
Jon 0.120 0.116 0.135 0.120 0.117 0.131 
0.066 0.083 0.110 0.066 0.083 0.110 
edui 0.310 0.299 0.335 0.305 0.294 0.334 
0.051 0.067 0.082 0.051 0.067 0.082 
Bio -0.306 -0.382 -0.204 -0.290 -0.380 -0.181 
0.144 0.188 0.233 0.144 0.188 0.234 
Math -0.076 -0.265 0.062 -0.068 -0.252 0.076 
0.097 0.140 0.146 0.097 0.140 0.146 
Phy -0.131 -0.061 -0.266 -0.119 -0.051 -0.256 
0.097 0.115 0.191 0.097 0.115 0.191 
Elec 0.179 0.195 0.065 0.185 0.197 0.073 
0.048 0.055 0.100 0.048 0.055 0.101 
Cons 0.082 0.058 0.233 0.086 0.057 0.228 
0.080 0.091 0.167 0.080 0.091 0.167 
Soc 0.269 -0.009 0.890 0.263 -0.023 0.877 
0.238 0.297 0.407 0.238 0.297 0.407 
Pol -0.111 -0.293 0.014 -0.092 -0.291 0.032 
0.136 0.194 0.200 0.136 0.194 0.200 
Lan 0.180 -0.062 0.270 0.203 -0.059 0.286 
0.078 0.147 0.106 0.078 0.147 0.107 
Lit -0.009 -0.006 0.021 -0.010 -0.007 0.020 
0.074 0.103 0.117 0.075 0.103 0.117 
Art 0.163 0.185 0.167 0.140 0.158 0.167 
0.147 0.197 0.227 0.147 0.197 0.227 
Chem 0.032 -0.044 0.411 0.047 -0.039 0.437 
0.135 0.154 0.289 0.135 0.154 0.289 
econ -0.027 -0.035 0.016 -0.016 -0.034 0.030 
0.081 0.104 0.137 0.082 0.104 0.137 
Law 0.098 0.194 -0.053 0.104 0.199 -0.047 
0.108 0.149 0.164 0.108 0.149 0.164 
med 0.169 0.227 0.144 0.175 0.232 0.157 
0.106 0.155 0.156 0.107 0.155 0.157 
man 0.016 0.068 -0.046 0.020 0.068 -0.040 
0.053 0.065 0.097 0.053 0.065 0.097 
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Table 4.4 Determinants of the probability of a job offer at different 
levels using the ordered probit model -continued 
Mill -0.329 -0.328 -0.412 0.032 0.008 -0.073 
0.039 0.050 0.072 0.101 0.166 0.224 
Lev 1 1.463 1.491 1.943 -0.798 -0.551 -0.453 
0.299 (0.364) (0.619) 0.655 1.028 1.625 
Lev2 2.481 2.460 3.097 0.219 0.417 0.700 
0.298 (0.364) (0.617) 0.655 1.028 1.625 
Lev3 4.410 4.320 5.237 2.149 2.276 2.840 
0.301 (0.367) (0.622) 0.656 1.029 1.626 
Lev4 5.620 5.477 6.671 3.373 3.442 4.285 
0.309 (0.375) (0.646) 0.656 1.029 1.629 
Logli -5445.99 -3608.95 -1773.26 -5437.94 -3605.72 - 
hood 1771.92 
Pseud 0.100 0.091 0.145 0.102 0.092 0.146 
oR2 
Obs 5289 3393 1896 5289 3393 1896 
Note: the results were estimated by probit model in Stata 8. * means the 
coefficient is significant at the lO per cent level, ** means the coefficient is 
significant at the 5 per cent level and *** means the coefficient is significant at 
the 1 percent level. 
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The first step probit estimation of table 4.4 
Var comb male female comb male female 
gender -0.137"' -0.138**' 
0.027 0.026 
lnsch 0.343*** 0.251""" 0.424"' 
0.055 0.073 0.087 
lnba 0.220"s 0.306"' 0.398"' 
0.030 0.035 0.042 
lnma 0.263`"' 0.344"' 0.457"" 
0.052 0.060 0.071 
lnphd -0.105 0.145' -0.022 
0.075 0.079 0.112 
Pcar1 -0.080*' -0.026 -0.146* -0.082" 0.000 -0.172*' 
0.038 0.051 0.057 0.038 0.045 0.052 
Pcar2 0.076`" 0.082 0.065 0.072"" 0.066 0.091" 
0.037 0.051 0.056 0.037 0.046 0.051 
Pcar3 0.228**' 0.254""` 0.193'"" 0.223"`" 0.216'"" 0.216'"" 
0.048 0.066 0.072 0.048 0.058 0.066 
Pqu 1 0.131* 0.075 0.192* 0.124" 0.025 0.064 
0.073 0.097 0.111 0.072 0.086 0.101 
Pqu2 0.132" 0.132 0.120 0.129' 0.085 0.010 
0.072 0.097 0.110 0.072 0.086 0.099 
Pqu3 0.196`"* 0.258"'" 0.115 0.193"" 0.221"' 0.044 
0.067 0.088 0.102 0.066 0.078 0.092 
Pqu4 0.026 0.074 -0.046 0.026 0.056 -0.048 
0.067 0.088 0.103. 0.067 0.078 0.093 
Pqu5 -0.065 -0.000 -0.166 -0.070 -0.007 -0.147 
0.069 0.091 0.109 0.069 0.080 0.098 
cadre 0.101*** 0.093* 0.111*** 0.102"" 0.141 "" 0.140""' 
0.026 0.035 0.039 0.026 0.031 0.036 
Reg 1 -0.202"' -0.154"" -0.250'" -0.210"' -0.067 -0.200"" 
0.034 0.047 0.050 0.034 0.042 0.045 
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The first step probit estimation of table 4.4-continued 
Reg2 -0.220"' -0.180'" -0.263"' -0.225'x' -0.093' -0.261"' 
0.045 0.061 0.065 0.044 0.054 0.059 
Reg3 0.207"' 0.131" 0.309"" 0.213"' 0.046 0.255'' 
0.037 0.049 0.059 0.037 0.044 0.053 
pmem -0.051 -0.047 -0.061 -0.049 0.011 -0.013 
0.033 0.045 0.048 0.033 0.040 0.043 
rankl 0.454"' 0.472"' 0.413"' 0.407"' 0.648"' 0.417"' 
0.039 0.053 0.060 0.040 0.048 0.055 
rankt 0.462"' 0.495"' 0.420"' 0.424"' 0.587"' 0.439"' 
0.048 0.063 0.075 0.049 0.056 0.067 
gradl -0.192"' -0.175"' -0.220"' -0.186` -0.100` -0.138"' 
0.029 0.040 0.042 0.028 0.035 0.038 
grad2 -0.232"' -0.203"' -0.279"' -0.234"' -0.135"' -0.158"' 
0.038 0.048 0.063 0.038 0.042 0.056 
grad3 -0.288"' -0.232"' -0.417"' -0.281 "' -0.190"' -0.216" 
0.059 0.068 0.126 0.058 0.060 0.110 
Eng 1 0.709'*' 0.750"' 0.669" 0.706"' 0.543*** 0.596"' 
0.040 0.053 0.060 0.039 0.047 0.054 
Eng2 0.385"* 0.327"' 0.474"' 0.400"' 0.139"' 0.316"' 
0.037 0.049 0.056 0.037 0.044 0.051 
Bio -0.102 -0.121 -0.012 -0.142' -0.334*' -0.105 
0.088 0.123 0.128 0.087 0.111 0.119 
Math -0.274"" -0.545"' 0.026 -0.290"' -0.474"' 0.089 
0.067 0.097 0.099 0.067 0.084 0.088 
Phy -0.441"' -0.481"' -0.336" -0.451"' -0.245"' -0.159 
0.080 0.096 0.148 0.080 0.080 0.125 
Elec 0.013 0.017 0.019 0.027 0.056 0.010 
0.039 0.047 0.071 0.039 0.042 0.064 
Cons 0.484"' 0.492'" 0.480" 0.464*" 0.447"' 0.643"' 
0.093 0.108 0.181 0.092 0.095 0.158 
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The first step probit estimation of table 4.4-continued 
Soc -0.400"` -0.401" -0.383' -0.407"' -0.509"' -0.503" 
0.152 0.204 0.228 0.152 0.186 0.230 
Pol -0.469"' -0.579"' -0.336'« -0.494. -0.597"' -0.300"' 
0.095 0.158 0.123 0.095 0.136 0.114 
Lan -0.089 -0.256" 0.024 -0.102* -0.188" 0.094 
0.056 0.107 0.074 0.056 0.096 0.068 
Lit -0.260"" -0.415"' -0.107 -0.275"` -0.353"' -0.132' 
0.054 0.080 0.078 0.054 0.071 0.072 
Art -0.267"' -0.357"' -0.137 -0.270"* -0.385"' -0.247" 
0.078 0.113 0.111 0.078 0.103 0.105 
Chem -0.361"' -0.411'"' -0.280' -0.373"' -0.315"' -0.429" 
0.089 0.113 0.148 0.089 0.101 0.139 
econ -0.223"' -0.284"' -0.124 -0.237'" -0.251"' -0.128 
0.063 0.086 0.094 0.063 0.077 0.087 
Law -0.403 -0.467"' -0.317"' -0.428"' -0.542"' -0.449" 
0.078 0.110 0.114 0.078 0.010 0.105 
med -0.405'" -0.286" -0.419"' -0.428"' -0.458"' -0.488"' 
0.086 0.126 0.120 0.086 0.110 0.106 
man 0.092" 0.143 0.003 0.095" 0.090' 0.016 
0.042 0.055 0.070 0.043 0.049 0.063 
const 0.06500 
-0.121 -0.091 "' -0.286' 0.125 -0.013 
. 118 0.101 0.131 0.156 0.085 0.098 
Loglih - - - - - - 
ood 8677.40 4932.75 3698.01 8729.71 4975.59 3707.48 
82 47 76 19 32 59 
Pseudo 0.1974 
0.2024 0.1977 0.2052 0.2038 0.2087 
R2 
Obs 16005 9235 6770 16005 9235 6770 
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Table 4.5 Determinants of the probability of a job offer at different 
levels using the ordered logit model 
Ordered logit model Ordered logit model 
comb male female comb male female 
gende -0.495 -0.017 
r 0.080 0.140 
lnsch 5.279 5.021 6.683 
0.344 0.414 0.702 
lnba 1.469 1.192 3.576 
0.981 1.541 2.386 
lnma 3.959 3.548 5.444 
0.473 0.651 1.137 
Inphd 6.190 6.266 6.661 
0.915 1.087 1.860 
Pcarl -0.313 -0.271 -0.384 -0.344 -0.294 -0.422 
0.087 0.109 0.148 0.087 0.109 0.150 
Pcar2 0.036 0.034 0.068 0.033 0.037 0.053 
0.087 0.108 0.151 0.087 0.108 0.151 
Pcar3 -0.061 -0.063 -0.047 -0.047 -0.050 -0.044 
0.110 0.139 0.185 0.110 0.139 0.185 
Pqu 1 0.048 0.003 0.124 0.032 -0.015 0.105 
0.086 0.102 0.160 0.086 0.103 0.161 
Pqu2 0.150 0.132 0.196 0.124 0.105 0.170 
0.089 0.107 0.167 0.090 0.108 0.168 
Pqu3 0.191 0.208 0.179 0.164 0.179 0.147 
0.120 0.146 0.216 0.120 0.147 0.218 
Pqu4 -0.012 -0.066 0.108 -0.056 -0.100 0.061 
0.125 0.154 0.220 0.125 0.155 0.223 
Pqu5 -1.292 -0.869 -2.057 -1.358 -0.929 -2.097 
0.250 0.314 0.416 0.250 0.315 0.416 
cadre 0.129 0.123 0.211 -0.184 -0.182 -0.058 
0.071 0.086 0.131 0.103 0.145 0.237 
Reg 1 -0.224 -0.186 -0.324 -0.205 -0.170 -0.299 
0.105 0.128 0.189 0.105 0.128 0.189 
Reg2 -0.184 -0.304www 0.052 -0.184 -0.299 0.070 
0.083 0.099 0.158 0.083 0.100 0.158 
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Table 4.5 Determinants of the probability of a job offer at different 
levels using the ordered logit model-continued 
Reg3 -0.164 -0.182 -0.063 -0.173 -0.186 -0.052 
0.089 0.109 0.162 0.089 0.109 0.162 
pme 0.505 0.457 0.631 0.452 0.409 0.587 
m 0.072 0.091 0.121 0.073 0.094 0.126 
rank 1 0.908 0.897 1.031 0.224 0.194 0.490 
0.146 0.187 0.252 0.219 0.327 0.470 
rank2 1.193 1.120 1.475 0.231 0.142 0.697 
0.171 0.216 0.307 0.287 0.433 0.648 
grad 1 -0.185 -0.216 -0.203 -0.060 -0.081 -0.079 
0.136 0.150 0.329 0.139 0.158 0.341 
grad2 -0.342 -0.318 -0.577 -0.140 -0.104 -0.378 
0.132 0.147 0.318 0.141 0.168 0.349 
grad3 -0.321 -0.286 -0.554 -0.058 -0.014 -0.307 
0.138 0.156 0.323 0.152 0.188 0.369 
Eng1 0.185 0.284 -0.031 0.382 0.459 0.138 
0.073 0.088 0.134 0.087 0.112 0.184 
Eng2 0.082 0.153 -0.131 0.349 0.410 0.113 
0.101 0.128 0.172 0.119 0.159 0.248 
Worl 0.348 0.369 0.320 0.323 0.323 0.312 
0.299 0.378 0.506 0.299 0.378 0.507 
Wor2 0.776 0.897 0.463 0.749 0.873 0.453 
0.286 0.358 0.496 0.287 0.357 0.497 
Wor3 1.23 8 1.403 0.854' 1.207 1.379 0.845' 
0.284 0.353 0.493 0.284 0.353 0.494 
east -0.038 0.022 -0.190 -0.049 0.015 -0.187 
0.070 0.087 0.123 0.070 0.088 0.123 
mid 0.074 -0.087 0.562 0.061 -0.100 0.560 
0.110 0.133 0.203 0.110 0.134 0.203 
Gov 0.097 -0.138 0.670 0.091 -0.143 
0.673 
0.107 0.130 0.191 0.107 0.131 0.192 
Stat -0.090 -0.126 -0.037 -0.086 -0.123 -0.038 
0.081 0.098 0.147 0.081 0.098 0.147 
Jon 0.225' 0.227 0.213 0.2241 0.227 0.212 
0.118 0.149 0.199 0.118 0.149 0.199 
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Table 4.5 Determinants of the probability of a job offer at different 
levels using the ordered logit model-continued 
edui 0.607 ***+ 0.573 0.667 0.591 0.552 0.663 
0.093 0.121 0.151 0.093 0.122 0.151 
Bio -0.462 -0.567 -0.381 -0.428 -0.555 -0.344 
0.258 0.341 0.416 0.259 0.341 0.417 
Math -0.050 -0.35 0.069 -0.035 -0.311 0.095 
0.176 0.263 0.264 0.176 0.264 0.264 
Phy -0.157 -0.007 -0.499 -0.132 0.022 -0.480 
0.171 0.202 0.339 0.171 0.202 0.339 
Elec 0.373 0.422 0.078 0.384 0.424 0.091 
0.087 0.100 0.184 0.087 0.100 0.185 
Cons 0.160 0.125 0.398 0.169 0.124 0.388 
0.142 0.160 0.305 0.142 0.160 0.305 
Soc 0.596 0.138 1.565 0.589 0.117 1.552 
0.427 0.519 0.716 0.428 0.519 0.716 
Pol -0.190 -0.491 -0.070 -0.150 -0.482 -0.043 
0.235 0.336 0.352 0.235 0.336 0.352 
Lan 0.360 -0.086 0.459 0.405 -0.085 0.485 
0.138 0.259 0.191 0.139 0.259 0.192 
Lit 0.000 0.048 -0.063 -0.002 0.044 -0.062 
0.134 0.186 0.210 0.134 0.186 0.210 
Art 0.299 0.377 0.196 0.259 0.335 0.199 
0.251 0.333 0.400 0.250 0.333 0.399 
Chem 0.115 0.018 0.555 0.142 0.031 0.596 
0.243 0.274 0.542 0.243 0.274 0.542 
econ -0.020 -0.019 -0.054 0.003 -0.016 -0.031 
0.146 0.185 0.247 0.146 0.186 0.248 
Law 0.171 0.390 -0.220 0.177 0.399 -0.211 
0.206 0.286 0.313 0.206 0.286 0.312 
med 0.319 0.450 0.201 0.327 0.460 0.221 
0.193 0.275 0.292 0.193 0.275 0.293 
man 0.039 0.178 -0.196 0.048 0.179 -0.186 
0.095 0.117 0.174 0.095 0.117 0.174 
Mill -0.655 -0.658 -0.801 0.015 0.053 -0.281 
0.070 0.089 0.134 0.176 0.289 0.404 
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Table 4.5 Determinants of the probability of a job offer at different 
levels using the ordered logit model-continued 
Lev 1 3.697 4.563 -0.646 -0.632 0.881 3.573 
(0.671) 1.146 1.153 1.799 (2.933) 
Lev2 5.508 6.746 1.265 1.176 3.061 
5.491 
(0.670) 1.140 1.153 1.799 (2.933) 
Lev3 8.723 10.525 4.616 4.388 6.839 
8.840 
(0.678) 1.156 1.155 1.801 (2.938) 
Lev4 11.151 13.505 7.228 6.863 9.855 
11.390 
(0.713) 1.231 1.160 1.804 (2.950) 
Logli -5380.322 -5371.241 -3565.555 -1746.893 
-3569.866 -1747.856 hood 
Pseud 0.1111 0.1126 0.1021 0.1579 
0.1010 0.1575 
o R2 
obs 5289 3393 1896 5289 3393 1896 
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Table 4.6 A Quadratic lnsch model for the determinants of the 
probability of a higher level job offer 
Ordered logit model Ordered logit model 
comb male female comb male female 
gende -0.012 -0.017 
r 0.139 0.140 
lnsch -2.863 -3.535 0.578 
1.951 3.030 4.465 
lnba -1.560 -1.875 0.316 
1.035 1.553 2.298 
lnma -0.895 -1.366 0.220 
0.883 1.088 1.665 
lnphd 
(lnsc 2.060 2.147 1.460 1.457 1.475 1.568 
h)2 0.487 0.754 1.056 0.215 0.256 0.438 
Pcar1 -0.343 -0.292 -0.422 -0.344 -0.294 -0.422 
0.087 0.109 0.150 0.087 0.109 0.150 
Pcar2 0.033 0.038 0.053 0.033 0.037 0.053 
0.087 0.108 0.151 0.087 0.108 0.151 
Pcar3 -0.046 -0.045 -0.044 -0.047 -0.050 -0.044 
0.110 0.139 0.185 0.110 0.139 0.185 
Pqu 1 0.032 -0.017 0.106 0.032 -0.015 0.105 
0.086 0.103 0.161 0.086 0.103 0.161 
Pqu2 0.123 0.103 0.171 0.124 0.105 0.170 
0.090 0.108 0.168 0.090 0.108 0.168 
Pqu3 0.163 0.175 0.147 0.164 0.179 0.147 
0.120 0.147 0.218 0.120 0.147 0.218 
Pqu4 -0.058 -0.107 0.062 -0.056 -0.100 0.061 
0.125 0.155 0.223 0.125 0.155 0.223 
Pqu5 -1.359w*w -0.936 -2.096 -1.358 -0.929 -2.097 
0.250 0.315 0.416 0.250 0.315 0.416 
cadre -0.187 -0.202 -0.055 -0.184 -0.182 -0.058 
0.103 0.143 0.233 0.103 0.145 0.237 
Reg I -0.205 -0.170 -0.300 -0.205 -0.170 -0.299 
0.105 0.128 0.189 0.105 0.128 0.189 
Reg2 -0.185 -0.299 0.069 -0.184 -0.300 0.070 
0.083 0.099 0.158 0.083 0.099 0.158 
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Table 4.6 A Quadratic lnsch model for the determinants of the 
probability of a higher level job offer-continued 
Reg3 -0.173 -0.184 -0.052 -0.173 -0.186 -0.052 
0.089 0.109 0.162 0.089 0.109 0.162 
pme 0.450 0.402 0.587w*w 0.452 0.409 0.587 
m 0.073 0.093 0.125 0.073 0.094 0.126 
rank 1 0.218 0.152 0.496 0.224 0.194 0.490 
0.219 0.321 0.461 0.219 0.327 0.470 
rankt 0.221 0.081 0.706 0.231 0.142 0.697 
0.286 0.423 0.634 0.287 0.433 0.648 
grad1 -0.059 -0.074 -0.080 -0.060 -0.081 -0.079 
0.139 0.158 0.340 0.139 0.158 0.341 
grad2 -0.139 -0.091 -0.379 -0.140 -0.104 -0.378 
0.141 0.167 0.348 0.141 0.168 0.349 
grad3 -0.055 0.005 -0.310 -0.058 -0.014 -0.307 
0.152 0.186 0.367 0.152 0.188 0.369 
Engt 0.385 0.471 0.135 0.382 0.459 0.138 
0.087 0.110 0.180 0.087 0.112 0.184 
Eng2 0.350 0.420 0.110 0.349 0.410 0.113 
0.119 0.158 0.245 0.119 0.159 0.248 
Worl 0.323 0.322 0.312 0.323 0.323 0.312 
0.299 0.378 0.507 0.299 0.378 0.507 
Wor2 0.749 0.874 0.453 0.749 0.873 0.453 
0.287 0.357 0.497 0.287 0.357 0.497 
Wor3 1.206 1.377 0.845 1.207 1.379 0.845 
0.284 0.352 0.494 0.284 0.353 0.494 
east -0.049 0.014 -0.187 -0.049 0.015 -0.187 
0.070 0.088 0.123 0.070 0.088 0.123 
mid 0.062 -0.097 0.560 0.061 -0.100 0.560 
0.110 0.133 0.203 0.110 0.134 0.203 
Gov 0.091 -0.144 0.673 0.091 -0.143 0.673 
0.107 0.130 0.192 0.107 0.131 0.192 
Stat -0.086 -0.122 -0.038 -0.086 -0.123 -0.038 
0.081 0.098 0.147 0.081 0.098 0.147 
Jon 0.224 0.227 0.212 0.224' 0.227 0.212 
0.118 0.149 0.199 0.118 0.149 0.199 
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Table 4.6 A Quadratic lnsch 
probability of a higher 
model for the determinants of the 
level job offer-continued 
edui 0.592*vv 0.554 0.663wow 0.591ww* 0.552vv. 0.663 
0.093 0.122 0.151 0.093 0.122 0.151 
Bio -0.425' -0.551 -0.345 -0.428' -0.555 -0.344 
0.259 0.341 0.417 0.259 0.341 0.417 
Math -0.033 -0.305 0.094 -0.035 -0.311 0.095 
0.176 0.264 0.264 0.176 0.264 0.264 
Phy -0.131 0.025 -0.481 -0.132 0.021 -0.480 
0.171 0.202 0.339 0.171 0.202 0.339 
Elec 0.386 0.430v*w 0.090 0.384 0.424 0.091 
0.087 0.100 0.185 0.087 0.100 0.185 
Cons 0.171 0.128 0.388 0.169 0.124 0.388 
0.142 0.160 0.305 0.142 0.160 0.305 
Soc 0.592 0.121 1.551 0.589 0.117 1.552 
0.428 0.519 0.716 0.428 0.519 0.716 
Pol -0.147 -0.475 -0.044 -0.150 -0.482 -0.043 
0.235 0.336 0.352 0.235 0.336 0.352 
Lan 0.407 -0.085 0.484 0.405 -0.085 0.485 
0.139 0.259 0.192 0.139 0.259 0.192 
Lit -0.001 0.048 -0.063 -0.002 0.044 -0.062 
0.134 0.186 0.210 0.134 0.186 0.210 
Art 0.259 0.333 0.199 0.259 0.335 0.199 
0.250 0.333 0.399 0.250 0.333 0.399 
Chem 0.143 0.035 0.596 0.142 0.031 0.596 
0.243 0.274 0.542 0.243 0.274 0.542 
econ 0.005 -0.011 -0.032 0.003 -0.016 -0.031 
0.146 0.185 0.248 0.146 0.186 0.248 
Law 0.179 0.407 -0.211 0.177 0.399 -0.211 
0.206 0.286 0.312 0.206 0.286 0.313 
med 0.330 0.466 0.220 0.327 0.460 0.221 
0.193 0.275 0.293 0.193 0.275 0.293 
man 0.051 0.184 -0.187 0.048 0.179 -0.186 
0.095 0.117 0.174 0.095 0.117 0.174 
Mill 0.023 0.101 -0.287 0.015 0.053 -0.281 
0.175 0.281 0.395 0.176 0.289 0.404 
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Table 4.6 A Quadratic lnsch 
probability of a higher 
model for the determinants of the 
level job offer-continued 
Levi -1.687 -2.334 2.028 0.054 0.077 1.635 
2.231 3.458 5.407 1.168 1.821 2.999 
Lev2 0.223 -0.527 4.207 1.965 1.885 3.814 
2.232 3.458 5.407 1.168 1.821 2.999 
Lev3 3.576 2.688 7.985 5.316 5.097 7.593 
2.233 3.460 5.412 1.170 1.822 3.000 
Lev4 6.184 5.155 11.003 7.928 7.572 10.608 
2.231 3.456 5.408 1.177 1.828 3.019 
Logli - - - - - -1746.893 
hood 5371.305 3565.798 1746.895 5371.241 3565.554 
9 4 4 4 8 
Pseud 0.1126 0.1126 0.1021 0.1579 
0.1020 0.1579 
o R2 
obs 5289 3393 1896 5289 3393 1896 
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Table 4.7 Determinants of the probability of a job offer at different 
levels using ordered logit model by geographical area 
Var east middle west 
male female male female male female 
Insch 4.934 6.902 6.891 9.763 1.861 8.227 
0.435 0.777 1.854 4.869 1.097 1.721 
lnpca -0.026 -0.046 0.168 0.164 -0.065 -0.240 
0.104 0.144 0.320 0.480 0.158 0.227 
lnpqu 0.047 0.183 -0.450 -0.105 0.071 -0.105 
0.101 0.152 0.310 0.589 0.156 0.234 
cadre 0.049 0.234 0.028 -0.136 -0.098 0.443' 
0.105 0.159 0.289 0.661 0.174 0.270 
Inregi -0.238 -0.134 -0.027 -0.662 -0.275 0.071 
S 0.091 0.141 0.275 0.455 0.140 0.221 
proem 0.437 0.597 0.620 0.308 0.398 0.536 
0.114 0.156 0.326 0.495 0.176 0.224 
Inran 0.754 1.394 1.018 3.549 0.756' 1.886 
k 0.210 0.321 0.678 1.681 0.443 0.648 
ingra -0.213 -0.447 0.262 0.172 -0.306 -0.823 
d 0.129 0.223 0.352 0.752 0.209 0.359 
InEng 0.155 -0.334 0.484 -0.083 0.677 0.067 
0.133 0.190 0.369 0.720 0.237 0.328 
Inwor 1.765 0.829 0.135 3.302 1.258 0.670 
0.249 0.309 0.721 1.535 0.267 0.448 
Gov -0.027 0.650 -0.147 2.474 -0.104 0.216 
0.165 0.235 0.480 0.880 0.248 0.358 
Stat -0.121 0.139 -0.118 -0.133 0.002 -0.280 
0.123 0.181 0.305 0.599 0.202 0.294 
Jon 0.172 0.312 1.305 0.926 0.019 -0.198 
0.172 0.229 0.550 1.021 0.400 0.461 
edui 0.633 0.775 0.309 0.459 0.681 0.353 
0.157 0.187 0.408 0.673 0.233 0.299 
Bio -0.115 -0.542 -0.964 -0.164 
0.506 0.608 0.484 0.595 
Math -0.842 0.435 -0.575 0.242 0.363 0.075 
0.346 0.420 1.007 1.022 0.443 0.418 
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Table 4.7 Determinants of the probability of a job offer at different 
levels using ordered logit model by geographical area-continued 
Phy 0.149 -0.150 -0.102 -1.344 
0.334 0.460 0.288 0.549 
Elec 0.537 -0.098 0.298 1.232 0.042 0.277 
0.123 0.234 0.346 0.777 0.198 0.363 
Cons 0.288 0.296 0.557 -0.151 -0.402 1.031 
0.196 0.358 0.498 1.440 0.374 0.663 
Soc 0.787 2.063 -1.982 -0.372 0.481 
0.634 0.774 1.054 2.581 1.323 
Pol -0.614 0.332 -0.892 0.923 1.260 -1.278 
0.393 0.490 0.829 1.062 1.065 0.811 
Lan 0.255 0.682 -0.239 2.712 -1.01 -0.196 
0.340 0.242 0.933 1.033 0.498 0.364 
Lit -0.472 0.051 -1.067 1.495 1.270 -0.403 
0.216 0.242 0.970 1.267 0.382 0.506 
Art 0.202 0.579 6.159 1.075 0.375 -0.403 
0.473 0.681 2.003 2.738 0.493 0.571 
Chem 0.150 1.217 0.008 -0.691 -0.120 
0.352 0.837 0.780 0.566 0.723 
econ 0.180 -0.113 -0.949 0.965 -0.423 0.051 
0.246 0.285 0.440 1.069 0.403 0.577 
Law 0.700 -0.206 -2.556 1.260 0.146 -0.696 
0.349 0.368 0.948 1.214 0.543 0.700 
med -0.645 -0.958 0.207 0.867 0.640 0.936 
0.575 0.390 1.961 1.305 0.325 0.448 
man 0.145 0.044 0.545 0.347 0.098 -0.510 
0.144 0.217 0.341 0.765 0.259 0.353 
Mills -0.575*h* -0.827*** -0.913*** -1.562* -0.110 -1.0968*' 
ratio 0.095 0.148 0.359 0.880 0.216 0.314 
Lev 1 4.196 5.400 4.484 13.554 0.483 5.728 
0.614 1.138 2.362 6.787 1.363 2.345 
Lev- 5.923 7.413 6.296 15.829 2.537 8.162 
0.610 1.129 2.353 6.779 1.357 2.334 
Lev3 9.240 11.267 9.58-5 20.241 5.641 11.864 
0.628 1.162 2.371 6.873 1.371 2.354 
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Table 4.7 Determinants of the probability of a job offer at different 
levels using ordered logit model by geographical area--continued 
Lev4 11.768 14.795 12.606 23.154 7.751 14.411 
0.685 1.307 2.633 7.015 1.402 2.515 
Logli 
-2221.661 -1080.116 -345.874 -128.690 -967.513 -516.765 hood 
Pseu- 
0.1102 0.1520 0.1177 0.2206 0.0965 0.1717 
-doR2 
obs 2159 1191 336 159 898 546 
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Table 4.8 Determinants of the probability of a job offer at different levels using ordered logit model by industrial sector area 
variables gov Stat Jon Edui others 
gender 0.371' -0.460 -0.407 -0.515 -0.587 
0.212 0,147 0.303 0.138 0.209 
lnsch 4.420 5.145 3.682"ww 5.362 4.444- 
0.769 0.629 1.153 0.517 0.985 
lnpca -0.114 -0.066 0.037 0.022 0.088 
0.095 0.059 0.109 0.066 0.080 
lnpqu -0.027 -0.035 0.034 -0.046 0.135 
0.082 0.048 0.100 0.055 0.069 
cadre -0.122 0.000 0.577 -0.063 0.027 
0.200 0.118 0.247 0.131 0.161 
lnregis -0.127 -0.077 0.005 0.017 -0.179 
0.086 0.049 0.098 0.056 0.066 
pmem 0.597 0.431 0.938 0.436www 0.549 
0.190 0.123 0.285 0.138 0.180 
Inrank -0.120 0.542 0.842 0.400 0.308' 
0.200 0.123 0.271 0.123 0.178 
Ingrad -0.040 -0.002 -0.084 -0.075 -0.142 
0.105 0.063 0.134 0.069 0.083 
InEng -0.279 0.032 -0.420 -0.049 0.090 
0.228 0.143 0.280 0.148 0.217 
Inwor 0.489 0.366 0.148 0.598'ww 0.442ww* 
0.170 0.103 0.227 0.083 0.116 
east 0.252 0.023 0.190 -0.203 -0.144 
0.200 0.115 0.311 0.134 0.167 
Mid 0.489 0.082 0.551 -0.078 -0.043 
0.365 0.174 0.505 0.223 0.260 
Bio 0.886 -1.570 0.953 -0.407 -0.079 
1.374 0.826 2.016 0.318 0.711 
Math -0.027 -0.475 0.018 1.025 
0.551 0.589 0.219 1.047 
Phy 0.448 0.290 0.673 -0.200 -0.477 
0.831 0.702 2.008 0.216 0.806 
Elec 0.432 0.584"ww 0.028 0.102 0.180 
0.272 0.138 0.300 0.185 0.200 
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Table 4.8 Determinants of the probability of a job offer at different 
levels using ordered logit model by industrial sector area-continued 
Cons 0.516 0.263 0.211 -0.071 0.295 
0.467 0.200 0.834 0.420 0.307 
Soc 1.268 -0.689 -0.658 0.974 -0.091 
0.773 0.996 1.203 0.956 1.039 
Pol -0.977 -0.160 -0.630 0.048 0.762 
0.516 0.627 2.030 0.322 0.834 
Lan 0.624 0.426 -0.179 0.338 0.623' 
0.430 0.312 0.394 0.234 0.339 
Lit -0.014 -0.007 -0.561 -0.115 0.298 
0.320 0.271 0.681 0.220 0.347 
Art 0.283 0.828 -0.177 -0.154 0.540 
1.113 0.478 1.299 0.512 0.427 
Chem -0.597 0.361 0.978 -0.613 0.188 
0.923 0.475 0.630 0.392 0.641 
econ 0.055 0.109 -0.520 0.585 -0.507 
0.396 0.236 0.409 0.548 0.309 
Law 0.202 0.487 -0.205 0.718 0.192 
0.351 0.420 0.669 0.679 0.503 
med 0.291 0.776 -0.866 0.536 -0.057 
0.480 0.347 0.803 0.479 0.368 
man 0.198 -0.037 0.110 0.283 -0.007 
0.282 0.150 0.323 0.254 0.212 
Mills -0.415*** -0.560* 
* 
-0.416' -0.597**S -0.425" 
ratio 0.154 0.121 0.222 0.105 0.176 
Lev 1 2.288 3.531 2.483 4.019 2.408 
1.285 0.876 1.902 0.807 1.280 
Lev2 3.724 5.706 4.599 5.619 4.556 
1.279 0.871 1.892 0.803 1.278 
Lev3 6.969 9.160 8.029 8.924 7.997 
1.301 0.892 1.928 0.816 1.302 
Lev4 9.554 11.968 10.478 11.419 10.676 
1.369 0.958 1.995 0.878 1.376 
Loglihood -673.879 -1754.061 -429.750 -1479.321 -989.859 
PseudoR2 0.0950 0.0911 0.1136 0.1462 0.0965 
obs 636 1805 428 1428 992 
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Table 4.9 Determinants of the probability of a job offer at different 
levels using the Logarithm of level variables 
Ordered probit model Ordered lo it model 
comb male female comb male female 
gende -0.201 -0.396 
r 0.043 0.076 
lnsch 2.336 2.167 3.045*ww 4.674 4.291 6.044 
0.165 0.200 0.326 0.303 0.363 0.612 
lnpca -0.007 -0.002 -0.014 -0.012 -0.011 -0.003 
r 0.018 0.023 0.031 0.033 0.042 0.057 
lnpqu -0.007 -0.007 -0.009 -0.007 -0.002 -0.018 
0.015 0.019 0.026 0.028 0.034 0.049 
cadre -0.001 -0.002 0.043 0.004 -0.005 0.076 
0.037 0.045 0.067 0.066 0.081 0.122 
lnreg -0.035 -0.046 -0.005 -0.072 -0.094 -0.020 
0.016 0.019 0.028 0.028 0.034 0.051 
pme 0.264 0.248 0.312 0.497 0.470 0.598 
m 0.039 0.050 0.065 
- 
0.071 0.091 0.120 
lnran 0.183 0.143 4 w 0.372 0.2970ww 0.560 
k 0.037 0.045 0.069 0.068 0.081 0.129 
ingra -0.041 -0.028 -0.086 -0.066 -0.051 -0.125 
d 0.020 0.024 0.036 0.036 0.042 0.066 
1nEng 0.039 0.061' -0.007 0.058 0.112 -0.054 
0.027 0.034 0.045 0.049 0.061 0.084 
lnwor 0.253 0.282 0.191 0.483 0.538 0.367w*w 
0.028 0.034 0.047 0.049 0.062 0.086 
east -0.045 -0.002 -0.134 -0.053 0.018 -0.199 
0.038 0.048 0.066 0.069 0.086 0.120 
mid 0.015 -0.066 0.269 0.049 -0.102 0.516--- 
0.060 0.074 0.108 0.109 0.133 0.198 
Gov 0.031 -0.090 0.334 0.117 -0.110 0.663 
0.059 0.072 0.103 0.106 0.129 0.189 
Stat -0.032 -0.045 -0.030 -0.069 -0.104 -0.024 
0.045 0.055 0.081 0.080 0.098 0.145 
Jon 0.126 0.128 0.132 0.218 0.226 0.208 
0.065 0.082 0.109 0.117 0.148 0.196 
edui 0.297 0.297w*w 0.298 0.581 0.565 0.603 
0.051 0.067 0.082 0.092 0.121 0.149 
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Table 4.9 Determinants of the probability of a job offer at different 
levels using the Logarithm of level variables-continued 
Bio -0.259 -0.352 -0.100 -0.370 -0.520 -0.203 
0.143 0.187 0.230 0.256 0.338 0.410 
Math -0.058 -0.269 0.112 -0.012 -0.360 0.173 
0.097 0.140 0.144 0.175 0.261 0.259 
Phy -0.119 -0.044 -0.337 -0.133 0.029 -0.599 
0.096 0.113 0.188 0.170 0.200 0.334 
Elec 0.163 0.180 0.053 0.337 0.380 0.076 
0.047 0.053 0.098 0.085 0.097 0.181 
Cons 0.123 0.095 0.258 0.225 0.173 0.450 
0.079 0.090 0.165 0.141 0.159 0.301 
Soc 0.293 -0.011 0.969 0.610 0.119 1.634 
0.237 0.296 0.400 0.424 0.516 0.722 
Pol -0.117 -0.300 0.000 -0.194 -0.500 -0.102 
0.135 0.194 0.197 0.234 0.335 0.344 
Lan 0.177 -0.088 0.294 0.365 -0.099 0.511 
0.077 0.146 0.105 0.137 0.258 0.188 
Lit -0.042 -0.053 -0.001 -0.066 -0.062 -0.073 
0.073 0.101 0.114 0.132 0.183 0.207 
Art 0.198 0.250 0.137 0.367 0.489 0.169 
0.146 0.195 0.225 0.250 0.331 0.394 
Chem -0.020 -0.090 0.338 0.020 -0.074 0.528 
0.134 0.153 0.285 0.241 0.272 0.530 
econ -0.070 -0.083 -0.020 -0.119 -0.117 -0.130 
0.081 0.103 0.135 0.144 0.184 0.242 
Law 0.064 0.143 -0.099 0.124 0.320 -0.280 
0.107 0.147 0.161 0.204 0.283 0.308 
med 0.152 0.207 0.122 0.289 0.434 0.148 
0.106 0.153 0.154 0.193 0.274 0.291 
man 0.014 0.072 -0.067 0.033 0.169 -0.208 
0.052 0.064 0.096 0.094 0.115 0.172 
Mill -0.238 -0.225 -0.324 -0.487 -0.452 -0.653 
0.032 0.040 0.059 0.057 0.072 0.110 
Lev 1 1.536 1.549 2.082 3.394 3.365 4.462 
0.235 0.280 0.505 0.429 0.505 0.942 
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Table 4.9 Determinants of the probability of a job offer at different 
levels using the Logarithm of level variables-continued 
Lev2 2.542 2.508 3.210 5.291 5.162 6.597 
0.235 0.279 0.502 0.427 0.502 0.935 
Lev3 4.455 4.353 5.318 8.608 8.347 10.307 
0.238 0.284 0.509 0.437 0.515 0.956 
Lev4 5.651 5.495 6.735 11.126 10.741 13.228 
0.248 0.295 0.537 0.472 0.554 1.034 
Logli 
-5489.919 -3635.136 -1799.591 -5419.527 -3635.136 -1799.591 hood 
Pseud 0.0930 0.0846 0.1325 0.1039 0.0946 0.1436 
o R2 
obs 5289 3393 1896 5289 3393 1896 
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Appendix A Questionnaire 
Basic questions 
1. Email address 
2. Graduate university 
3. University belongings(province) 
4. Highest qualification 
5. Specialty 
6. Age 
7. Gender 
8. Race 
9. Registration 
10. Score for entrance examination to university 
11. father's career 
12. mother's career 
13. father's highest qualification 
14. mother's highest qualification 
15. your current situation 
Questions about university 
16. Are you a party number? 
17. Have you passed College English Test(CET) 4? 
18. Have you passed CET-6? 
19. Other qualifications 
20. Are you interested in your specialty 
21. Are you satisfied with the teaching level? 
22. Do you want to transfer to other specialty? 
23. Class rank 
24. Working experience 
25. Have you got scholarship during the four year study? 
Questions about employment 
1. How much do you know about your current employed company 
?. Which province does your company belongs to? 
3. Where do you work? 
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A. Large or middle city B. small city C. town D. village 
4. Monthly glossary payoff 
5. Are you satisfied with your current company 
6. Whether your current job is related with what you have learned in the 
university 
7. What is the minimum formal qualification required in your contracted 
job? 
8. How many people in your company 
9. Which industry sector does your company belong to? 
A. state-owned B. foreign C. school or university D. government 
E. joined venture F. others 
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Chapter 5 Chinese Graduates' 
Education Choices: considering 
overeducation uncertainty 
5.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we learned about 20% individuals are 
overeducated to their current jobs and individuals characteristics, 
geographic area and industry sector may all affect individuals positions on 
getting a matched job. But what is interesting to individuals is whether 
overeducation will affect their earnings, what kinds of factors are 
determining their payment and what are the optimal education choices. 
According to the pecking order theory in chapter 4, individuals' wages 
were determined by individuals' other characteristics, not their 
qualification level or job level. However for individuals who have the 
same characteristics may have different levels of qualification and for 
individuals with the same level of qualification may get varied level of 
jobs. It is very instructive to find out the impact of job level and surplus 
(deficit) schooling on wages in order to give a guideline for individuals to 
make education decisions. 
In this chapter we will first examine the determinants of graduation wages 
by the same dataset we used in chapter 4 to see whether individuals' 
characteristics, geographic area and industry sector still play a role in 
wages. And then the effect of job level, surplus schooling and deficit 
schooling on individuals wages. According to these regression results and 
pecking order theory, we evaluate individuals' optimal education choices 
under uncertainty. Finally we discuss the impact of changes over time on 
individuals' education decisions. 
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5.2. The Determinants of Graduation Wages 
In the Pecking Order theory of Section 2 in chapter 4, wages were 
determined only by individual characteristics, as in equations (4.2) and 
(4.7). In this section, we want to examine what kind of factors may affect 
wages empirically and to what extent. Table 5.1 below shows the results 
of regressing the natural log of wages on graduation on individual 
characteristics, including firstly Inschooling years, and secondly on each 
separate additional qualification level compared to being a basic college 
graduate. In order to control for selection bias on the determination of 
wages by including only those graduates who have found a job, we 
include the relevant Inverse Mills ratio as well. The value of F-test against 
the hypotheses that all the coefficients except the constant term are zero in 
each case proves to be strongly significantly different from zero. 
Table 5.1 shows the estimated percentage increase in graduation wages 
from each subsequent percentage in years spent in higher education is 
highly significantly different from zero at 9.5 per cent for both genders 
and 7.9 per cent for male graduates and 9.9 per cent for female graduates. 
Decomposing the years spent in higher education significantly improves 
the goodness of fit, with variations in the estimated percentage increase in 
graduation wages from subsequent percentages increases in years spent in 
higher education at bachelors, Masters, and PhD level respectively of 3.7 
per cent, 17.1 per cent and 15 per cent for both genders combined. Hence 
investing in a Masters degree yields the highest rewards, with investment 
in a PhD yielding an estimated negative return (though one which is not 
significantly different from zero). The results accord to our expectation, 
with a recent survey by a graduate recruiting website26 in China displaying 
mean and median wages for new Masters that are all higher than the 
wages for those with new Doctorates. This is also consistent with Flenette 
(2004)'s Canadian graduate labour market study that the return to master 
degree is the highest. Whilst being a female in the labour market itself 
:b chinahr. conm 
137 
Chapter 5 Chinese Graduates' Education Choices 
makes the baseline wage more than 4.8 per cent lower, the marginal return 
to female undertaking additional years of higher education through 
bachelors and Masters degrees exceeds that for males. 
In line with the finding of Rumberger & Thomas (1993) that college 
quality had a significant impact on earnings, we find that the marginal 
impact on wages from graduating from a top 100 university in China is 
14.4 per cent. In China, English skills can also have an important impact 
on graduation wages, with having a qualification of College English Test 
level 6 (CET-6) yielding a marginal return on graduation wages of 15.9 
per cent for men, though not a significant effect for women. In contrast to 
its effect in some western countries (see Dolton & Vignoles, 2000), the 
class or grade of degree does not have a significant positive effect on 
graduation wages in China. However, being a student leader (cadre) or 
coming from a large city does have a significant positive effect on wages. 
So does parents' education and career for the separate qualification logit 
model. It is also interesting to note that whilst in China party membership 
plays on important role in raising the probability of securing a better job, 
it has no direct effect on graduation wages. 
Starting salaries for graduates in China differ also across the type of 
employer involved, especially for men. Relative to working in other 
sectors, working in the government, state-owned companies and education 
institutions tends to imply a lower wage level, and with starting salaries in 
joint ventures significantly higher. However, since employees in 
government, state-owned firms and education institutions have higher 
welfare benefits, more stable employment and a less pressurised workload, 
lower wages may be being traded-off by graduates against these benefits, 
with a tendency towards equalisation of net advantages in attracting 
graduate employees. The region where the employment is located also has 
an impact on starting salaries for graduates, with working in the West of 
China implying less favourable payments than working in the East or 
Middle of China. This is in line with the findings elsewhere by Griffin 
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Edwards (1993) that regional differences in earnings are not simply due to 
differences in individual characteristics 
The returns to the subject of the degree study are quite different to those 
found in studies in several other countries 27 . 
Studying language or 
literature generates a significant positive return in China, but a negative 
one in Western countries. On the other hand, a subject with a high positive 
return in many Western countries, namely medicine, has a significantly 
negative effect on wages in China overall, and particularly for women. 
One reason for the low initial return to studying medicine is the high 
requirement for experience in medical jobs before wages rise after lower 
initial graduation wages. Another is that the quality of medical schools in 
China varies greatly, with no strong entry barriers to entering lower 
quality medical schools in China, in contrast to the strong competition for 
medical school places in countries such as the UK and USA. 
It is also notable that studying mathematics at university does not yield a 
significant positive return in China. In China, studying mathematics is 
compulsory up until university entrance, so mathematical skills are not in 
such short supply as they are in some Western countries, such as the UK, 
where there is evidence of a strongly positive rate of return to studying 
mathematics at school beyond the lower compulsory age (see Dolton & 
Vignoles, 2002). However, there is a significant positive return to 
studying electronics and computing (elec&comp), which play an 
important part in China's economic growth. There is also, but to a lesser 
extent, a significant positive return in China to studying physics. However, 
studying construction yields a significant negative return, despite China's 
current construction boom. 
An interesting question which arises in the context of the Pecking Order 
model is whether the single index of individual characteristics that 
determines the probability of an individual receiving the offer of a higher 
" Walker and Zhu(2003), Dolton and Vignoles(2000) for example 
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level job can also explain the graduation wage. Under the Pecking Order 
model in chapter 4, equations (4.7) and (4.9) imply that: 
n-I 
In Wir = a, w, gir +E where qit 
I 
xrh, ah, a, = In B,, cu w, err (5.1 ) 
h=1 
where q'1 is the single index of observable individual characteristics that 
together with the stochastic term e., determines the probability of 
individual i receiving a job offer at a given level. In order to test 
empirically whether the inwages equation can also be expressed simply as 
a linear function of the same single index q,,, as in (5.1), ve first regress 
Inwages on the single index of observable individual characteristics 
implied by the ordered probit model of Table 4.4, and test whether it gives 
a significantly lower goodness of fit to the model of Table 5.1 above, 
where the coefficients in the inwages regression are free to differ from 
those in the single index model. To test this idea, we run the wages 
equations on individual character by weighted coefficients from ordered 
probit model in table 5.2. 
We find that the significance and adjusted R2 of table 5.1 and table 5.2 are 
almost the same, while some variables' signs are different, which due to 
the opposite effect of some variables in getting a high level job and 
receiving a large amount of wages. For example, parents belong to the 
lowest social background will play a negative role in getting a high level 
of job, but contribute positively to good salaries 28 . It 
is not hard to 
understand that parents belong to the lowest social background cannot 
provide sufficient information or help on finding a job for their kids 
resulting in a negative role in getting a high level job. At the same time, 
graduates from lowest social background may earn higher wages, since 
they are less likely to be overeducated and also pay little concern on 
working conditions. Parents with the highest qualification, working in the 
cast, major in physics and literature all have opposite effects on getting a 
high level job and receiving a large amount of wages. By comparing table 
4.4 (also table 4.5) in chapter 4 and table 5.1 in this chapter, we find that 
=' One can observe the results by comparing table 4 or table 5 in chapter 5 and table I in chapter 6 
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parents with the highest qualification play a negative role in getting a high 
level job, but contribute positively on wages. This may due to the 
subjective bias on reporting overeducation and undereducation. 
Individuals whose parents acquire the highest rank of qualification may 
have a higher expectation on their current job. They may receive a 
comparatively high wages and report overeducated to their current jobs in 
the same time. The high wages for working in the east can be explained by 
the high consumer price index in the east. Overeducated graduates in 
physics and literature subjects earn a comparatively high wages can 
attribute to the subject specialty. Students who are major in physics and 
literature will learn a lot of theoretic knowledge on these subjects, which 
may not be used on work. Therefore, graduates from these two subjects 
may think they are overeducated. All these phenomena suggest job level 
and wages are not highly correlated, which inspires us to examine whether 
job level plays a role in wages determination. 
In the full version of the pecking order model, wages are determined by 
individual characteristics X1, as in equation (4.7) in chapter 4, as 
influenced by their marginal productivity in the underlying production 
function. If these individual characteristics, and the parameters of the 
wage function in (4.7), are known to the individual, there is no uncertainty 
for the individual concerning their graduation wage, save for the 
stochastic term co, that affects v, and Bt in equations (4.4) and (4.7). This 
term reflects general macroeconomic uncertainty that affects the overall 
level of wages at time t in equation (4.7). We will abstract from such 
macroeconomic uncertainty for the present by assuming that co, is a 
known constant. There will then be a known variation in wages with 
individual characteristics, irrespective of the level of job which the 
individual succeeds in securing on graduation. Whether an individual gets 
a doctoral or a master level job does not affect their wages in the full 
version of the pecking order model, since it is their individual 
characteristics, including their education, which determine their 
productivity. 
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However, particularly in a country such as China where market forces 
have only recently been allowed to have greater influence, wage rigidities 
due to institutional factors may limit the extent to which wages vary with 
marginal productivity and associated individual factors, such as ability 
and degree qualifications. Instead, the designated job level may also play 
an important role in determining wages. In the following Table 5.3, we 
therefore investigate the effect of adding job level to the list of variables 
which may influence graduation wages. 
Table 5.3 shows the goodness of fit of the lnwage equation increases 
significantly after adding the job level, particularly for men, with a 3.5 per 
cent increase in wages overall with job level. Table 5.3 used 1,2,3,4 as the 
job level variable, which assumes an equal influence as one goes from 
Diploma to Batchelor to Masters to PhD job level. But there may be a 
negative return on the PhD job level as a separate variable. Then we add 
each of these job levels as a separate dummy variable in table 5.4 and find 
the overall goodness of fit significantly improved compared to the single 
job level variable in Table 5.3 by F-test. That is to say, the wages include 
a reward to not only qualifications and other individual characteristics but 
also the job level. 
A related approach here is to examine how far wages vary with the extent 
of matching between an individual's education and the level of the job 
they secure on graduation. Following Sicherman (1991), we may then 
investigate two stylized hypotheses: i) the earnings of individuals in 
occupations that require more schooling than they actually have (i. e. the 
undereducated) are more than the earnings of workers with the same 
qualification but in a less demanding job that just requires their existing 
level of schooling. However, at the same time, undereducated individuals 
receive less earnings than the workers who have the qualifications needed 
for the job; ii) the earnings of individuals in occupations that require less 
schooling than they actually have (i. e. the overeducated) are less than the 
earnings of workers with the same level of education as themselves who 
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are in a job whose level matches their qualifications. However, 
overeducated individuals earn more than individuals with similar jobs but 
with qualifications that just match the level of the job concerned. 
Equation (5.2) examined the two hypotheses from mathematics form, 
where Q;, ' means the years of schooling required to match the level of the 
job individual i has at time t, Q,, S >_ 0 denotes years of surplus schooling 
which individual i has in excess of the level required by their job, 
Q;, U >_ 0 denotes the shortfall in years between the education individual i 
has and that required for their job, Ti, represents all the other variables 
that may affect individuals' wages including personal characteristics and 
academic achievement29, and S-;, is a disturbance term. p, X. t is the term to 
overcome the selection bias (Heckman, 1979), and X,, is the relevant 
inverse Mills ratio. 
log wir =alt +a21Qr +a31Qrr +a41Qir +a5r0W; r 
+PrA, +i; jr 
(5.2) 
We expect the absolute value of the return to Q, ' to be larger than that for 
Q;, and Q,,, ' , with the coefficient of 
Q;, having a positive sign and the 
coefficient of Q having a negative sign. If this holds, then the above two 
hypotheses will be confirmed. 
The results show the returns to required years of schooling, surplus years 
of schooling and a shortfall of years of schooling are significant in the 
directions expected, with the return on required years of schooling greater 
than that on surplus years of schooling for males, but not for females. 
Therefore we think two stylized facts hold in China. Comparing to the 
findings by Rumberger (1987), Verdugo & Verdugo(l 989) and Dolton & 
Vignoles (2000), our regression results to surplus years of schooling are 
comparatively high, which may explain the large number of overeducated 
individuals. 
29 Again non-dummy variables \ý ere regressed by their natural logarithm due to better fit 
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5.3. Educational Choices under Uncertainty and 
Pecking Order Theory 
5.3.1 Individuals optimal educational choices under 
uncertainty 
After analyzing the pecking order theory, individuals' education decisions 
not only depend on individuals' characteristics, but also economy wide 
factors (e. g. GDP, growth rate, exchange rate, population growth rate) and 
job specification. That is to say, individuals' wages were affected by their 
own characteristics as well as how many graduate jobs the economy can 
offer and their ranks within the same qualification candidates. 
If job level does not play a role in education decisions, individuals' wages 
will be determined by individuals' characteristics only, which has been 
analyzed in chapter 3 and chapter 4. However, our above empirical 
findings suggest that not only are individual characteristics significant 
determinants of wages on graduation, but so too is the level of the job 
offered to the individual on graduation. In the next section, we will 
analyze what the optimal education choice is if job level does affect 
individuals' wages. 
5.3.2 When Job Level Does Affect Wages 
In such a case that job level does affect wages, the probabilities of 
receiving a job offer at each different level should be added into the 
analysis of optimal education choices under uncertainty. The expected 
beginning wages in next period (e. g. equation (2.11)) will be 
EY, 
+, =p0(Ji,, 
Ci, )P m(C;, )-Yn, 
n +L1-P°(J«, 
Cg, )]P m(C;, )'Ym + 
(5.3) 
[l-AIM(C,, )} ; 
7(n-l) 
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where p°denotes the probability to be overeducated, which is a function 
of the sum of individual characteristics C and job specification J. The 
probability to graduate pg (C;, ) equals to one given the China's drop out 
rate in higher education is less than one per cent. Y° denotes the 
graduation wages in a job for which the individual is overeducated with 
qualification m and Ym represents the graduation wages for a job that 
matched their qualifications of level m. 
Then, as in Chapter 2, individuals are assumed to maximise their expected 
utility in order to find their optimal choices for investment in their 
education. Specifically, we define: 
T 
V (C; , t) = max E[I (1 + 8)-r` U(Cir) I Ißt )1 (5.4) 
r =t 
TT 
subject to the life-time earnings C; r =L 
EY,.,,, (I+ gm )r .c is the inter- 
r=1 r=1 
temporal discount rate. In the following empirical analysis, we only 
consider academic choices, since technical education system is 
undeveloped in China and there is not any data on technical education. 
Due to the limitations of our micro dataset, we do not have data on the 
detailed nature of individual utility functions in (2.6). Here assume utility 
is determined by peculiar return only, which implies that they will not 
invest in education unless the expected net present value of their future 
earnings are larger than not investing. In other words, the net benefits of 
their investment in additional education is positive. If we examine for 
simplicity the case where there is a risk simply of the individual being 
either overeducated or exactly matched in their education with the 
requirements of the job they secure on graduation, we may write the 
expected earnings in the next period as: 
E( 
m)=pnlYm(I+g, 
)+(1-p, 
)1 
n'(l+9.. ) (5.5) 
145 
Chapter 5 Chinese Graduates' Education Choices 
where g,.. is the average wage growth rate for qualification m. The 
expected present value E(PV) of life-time earnings, using the discount 
rate 0, may then be expressed as: 
Tm 
E(PV)=I(1+8)-'[p Ym(1+gm)`-' +(1_ pm)Yý'(1+g,,, )'-'] (5.6) 
Tm is the number of years of working life that the individual with 
qualification m has before retirement. Consistent with the analysis in 
chapter 2 and 3, we assume the retirement age is 60 for both male and 
female and the total numbers of years of working life are 38,35 and 32 
respectively for bachelor, master and doctorate degree. 
The expected net present value E(NPVm) of life-time earnings is given by: 
E(NPV) = E(PV) - Cm (5.7) 
where Cm is the total costs of acquiring schooling to level m, including 
tuition fees. The increase in the expected net present value of the future 
earnings that result from investing in achieving a level m qualification, 
rather than a level m-1 qualification, net of the cost I,,, of this additional 
educational investment is then given by: 
AE(NPV, 
n) = 
E(PV. ) - E(PV -, 
) 
- 
Im for Im = C,, - Cm-1 (5.8) 
In view of the importance of the increase in the expected net present value 
of the future earnings that results from their investment in additional 
education being positive if risk-averse individuals are to invest in such 
additional education, it is instructive to examine the threshold case of 
AE(NPV )=0 in (5.8). In this threshold case, there exists a positive 
trade-off relationship between the probability p,,, of an individual With 
qualifications m being overeducated (with the negative consequences this 
has for their graduation wages once job level affects their graduation 
wages) and the growth rate g in their future earnings after graduation (that 
c c'teris paribus will boost the expected net present value of their future 
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life-time earnings), for a given value of p°, _, and other relevant variables. 
The critical probability pm (g, Y, , Y, 
'", pm_ý , Y°_1 ,y 
"'1 ) is the value of the - 
probability pm of being overeducated with qualifications m at which of 
AE(NPV) =0 in (5.8) for a given value of g, Y,,, Y., Y, 1 and p°_, . 
This can to some extent provide a guideline for individual decision- 
making on the extent of the risks involved in investing in being educated 
to level m. The following figure draws the relationship between average 
wages growth rate g and the critical probability p°, for each degree 
qualification level, given the mean levels of pm-1 found in our survey and 
for values of Y, ° , Y,,, Y, °_, and Y, , equal to their mean level found in our 
survey. 
In the following figures, we map out the trade-off between p', and g from 
setting AE(NPV) =0 in (5.8), for the mean levels of p°, _, 
found in our 
survey and for values of Y, ° , Y,,; 
" 
, Y, 
°_, and Y,, "I equal to their mean level 
found in our survey. 
Figure 5.1 The relationship between average wages growth rate and 
the critical probability 
1.2 
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Figure 5.1 shows the range of overeducation rate and wages growth rate 
when NPV=O. Since all these lines are quite steep, we list the range of 
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average wages growth rate gam, in table 5.6 when the overeducation 
probability p° varies from 0 to 1. The results show investing in Masters 
education appears to be the least risky. As long as the wages growth rate is 
larger than 2.2 per cent per year, individuals will never be overeducated. 
This result is consistent with the findings in table 5.1 that the return to 
master degree is the highest, so does the overeducation rate for master 
degree. 
Table 5.6 The contrast of critical growth rate with empirical evidence 
on growth rate 
bachelor master PhD 
g 0.0308- 
0.0352 
0.0196-0.0221 0.0650- 0.0675 
go 0.032 0.045 0.054 
We can also get an idea of the current rate of growth, go, of earnings of 
graduates as they progress through their careers from a Chinese recruiting 
company30 that selected a one per cent sample of the workforce in 30 
Chinese cities for different levels of degree qualifications, as shown in 
Table 5.6. This suggests that the rate of growth of individual earnings 
after graduation does depend upon the qualification level m. Contrast two 
growth rates (g and go ), we can again get the conclusion that investing in 
master degree is very profitable. 
5.3.3 The impact of changes over time 
One important feature of investment in university education is the 
significant lag that exists between the date when a decision is made by an 
individual to invest in seeking to acquire an additional university 
qualification and the date at which they enter the labour market with such 
a qualification. Another important feature of the current situation in China 
is the very high rates of expansion of the number of university graduates 
passing through the university system in recent and future years. These 
30 www wv. chinahr. com 
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two features mean that an individual who is currently considering whether 
or not to invest in additional university education needs to take into 
account in their calculations of the expected net present value of such an 
additional investment under uncertainty not simply the current graduation 
wage levels and current probability of being overeducated or securing a 
job at a given level, but instead their projected future levels when the 
individual graduates with the additional qualification. In addition, a 
rational individual making these important investments in their human 
capital under uncertainty needs to make predictions about the future 
growth rate in their earnings after graduation, since this is also an 
important element in the calculation of the expected present value of the 
enhanced future earnings which their additional qualification will yield. 
While the above calculation of the critical probability 
P;, (g, Y0 , 
Ym " Pm-1 9 Ym-> > Y; 
n1) of being overeducated on graduation may 
shed some light ceteris paribus on the calculation of whether or not the 
change in the expected net present value of future earnings as a result of 
the additional qualification is positive, this calculation does not itself take 
into account the changes which may take place in the levels of the 
graduation wages Y, ° and Y,,, and of the probability, pm _1 , of 
being 
overeducated even if the additional qualification is not taken, by the time 
the individual does graduate. The extent to which individuals can, and do, 
anticipate these changes will itself form an important part of any market 
adjustment mechanism by which any future over-supply of university 
graduates results in a potential fall in graduation wages and rise in the 
probability of overeducation that feed back into the investment decisions 
of those seeking additional university qualifications. 
Moreover, since the change in the net present value of future earnings in 
equations (5.6) and (5.8) above depends upon a comparison of future 
earnings with and without the additional qualification, a rational investor 
in human capital must here seek to project the extent of any changes over 
time not just in the graduation wages Y,, and Y"', but also in i'_m, and 
149 
Chapter 5 Chinese Graduates' Education Choices 
Y,, ,, that the individual may receive if they do not undertake the 
additional education and are not currently in employment. Growing rates 
of overeducation, and falling wages on graduation, of graduates with 
lower qualifications than those being considered by the individual may 
indeed themselves act as a spur to encourage the individual to invest in a 
further qualification in order to boost their competitive position in the 
labour market, in the way the pecking order model suggests, and improve 
their wages relative to being without the qualification, even if graduate 
wages are falling overall. 
The above pecking order model itself provides a framework in which 
graduation wages and the probability of receiving a job offer at a given 
level on graduation may be related to the underlying parameters of the 
distribution of individual characteristics, including their educational 
qualifications, and to the parameters of the distribution of job 
characteristics in the economy. Each of these parameters may indeed 
change over time with increases in the supply of graduates with different 
educational qualifications and with the rate of economic growth and other 
macro-economic factors that affect the distribution of available job 
characteristics in the economy at large. These parameters are the mean 
(Oct) and the standard deviation (act) of the distribution of individual 
characteristics, and the mean (Omt) and the standard deviation (ßmt) of the 
distribution of job characteristics, all of which may change over time. 
For the reason of simplicity, we will assume that the ratio ( mac, /or., ) 
between the respective standard deviations for the distributions of the 
indices of individual characteristics and job specifications remains the 
same over time, with the two distributions remaining lognormal over time. 
Equations (4.10) and (4.11) then imply that the change in the overall 
probability of receiving a job offer at level e for an individual with a given 
set, x;, , of the 
first n-1 characteristics is given by: 
ýpll (. l", 
r) 
hit =ý (x,, a qr' 
)((act / 6mr)(dOmr / dt) - (JOC, 
/ dt)) (5.9) 
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where ý is the standardised normal density function. The condition 
(dOc, /dt) > (d8m /dt)(ac, 1 "mi ) (5.10) 
is then necessary and sufficient for a decrease over time in the overall 
probability p1t 
(xil) 
of the offer of employment at level r>0 or above for 
an individual with characteristics given by X; t . It should be noted here 
that the overall probability p'1(xiJ) is that the first nth individual 
characteristic can get a level I job. e, is a stochastic latent variable, such 
as individual enthusiasm, that cannot be directly measured but which 
nevertheless affects the individual's position in the pecking order. It is 
important to note here that if the individual does have further information 
on the value of this variable for their own individual case within the 
overall distribution across all individuals, they may be able to further 
refine their estimate of their own probability of securing a job at a given 
level beyond that implied by the overall probability p,, (x;! ) . 
Macro-economic factors, such as growth in GDP, are likely to impact not 
just upon the value of output V;,,, c produced by any job j with given job 
specifications in equation (4.1) of chapter 4 in terms of the tasks which the 
job involves. They are also likely to change the distribution of job 
specifications across jobs in the economy. In particular, economic growth 
may be associated with a change in the average level of the complexity of 
the tasks which jobs in the economy involve, and in the associated 
desirable degree of education and training for those who carry out these 
tasks. If we assume that 
E(1nJn)=jarlnM 
r=1 
(5.11) 
where each ar is a constant, it follows from equations (4.3) and (4.9) of 
chapter 4 that condition (5.11) is equivalent to 
11 S 
I 
ah ý hr Chi) 
l (QCr / Qmf )l a, h'7 
(5.12) 
h=1 r=l 
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where xhl is the mean level of Xih, at time t across the population of 
individuals and K is the proportionate growth rate at time t in the 
macroeconomic factor Mn . The change in wages over time for an 
individual with any given vector of individual characteristics is given by: 
Sn 
dw; 
r 
(X; 
r) 
l dt = (w;, (X;, )- ý)(ý (cr + a, )Kzt - (U,,, l 6a )y ah (dh, / dt)) 
T=I h=1 
(5.13) 
with 
nS 
j 
ah (dxht / dt) < (act / 6m, )1: (cr + a, )Kzt (5.14) 
h=1 r=1 
being a necessary and sufficient condition for 
dw; 
r 
(X;, ) / dt >0 in (4.19). 
Clearly (5.12) and (5.14) occurring together requires that the growth rates 
in the macroeconomic factors have a sufficiently large impact on each Vimt 
in equation (4.1) via the coefficients cr to more than offset the imbalance 
in the growth rates in (5.12). However, if condition (5.14) does not hold 
and each cr >0 and icn >0, the growth in the population mean values of 
the individual characteristics will be sufficiently large overall to imply a 
decline both in the probability of any individual i receiving an offer of 
employment at level e>0 or above and in their wage rate. 
Though we do not have panel micro data to examine the impact of 
changes over time, Macro statistics do show the consistency with our 
theoretic prediction. The GDP growth rate K in equation (5.14) is around 
10 percent in 2003, nevertheless the increase of new graduates in the 
labour market is more than 40 percent implying equation (5.13) and (5.14) 
does not hold in China. According to our theoretical prediction, the 
probability p,, to get an offer of employment at level I will decrease 
significantly and the average wages will decline accordingly. Our 
empirical survey took place in 2003, when the first group of students 
graduated after higher education expansion. Until June 2003, there is 
about 30 percent graduates did not find a satisfactory job with an average 
wage of 1351 yuan for undergraduates. The unemployment rate for the 
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university graduates increases to 50 percent in June 2005 with an average 
wage of 1000 yuan for undergraduates. 
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Table 5.1A The determinants of wages on graduation 
Including schooling Including each qualification 
level 
comb male female comb male female 
gende -0.033' -0.048 
r 0.018 0.013 
sch 0.095"' 0.079"" 0.099" 
0.023 0.027 0.048 
ba 0.037""s 0.035 0.149' 
0.005 0.058 0.081 
ma 0.171*** 0.171*** 0.223'"" 
0.011 0.026 0.042 
phd 0.150"' 0.169"' 0.152"' 
0.020 0.034 0.064 
Pcar1 0.043*" 0.047' 0.048 0.029' 0.004 0.074"' 
0.019 0.026 0.035 0.017 0.021 0.027 
Pcar2 0.018 -0.003 0.058' 0.031' -0.008 0.106"" 
0.019 0.024 0.034 0.018 0.022 0.029 
Pcar3 0.092"*" 0.077*' 0.125"'" 0.093"' 0.050' 0.182'"" 
0.023 0.032 0.043 0.021 0.027 0.035 
Pul q -0.018 0.003 -0.086 -0.022 -0.009 -0.051 
0.037 0.047 0.070 0.017 0.020 0.030 
Pqu2 0.002 0.021 -0.078 -0.009 0.024 -0.064" 
0.039 0.052 0.067 0.017 0.022 0.033 
Pqu3 -0.087«" -0.068 -0.192"" 0.053" 0.090"' -0.022 
0.041 0.050 0.083 0.024 0.030 0.042 
Pqu4 -0.103"" -0.091** -0.194" 0.058" 0.081 
"' 0.001 
0.040 0.047 0.082 0.025 0.031 0.043 
Pqu5 -0.082" -0.085"' -0.130' 0.150"" 0.164"' 
0.114 
0.039 0.048 0.080 0.051 0.065 0.085 
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Table 5.1A The determinants of wages on graduation-continued 
cadre 0.020 -0.003 0.039 0.091"` 0.026 0.159' 
0.017 0.022 0.033 0.021 0.030 0.045 
Regl 0.058"' 0.048" 0.075"' 0.033 0.047' 0.020 
0.017 0.024 0.030 0.021 0.025 0.037 
Reg2 0.038` 0.034 0.036 0.034" 0.050"' 0.002 
0.022 0.030 0.045 0.016 0.019 0.029 
Reg3 0.090'*' 0.096"' 0.093"' 0.080"' 0.080` 0.068-- 
0.020 0.028 0.035 0.017 0.021 0.030 
pmem 0.003 0.023 -0.056' 0.004 0.006 -0.005 
0.017 0.021 0.031 0.014 0.018 0.023 
rankt -0.360 -0.445 -0.362 -0.080* -0.186"' -0.010 
0.268 0.322 0.264 0.046 0.069 0.092 
rankt 0.144"' 0.203" 0.161*** 0.151" 0.013 0.226' 
0.054 0.095 0.059 0.060 0.091 0.126 
grad 1 -0.010 -0.021 -0.024 0.002 0.038 -0.109' 
0.018 0.023 0.031 0.027 0.031 0.064 
grad2 0.022 0.016 -0.017 -0.038 0.007 -0.154" 
0.022 0.025 0.053 0.028 0.034 0.066 
grad3 0.023 -0.001 0.127' -0.031 0.022 -0.148" 
0.029 0.032 0.073 0.031 0.039 0.070 
Eng! -0.220"' -0.277'"' -0.151"' 0.024 0.081 -0.054 
0.022 0.042 0.036 0.017 0.023 0.035 
Eng2 0.159+'+ 0.207'*' 0.171"' 0.071" 0.160'" -0.030 
0.040 0.060 0.052 0.024 0.031 0.048 
Wor 1 -0.116+'" -0.099'" -0.140"' 0.072 0.095 -0.002 
0.017 0.021 0.028 0.061 0.076 0.108 
Wor2 -0.095+"' -0.096'" -0.101" 0.028 0.051 -0.017 
0.028 0.036 0.043 0.058 0.070 0.104 
Wor3 0.192*" 0.213*" 0.139 0.120" 0.135" 0.076 
0.059 0.070 0.107 0.057 0.069 0.105 
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Table 5.1A The determinants of wages on graduation-continued 
east 0.009 0.012 0.065' 0.281"' 0.219'" 0.392' 
0.023 0.028 0.040 0.013 0.017 0.023 
mid -0.062 -0.048 -0.089 0.151"' 0.164"' 0.115`" 
0.043 0.053 0.074 0.021 0.026 0.038 
Gov -0.065*" -0.085'" -0.014 -0.074 -0.111 0.005 
0.022 0.026 0.039 0.022 0.026 0.037 
Stat -0.027* -0.018 -0.053' 0.000 -0.015 0.026 
0.016 0.020 0.030 0.017 0.021 0.029 
Jon 0.171"; 0.170"` 0.168"' 0.133"' 0.130' 0.137"' 
0.024 0.029 0.039 0.023 0.029 0.037 
edui -0.048'"' -0.063"` -0.026 -0.030 -0.073' 0.033 
0.019 0.024 0.030 0.019 0.025 0.029 
Bio -0.064 -0.024 -0.117 -0.043 -0.062 -0.049 
0.064 0.101 0.084 0.052 0.071 0.078 
Math -0.025 0.110' -0.187" 0.013 0.074 -0.026 
0.037 0.061 0.065 0.035 0.051 0.049 
Phy 0.029*** 0.013 0.075 0.083" 0.100" 0.055 
0.008 0.045 0.090 0.034 0.041 0.065 
Elec 0.055** 0.070'*' -0.029 0.112" 0.126"' 0.088" 
0.020 0.025 0.048 0.018 0.020 0.036 
Cons -0.177'" -0.186'" -0.335" -0.139"' -0.127'" -0.160'" 
0.053 0.055 0.169 0.029 0.033 0.060 
Soc 0.052 0.116 -0.043 -0.021 0.015 -0.125 
0.093 0.129 0.150 0.084 0.109 0.131 
Pol 0.002 0.000 -0.010 0.027 0.063 0.005 
0.054 0.074 0.087 0.050 0.070 0.073 
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Table 5.1A The determinants of wages on graduation-continued 
Lan 0.119"' 0.154"' 0.012 0.160"' 0.177"' 0.110"' 
0.036 0.056 0.076 0.028 0.054 0.037 
Lit 0.042" 0.024 0.013 0.079"' 0.060 0.088" 
0.018 0.043 0.047 0.027 0.037 0.041 
Art -0.007 0.089 -0.159' -0.031 0.058 -0.150' 
0.055 0.074 0.087 0.052 0.070 0.078 
Chem -0.024 0.011 -0.053 -0.005 0.000 0.018 
0.054 0.064 0.111 0.050 0.058 0.096 
econ -0.037 -0.067 -0.071 0.030 0.024 0.014 
0.035 0.047 0.065 0.031 0.039 0.050 
Law -0.018 -0.025 -0.027 -0.022 -0.047 -0.013 
0.045 0.068 0.067 0.040 0.056 0.058 
med -0.179`*' -0.123" -0.287"' -0.060 -0.015 -0.108" 
0.039 0.058 0.068 0.038 0.054 0.054 
man -0.030 0.014 -0.207"' 0.026 0.053" -0.024 
0.035 0.038 0.085 0.019 0.024 0.034 
cons 6.341`** 6.612"t 7.463" 6.1490'« 6.725"' 5.900"' 
0.615 0.788 1.184 0.244 0.381 0.580 
Mill -0.126 -0.116 -0.151 -0.088" 0.012 -0.127 
0.151 0.203 0.264 0.038 0.062 0.080 
Obs 16005 9281 6724 16005 9281 6724 
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Table 5.1B First step probit estimation of table 5.1 
Var Ordered probit model Ordered probit model 
comb male female comb male female 
gender -0.125"' -0.124"' 
0.024 0.024 
lnsch 0.753"` 0.696"` 0.819"' 
0.048 0.062 0.077 
Inba 0.408"' 0.362`"' 0.447"' 
0.028 0.036 0.044 
Inma 0.454"' 0.441"' 0.473"' 
0.038 0.050 0.060 
lnphd 0.429"' 0.454"' 0.373"' 
0.057 0.068 0.108 
Pcarl -0.017 -0.078 0.063 -0.024 -0.080 0.053 
0.034 0.044 0.053 0.034 0.044 0.053 
Pcar2 0.003 -0.033 0.049 -0.000 -0.036 0.047 
0.033 0.044 0.052 0.033 0.044 0.052 
Pcar3 0.022 0.080 0.067 0.027 0.081 0.059 
0.042 0.055 0.065 0.042 0.055 0.065 
Pqu 1 0.077 0.047 0.121 0.084 0.051 0.123 
0.064 0.083 0.101 0.064 0.083 0.101 
Pqu2 0.129" 0.174 0.054 0.136" 0.184" 0.049 
0.064 0.084 0.102 0.064 0.083 0.101 
Pqu3 0.235**' 0.196` 0.277"` 0.241" 0.205' 0.271"' 
0.059 0.076 0.094 0.059 0.076 0.094 
Pqu4 0.201"' 0.146 0.259*" 0.211"` 0.157"` 0.258"' 
0.060 0.077 0.096 0.059 0.076 0.096 
Pqu5 0.181"' 0.139'1` 0.222" 0.186"' 0.145" 0.217" 
0.062 0.079 0.102 0.062 0.078 0.101 
cadre 0.105"` 0.102"' 0.118"` 0.105"' 0.105*" 0.115" 
0.023 0.030 0.037 0.023 0.030 0.036 
Reg 1 0.010 0.069 -0.058 0.009 0.070 -0.059 
0.030 0.040 0.045 0.030 0.040 0.045 
Regt -0.015 0.053 -0.104" -0.014 0.054 -0.100 
0.040 0.053 0.062 0.040 0.053 0.062 
Reg3 0.059` 0.107` 0.011 I 0.055` 0.108 0.018 
0.033 0.043 0.054 0.033 0.043 0.054 
pmem 0.080 0.060 0.096" 0.084"' 0.059 0.104" 
0.028 0.037 0.043 0.028 0.038 0.043 
rankl 0.509"` 0.722"` 0.209"' 0.484*" 0.707"' 0.1850" 
0.036 0.048 0.056 0.038 0.051 0.059 
rank2 0.342"' 0.504"' 0.155" 0.323"' 0.488"' 0.142" 
0.042 0.056 0.067 0.043 0.057 0.068 
grad1 0.103"' 0.102"' 0.103"' 0.106"" 0.107"' 0.103"' 
0.025 0.034 0.039 0.025 0.034 0.039 
grad2 0.120*" 0.074" 0.209"" 0.118*" 0.075' 0.206"' 
0.033 0.041 0.057 0.033 0.041 0.057 
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Table 5.1B The first step probit estimation of table 5.1-continued 
grad3 0.078' 0.027 0.135 0.075 0.031 0.132 
0.051 0.059 0.112 0.051 0.059 0.112 
Engl 0.130"' 0.257" -0.059 0.126*" 0.253' -0.059 
0.034 0.045 0.054 0.034 0.045 0.054 
Eng2 0.342"' 0.408"' 0.227*" 0.324*" 0.400"" 0.202"' 
0.030 0.039 0.047 0.030 0.040 0.048 
Bio -0.379"' -0.524"' -0.133 -0.410'" -0.548"' -0.181 
0.084 0.118 0.121 0.084 0.118 0.122 
Math -0.063"` -0.191"' 0.151' -0.078 -0.193" 0.115 
0.062 0.090 0.088 0.062 0.090 0.089 
Phy 0.095" 0.034 0.234' 0.093 0.051 0.189 
0.066 0.079 0.124 0.066 0.078 0.124 
Elec 0.076' 0.090" 0.114' 0.061' 0.085" 0.084 
0.033 0.040 0.064 0.034 0.040 0.065 
Cons 0.463"' 0.337"' 0.842"' 0.445"' 0.333"' 0.794"' 
0.068 0.078 0.138 0.067 0.078 0.136 
Soc -0.215 -0.299 -0.093 -0.230 -0.300 -0.138 
0.148 0.199 0.222 0.147 0.199 0.222 
Pol -0.168' -0.089 -0.185 -0.194" -0.104 -0.229' 
0.088 0.134 0.120 0.088 0.134 0.121 
Lan 0.188"' 0.006 0.307"' 0.182"' 0.024 0.282*" 
0.052 0.098 0.068 0.051 0.097 0.069 
Lit 0.020 0.100 0.001 0.002 0.087 -0.030 
0.049 0.070 0.072 0.049 0.070 0.072 
Art -0.094 -0.054 -0.057 -0.093 -0.039 -0.085 
0.081 0.115 0.118 0.081 0.114 0.118 
Chem -0.158' -0.127' -0.176 -0.178" -0.140 -0.206 
0.086 0.105 0.151 0.086 0.105 0.150 
econ 0.154*" 0.186"' 0.159' 0.139'" 0.183-" 0.123 
0.055 0.074 0.086 0.055 0.074 0.086 
Law -0.147" -0.208'"' -0.082 -0.171*' -0.217" -0.130 
0.071 0.101 0.104 0.072 0.101 0.105 
med -0.036 -0.097"' 0.090 -0.063 -0.107 0.038 
0.073 0.107 0.104 0.074 0.107 0.105 
man 0.274"' 0.221"' 0.375"' 0.261'" 0.216"' 0.345"' 
0.037 0.048 0.062 0.037 0.048 0.063 
const -2.157*'* -2.260 -2.191"' -1.628"' -1.781"' -1.591"' 
0.091 0.118 0.145 0.077 0.098 0.121 
Loglih - - - - - - 
ood 8729.71 
5395.64 3559.04 9071.94 5430.91 3579.69 
19 48 03 74 61 53 
Pseudo 
0.2038 0.1152 0.0969 0.1091 0.1153 0.0973 
R2 
Obs 16005 9235 6770 16005 9235 6770 
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Table 5.2 Weighted wages equation by single index function 
combined male female 
Coeff. Std. Err Coeff. Std. 
Err. 
Coeff. Std. 
Err. 
gende 
r 
- 
44.685' 
5.467 
sch 0.175"` 0.006 0.782"' 0.197 0.948"' 0.336 
Pcarl -0.145 0.092 -0.018 0.138 -0.289"' 0.114 
Pcar2 1.502` 0.891 -0.273 0.575 -14.867"' 4.161 
Pcar3 -2.099`** 0.524 -1.125 0.758 -2.534"' 0.492 
Pqul -0.631 0.601 0.490 2.622 -0.564 0.369 
Pqu2 -0.052 0.220 0.473 0.373 -0.449' 0.249 
Pqu3 0.579" 0.244 1.028" 0.314 -0.217 0.403 
Pqu4 -3.850"` 1.428 -1.418"' 0.473 0.122 0.652 
Pqu5 -0.268"` 0.090 -0.416"' 0.154 -0.132 0.105 
cadre 1.526"' 0.205 1.197" 0.264 1.353"' 0.204 
Reg 1 -0.283* 0.173 -0.474' 0.259 -0.131 0.224 
Reg2 -0.460' 0.217 -0.351" 0.143 0.068 0.427 
Reg3 -1.016 *** 0.235 -0.905"' 0.261 -5.495" 2.602 
pme 
m 
0.044 0.056 0.083 0.079 -0.002 0.074 
rank! -0.102 0.063 -0.153' 0.086 0.016 0.088 
rankt 0.319"* 0.057 0.313"' 0.080 0.332"' 0.077 
grad 1 0.015 0.273 -0.174 0.302 0.495' 0.290 
grad2 0.249' 0.143 0.194 0.195 0.355" 0.144 
grad3 0.248' 0.152 0.192 0.226 0.348" 0.143 
Engt 0.118 0.147 0.336"` 0.122 -34.521"' 13.273 
Engt 1.100 " 0.349 1.517« 0.312 1.730 1.382 
Worl -1.219 1.044 -1.159 0.875 0.042 1.337 
Wor2 0.166 0.345 0.252 0.338 0.872 5.306 
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Table 5.2 Weighted wages equation by single index function- 
continued 
Wor3 0.283" 0.133 0.281" 0.139 0.379 0.514 
east -9.112"' 0.461 21.969"' 1.792 -3.173" 0.190 
mid 4.783"` 0.697 -2.928"' 0.482 0.392" 0.128 
Gov -3.382"' 0.996 1.079*' 0.267 0.006 0.113 
Stat 0.033 0.364 0.279 0.355 -0.613 0.694 
Jon 1.128`*` 0.198 1.157*'* 0.259 1.010"' 0.284 
edui -0.104' 0.061 -0.245*" 0.084 0.093 0.088 
Bio 0.163 0.174 0.175 0.189 0.271 0.387 
Math -0.107 0.459 -0.239 0.194 -0.466 0.793 
Phy -0.604" 0.266 -1.552 0.684 -0.183 0.248 
Elec 0.574'4' 0.099 0.601"' 0.105 1.192" 0.552 
Cons -1.782"' 0.354 -2.302*" 0.573 -0.720"' 0.257 
Soc -0.111 0.314 -1.183 12.157 -0.151 0.148 
Pol -0.152 0.456 -0.176 0.241 -0.334 5.223 
Lan 0.854"' 0.159 -2.889"' 0.892 0.385*" 0.140 
Lit -8.043"' 3.092 -9.044 6.346 3.840' 2.019 
Art -0.196 0.327 0.369 0.385 -0.937" 0.478 
Chem -0.272 1.560 0.141 1.331 0.049 0.234 
econ -0.705 1.135 -0.431 1.116 0.138 3.126 
Law -0.315 0.412 -0.307 0.291 0.392 1.100 
med -0.422 0.225 -0.112 0.239 -0.834" 0.380 
man 1.079 1.221 0.663' 0.355 0.716 0.750 
Mill -0.126"' 0.014 -0.116"' 0.018 -0.151"' 0.026 
cons 5.268' 0.149 5.322*" 0.181 5.011"' 0.305 
Adj. 
R2 
0.3853 0.3447 0.3920 
Obs. 4632 2999 1633 
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Table 5.3 Wages determinants after adding job level 
combined male female 
Coeff. Std. Err Coeff. Std. 
Err. 
Coeff. Std. 
Err. 
gender -0.129'8` 0.016 
sch 0.097"` 0.007 0.080"' 0.008 0.101"' 0.006 
Joblev 0.035"' 0.008 0.044*' 0.010 0.023 0.015 
Pcar1 0.021` 0.012 0.005 0.023 0.071"' 0.023 
Pcar2 0.028* 0.018 -0.012 0.022 0.095"' 0.029 
Pcar3 0.085"' 0.019 0.041 0.029 0.106"' 0.031 
Pqul -0.021 0.017 -0.003 0.021 -0.047 0.031 
Pqu2 -0.005 0.018 0.028 0.022 -0.059' 0.033 
Pqu3 0.052** 0.021 0.094"' 0.030 -0.025 0.042 
Pqu4 0.068"4 0.025 0.179+" 0.032 0.006 0.043 
Pqu5 0.164"** 0.053 0.189"' 0.066 0.111 0.084 
cadre 0.104"" 0.013 0.030"' 0.008 0.166"' 0.025 
Reg 1 0.035* 0.021 0.055" 0.026 0.023 0.038 
Regt 0.033" 0.015 0.081" 0.020 0.004 0.030 
Reg3 0.076 0.013 0.079"' 0.022 0.067" 0.031 
pmem 0.006 0.015 0.013 0.019 -0.004 0.024 
rankt -0.058" 0.029 -0.087 0.040 0.001 0.051 
rankt 0.183"' 0.034 0.161 0.046 0.253 0.061 
grad1 0.000 0.027 0.020 0.030 -0.109' 0.063 
grad2 -0.042 0.026 -0.027 0.030 -0.141" 0.060 
grad3 0.011 0.007 -0.024 0.031 0.142" 0.061 
Eng 1 0.010 0.015 0.066"' 0.018 -0.069` 0.027 
Eng2 0.053**" 0.019 0.163"' 0.026 -0.041 0.033 
Won 1 0.076 0.063 0.055 0.077 0.001 0.108 
Wor2 0.026 0.059 0.046 0.071 -0.014 0.106 
Wo3 0.110" 0.059 0.130' 0.070 0.074 0.105 
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Table 5.3 Wages determinants after adding job level-continued 
east 0.279"" 0.010 0.216" 0.017 0.392"' 0.019 
mid 0.141"` 0.017 0.159"' 0.024 0.104"' 0.031 
Gov -0.072"" 0.021 -0.109"" 0.027 -0.002 0.037 
Stat -0.002 0.016 -0.015 0.021 0.027 0.029 
Jon 0.131**' 0.021 0.130' 0.030 0.131"" 0.030 
edui -0.042"" 0.022 -0.072"" 0.025 0.027 0.030 
Bio -0.043 0.0539 -0.057 0.072 -0.057 0.079 
Math 0.013 0.035 0.076 0.051 -0.029 0.049 
Phy 0.081'" 0.032 0.098"' 0.048 0.051 0.066 
Elec 0.008""" 0.018 0.115**' 0.020 0.072"' 0.032 
Cons -0.141"" 0.021 -0.132` 0.031 -0.177"" 0.060 
Soc -0.036 0.084 0.010 0.109 -0.144 0.132 
Pol 0.019 0.041 0.063 0.070 -0.002 0.073 
Lan 0.132 0.009 0.183"" 0.052 0.009"" 0.002 
Lit 0.060**' 0.018 0.058 0.038 0.071 0.032 
Art -0.028 0.043 0.064 0.071 -0.151" 0.060 
Chem -0.010 0.050 -0.006 0.058 0.016 0.096 
econ 0.023 0.031 0.021 0.039 0.003 0.050 
Law -0.020 0.040 -0.062 0.056 -0.018 0.058 
med -0.053" 0.038 -0.030 0.054 -0.119" 0.051 
man 0.018 0.019 0.044' 0.024 -0.030 0.034 
Mill -0.119""' 0.014 -0.108"' 0.018 -0.146'" 0.026 
cons 5.313""' 0.150 5.379"" 0.181 5.050*" 0.306 
Adj. 
R2 
0.3861 0.3488 0.3925 
Obs. 4632 2999 1633 
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Table 5.4 Wages determinants after adding each job level 
combined male female 
Coeff. Std. Err Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
gender -0.048" 0.013 
sch 0.102""' 0.007 0.094"' 0.006 0.104"' 0.008 
Joblev1 0.074"" 0.027 0.077'" 0.031 0.060 0.048 
Joblev2 0.108""" 0.026 0.133'"" 0.032 0.076' 0.046 
Joblev3 0.158""" 0.030 0.173''* 0.036 0.134*" 0.048 
Joblev4 0.016 0.030 0.066 0.059 -0.051 0.099 
Pcarl 0.023" 0.018 0.005 0.023 0.072 0.029 
Pcar2 0.025' 0.018 -0.010 0.022 0.103'"' 0.029 
Pcar3 0.090"8' 0.022 0.044 0.029 0.181 "' 0.036 
Pqu 1 -0.020 0.017 -0.004 0.021 -0.058' 0.031 
Pqu2 -0.006 0.018 0.027 0.022 -0.066" 0.033 
Pqu3 0.053"" 0.025 0.094'*' 0.030 -0.031 0.042 
Pqu4 0.069 0.026 0.097'" 0.032 0.006 0.043 
Pqu5 0.179 0.052 0.195'"' 0.066 0.140 0.086 
cadre 0.113""" 0.015 0.085'"' 0.018 0.166'' 0.026 
Reg 1 0.036' 0.022 0.046' 0.026 0.025 0.038 
Reg2 0.036"" 0.017 0.048"' 0.020 0.004 0.030 
Reg3 0.072" 0.018 0.085"' 0.022 0.063" 0.031 
pmem 0.006 0.015 0.011 0.019 -0.003 0.023 
rank 1 -0.043 0.032 -0.068' 0.041 0.019 0.052 
rankt 0.109'"" 0.031 0.181""' 0.026 0.107'" 0.051 
grad 1 -0.008 0.027 0.013 0.030 -0.122" 0.063 
grad2 -0.051'" 0.026 -0.033 0.030 -0.160""' 0.061 
grad3 -0.050" 0.027 -0.030 0.031 -0.164"' 0.062 
Eng 1 0.006 0.015 0.042" 0.018 -0.068'" 0.027 
Eng2 0.051. 0.020 0.110"" 0.026 -0.043 0.033 
Worl 0.050 0.063 0.075 0.077 -0.014 0.108 
Wor2 -0.001 0.059 0.015 0.072 -0.026 
0.106 
Wor3 0.091 0.059 0.099 0.071 0.064 0.105 
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Table 5.4 Wages determinants after adding each job level-continued 
east 0.280" 0.014 0.216' 0.018 0.390' 0.024 
mid 0.144"' 0.022 0.158"' 0.028 0.112*" 0.038 
Gov -0.071"' 0.022 -0.107'" 0.027 0.001 0.037 
Stat -0.002 0.017 -0.017 0.021 0.028 0.029 
Jon 0.133""' 0.024 0.134"' 0.030 0.131"' 0.038 
edui -0.033` 0.019 -0.075"' 0.024 0.026 0.030 
Bio -0.045 0.053 -0.060 0.072 -0.045 0.069 
Math 0.013 0.035 0.076 0.051 -0.022 0.049 
Phy 0.078'" 0.035 0.088" 0.042 0.059 0.066 
Elec 0.093**' 0.017 0.113"' 0.019 0.081" 0.036 
Cons -0.147`"* 0.028 -0.133"' 0.031 -0.169" 0.058 
Soc -0.041 0.084 0.002 0.109 -0.153 0.132 
Pol 0.018 0.051 0.062 0.070 -0.002 0.073 
Lan 0.150"` 0.029 0.181"' 0.051 0.100"' 0.036 
Lit 0.069"t 0.028 0.055 0.038 0.081" 0.043 
Art -0.038 0.053 0.058 0.071 -0.156" 0.080 
Chem -0.010 0.050 -0.006 0.058 0.005 0.096 
econ 0.023 0.031 0.022 0.039 0.001 0.050 
Law -0.025 0.040 -0.055 0.056 -0.019 0.058 
med -0.069' 0.038 -0.027 0.054 -0.121" 0.055 
man 0.018 0.019 0.042 0.024 -0.030 0.034 
Mill -0.136"' 0.015 -0.125"' 0.019 -0.163"' 0.028 
cons 5.812. 0.115 5.854"' 0.139 5.607"' 0.241 
Adj. R2 0.3563 0.3508 0.3956 
Obs. 4632 2999 1633 
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Table 5.5 Returns to overeducation and undereducation 
combined male Female 
Coeff. Std. Err Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
gender -0.046'" 0.015 
reqschooling 0.041'"" 0.009 0.025* 0.007 0.045"" 0.009 
surschooling 0.017"` 0.003 0.021-'- 0.008 0.016' 0.003 
defschooling -0.020"` 0.004 -0.017`"' 0.002 -0.016`" 0.002 
Pcar1 0.017 0.018 -0.006 0.023 0.064" 0.029 
Pcar2 0.019 0.018 -0.023 0.023 0.096 0.029 
Pcar3 0.082"` 0.023 0.036 0.029 0.177 0.036 
Pqu 1 -0.031* 0.018 -0.017 0.021 -0.058' 0.032 
Pqu2 -0.016 0.018 0.016 0.022 -0.071" 0.033 
Pqu3 0.052" 0.025 0.090'"' 0.031 -0.027 0.043 
Pqu4 0.063" 0.026 0.091*** 0.033 0.001 0.043 
Pqu5 0.155"` 0.053 0.167" 0.067 0.117 0.087 
cadre 0.034"' 0.013 0.008 0.016 0.092` 0.022 
Regt 0.051" 0.022 0.067" 0.027 0.031 0.038 
Reg2 0.046"` 0.017 0.067"` 0.021 0.006 0.031 
Reg3 0.099` 0.018 0.101` 0.023 0.082"' 0.031 
pmem 0.008 0.015 0.015 0.019 -0.007 0.024 
rank 1 -0.222"" 0.028 -0.248"` 0.037 -0.159"' 0.043 
rank2 -0.007 0.032 -0.028 0.042 0.045 0.050 
grad! 0.032 0.027 0.053' 0.030 -0.067 0.063 
grad2 0.010 0.026 0.027 0.029 -0.076 0.060 
grad3 0.024 0.027 0.043 0.031 -0.064 0.061 
Eng l 0.030" 0.015 0.061 "' 0.018 -0.042 0.026 
Eng2 0.133" 0.019 0.200"' 0.025 0.025 0.031 
Wor 1 0.072 0.063 0.085 0.078 0.023 0.109 
Wor2 0.022 0.060 0.033 0.072 0.004 0.107 
Wor3 0.122"` 0.059 0.125' 0.071 0.103 0.106 
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Table 5.5 Returns to overeducation and undereducation--continued 
east 0.283"' 0.014 0.224"' 0.018 0.392' 0.024 
mid 0.142"' 0.022 0.161"' 0.027 0.104"' 0.038 
Gov -0.060"' 0.022 -0.089"' 0.027 0.007 0.037 
Stat -0.005 0.017 -0.019 0.021 0.023 0.029 
Jon 0.135'" 0.024 0.132"' 0.030 0.136"' 0.039 
edui -0.026 0.019 -0.059 0.025 0.028 0.030 
Bio -0.065 0.054 -0.083 0.073 -0.078 0.080 
Math -0.013 0.035 0.053 0.052 -0.060 0.049 
Phy 0.057' 0.035 0.069 0.042 0.024 0.066 
Elec 0.065'"' 0.018 0.079"' 0.020 0.039 0.035 
Cons -0.172"" 0.029 -0.158"' 0.033 -0.206" 0.060 
Soc -0.086 0.085 -0.029 0.110 -0.221' 0.133 
Pol -0.026 0.051 0.015 0.071 -0.050 0.073 
Lan 0.130"' 0.029 0.162"' 0.056 0.070" 0.038 
Lit 0.029 0.028 0.013 0.038 0.030 0.042 
Art -0.057 0.054 0.053 0.072 -0.196" 0.080 
Chem -0.042 0.050 -0.048 0.059 -0.009 0.097 
econ -0.012 0.031 -0.013 0.039 -0.039 0.050 
Law -0.082" 0.040 -0.113" 0.057 -0.070 0.058 
med -0.113"' 0.038 -0.056 0.055 -0.168"' 0.054 
man -0.015 0.020 0.015 0.024 -0.074" 0.034 
Mill 0.009 0.008 0.027 0.010 -0.017 0.013 
cons 6.561" 0.095 6.646"' 0.115 6.415*" 0.184 
Adj. R2 0.3377 0.3310 0.3821 
Obs. 4632 2999 1633 
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Chapter 6 Socially Optimal 
Investment in Education 
---new evidence from China 
6.1. Introduction 
In the previous two chapters, we considered the effect of individual and 
job characteristics on individuals' earnings and education choices, which 
implies the return to education is not fixed as Mincerian equation 
suggested, but amongst other things varies with the uncertainties 
associated with labour supply and demand in the long run. Therefore, the 
determination of an education policy and the supply of qualified labor to 
the market is quite critical to individuals' education choices. Whether or 
not graduates will face a high risk of being overeducated for their 
available job depends in large part upon the direction of government 
policy on the expansion of higher education. Moreover, the risk of being 
overeducated for the job secured on graduation becomes less significant if 
the economy at large is capable in the long run of productively using the 
expanding quantity of graduates that the government's educational policy 
determines. In this chapter, we try to derive the social return to human 
capital in order to investigate its implications for future education policy 
and the trend of long time labour supply. 
In order to improve their relative position in the pecking order and acquire 
a graduate level of job, individuals have an incentive to accept more 
education. The analysis of last section in chapter 5 shows more and more 
individuals in China will be overeducated and have an average lower 
wages since the speed of higher education expansion is far more than the 
GDP growth rate 31 . 
This may result a negative externality on other 
However, if the ratio changes over time, such as with more complex production processes etc, it 
is possible that the demand for graduates mav- rise faster than the growth rate of GDP. Considering 
the huge gap between the higher education expansion and GDP growth ratio, it is less likely to 
happen. 
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individuals through competitive education theory. However, it is 
comprehensively believed that education plays a very important role in 
promoting national economic growth, individuals' skills level, more 
equitable distribution, national consumption and other wider benefits. In 
other words, acquiring more education may not be a good education 
choice to each individual, but overeducated individual will benefit to the 
whole society because of the good externality of education. 
In order to analyze whether higher education expansion benefits the 
society (here specially refer to China) as a whole or not, we need to find 
out the impact and the dimension of education on economic growth in 
China. If education does play an important role in economic growth, the 
social optimum amount of human capital in China should be estimated so 
that we can conclude whether China is overeducated from the social point 
of view and so the future education policy. 
This chapter is organized as follows: in the next section, we will discuss 
whether education can play a role in economic development and in what 
extent it may promote economic growth. Secondly we develop an 
endogenous model to estimate the social optimal investment. The policy 
suggestions and conclusions are drawn in the final part. 
6.2. Investment in Education and Economic Growth 
In most of the OECD member countries, the public and private 
expenditure on education accounts for over 6 per cent of the collective 
GDP. The expenditure in China once criticized by western scholars for its 
low investment in education has recently risen from 3 per cent of GDP in 
1995 to about 5 per cent of GDP in 2002. However the empirical analysis 
in chapter 4 and 5 suggests that China now faces an overeducation rate of 
up to 20 per cent. Whether a significant amount of investment from public 
and private in China is redundant becomes an interesting topic to research. 
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In this section I will mainly examine the effects of education on economic 
growth, which in western countries has been widely used to justify a high 
social rate of investment in education. We have found a positive and 
significant private return to education in the previous chapter, whereas the 
relationship between education and the economic growth is still unclear. If 
the relationship is positive, whether the current investment on education is 
sufficient and efficient will be examined in the second part. 
According to Aghion & Howitt (1998), there are two branches of 
exogenous methods to test the relationship between human capital and 
economic growth. One exemplified by Nelson & Phelps (1966) (NL), who 
assume that the stock of human capital has a level effect on output, 
whereas the other called augmented Solow model (e. g. Mankiw et al 1992, 
Romer 1990) (ASM), which states that human capital would affect 
output's growth rate. The empirical evidence on these two frameworks is 
quite controversial. Mankiw et al (1992) and De la Fuente & Domenech 
(2000) demonstrate that the effect of the schooling variable on economic 
growth is positive and significant. Benhabib & Spiegel (1994) and 
Pritchett (1996) argue there is no relationship between economic growth 
and human capital for a large samples of countries, especially in 
developing countries.. 
Though the importance of sample quality, especially the proxy for human 
capital has been emphasized by some scholars, the results are quite 
controversial among countries. It is our interest in this study to consider 
whether these two frameworks can be applied to China and whether 
human capital is a significant factor in determining output growth. Panel 
data collected by China's statistics bureau will be utilized to realize this 
assignment. Output in each country in NL and ASM will be replaced by 
output in each province in China32 during the period of 1984 to 2004. The 
logarithm of the average percentage of fixed income investment over GDP 
in each province «was treated as the physical capital investment variable. 
32 Chongqing was separated from Sichuan in 1999, which means wie do not have separate 
data for 
Chongqing before 1999. Then we combine these two provinces as one unit. Xi/hang's data is 
sparse ww ith poor quality and so ww c did not include it into our regression. 
This makes the number of 
final observation 29. 
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The logarithm of the average growth rate of the population at age 15-59 is 
the proxy of changes in the labour force. The logarithm of the average 
percentage of people with higher education in the work force and the 
logarithm of the average percentage of people with upper secondary 
education in the work force act as the stock of human capital separately in 
the regression. 
Using the NL approach, we will assume the Cobb-Douglas production 
function: 
Y(t) = A[H(t), t]K(t)" L(t)ß (6.1) 
where Y is output, K physical capital, L labour and A is the level of 
technology depending on the stock of human capital H(t) and time t. The 
log difference of end and initial period A in province i can be represented 
as: 
log A[H(t), t); - log A[H(0), O); = 8l + 612H1 + ®3H; [(Y,,, ax - 
Y_ )! Y,. ] (6.2) 
8y is exogenous technological progress, 02H1 reflects domestic investment 
in the stock of human capital and the last term represents technology 
diffusion from other province, where Ymax is the average output of the 
richest province during time [0, t], Y, the average output of province i 
during time [0, t]. Taking logs of the production function and inserting 
equation (6.2) yields 
logY(t), -logY(0); =9, +82H; +O3Hi[(Ym -Y,. )/Yi] (6.3) 
+ a[log K(t) - log K(O)] + ß[log L(t) - log L(0)] 
Table 6.1 shows the regression results of equation (6.3) by OLS using the 
logarithm of the average percentage of higher education attendees and 
upper secondary education attendees separately. The coefficients for the 
stock of human capital and diffusion in both column 2 and column 3 are 
significant implying human capital does affect the economic growth in 
China, especially for the contribution of upper secondary attendees. 
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Besides, the positive role of physical investment on economic growth is 
quite obvious, which confirms the findings by Nelson & Phelps (1966). 
Population growth rate may affect the economic growth negatively, albeit 
not significantly so. 
Table 6.1 Regression results from NL approach 
Treat higher education Treat upper secondary 
attendees as human education attendees as 
capital investment human capital 
investment 
Lnschool 0.0585`(0.041) 0.145***(0.060) 
Diffusion 0.061 "(0.034) 0.048(0.032) 
Ln(I/GDP) 0.285** (0.090) 0.303"(0.082) 
1nL -0.184(0.417) -0.379(0.405) 
Constant 1.307***(0.218) 1.767***(0.318) 
Adjusted R2 0.307 0.398 
observations 29 29 
Then we examine the Augmented Solow model (ASM), exemplified by 
Mankiw et al (1992). Assume production at time t satisfies a Cobb- 
Douglas function, which can be expressed as: 
Y(t) = K(t)a H(t)a(A(t)L(t))'-'-ß (6.4) 
where Y is output, K physical capital, H the stock of human capital, L 
labour, and A the level of technology. Solow (1956) assumes the rates of 
saving or investment rate (s). population growth rate (n) and technological 
progress rate (g) are exogenous. The time paths of the right-hand side 
variables are described by the following equations. 
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k(t) = sk y(t) - (n +g+ 8)k(t) 
h(t) =shy(t)-(n+g+8)h(t) (6.5) 
A(t) = g(t)A(t) 
L(t) = n(t)L(t) 
where y=Y/ AL ,k=K/ AL and h=H/ AL is the level of output per 
effective unit of labour, the stock of physical capital per effective unit of 
labour and the stock of human capital per effective unit of labour 
respectively. Sk and sh are the investment rate in physical and human 
capital. 5 is the depreciation rate. When the economy converges to a 
steady-state, physical capital and human capital will grow at a constant 
rate. Hence the exogenous economic growth rate n+g+, 5 will have a 
negative relationship with k(t) and h(t). Equation (6.5) implies that the 
optimal physical investment and human capital investment are: 
1-Q Q1 
k* _( 
Sk Sh 
`n+g+ýSl 
a 1-a 
h* _` 
Sk Sh 
In+g+6l 
(6.6) 
substituting (6.6) into production function and taking logs yields the 
expression for the steady-state output in intensive form. 
In y* =1n A(t) +a In(sk )+ ln(sh) -a+ß ln(n +g+ 15) 1-a-ß 1-a-ß 1-a-ß 
(6.7) 
Mankiw et al (1992) also shows the growth of income in the Solow model 
is a function of the determinants of the ultimate steady state and the initial 
level of income. 
ln(y(t) - ln(y(0)) = (1- e-A') 
a ln(sk )+ (1- e-) 
ß 
ln(s,, ) 
1-a-8 1-aß (6.8) 
- (ý - e_, 
ý) a+ß ln(n +t+ ö) - (1- e-' ) ln(y(0)) 1-a-, 3 
wilcre Ä=(, z+g+ý)(1-a-ß) 
l: 3 
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Equation (6.8) suggests the economic growth increases faster for 
developing provinces than developed provinces. In other words, the high 
initial income retains the speed of economic growth. The first column in 
table 6.2 lists the regression results of the change in the log of income per 
capital over the period 1984 to 2004 on the log of income per capital in 
1984, average investment rate, average population rate during this period 
for a 29-province sample in China. The negative coefficient on InGDP84 
shows there is a tendency toward convergence in this 29 provinces sample, 
but this coefficient is not significant. This may suggest China's economic 
growth has not arrived at a steady state. Column two and three are the 
regression results after we add the average increasing rate of higher 
education attendees over the population in each province and the average 
increasing rate of upper secondary education attendees over the population 
in each province separately. These two new variables improve the 
goodness of fit and lower the effect of the initial level of income, which 
implying human capital investment can explain a certain level of 
economic growth in China. 
Table 6.2 Regression results from augmented Solow model 
Without Conditioning on Conditioning on 
conditioning on higher upper secondary 
human capital education education 
LnGDP84 -0.342 -0.213 -0.209 
(0.522) (0.203) (0.156) 
Ln(I/GDP) 0.288 0.320 0.289 
(0.204) (0.215) (0.208) 
Ln(n+g+b) -5.375 -7.013 -6.361 
(2.445) (3.063) (2.682) 
Ln(school) 0.083 0.138 
(0.091) (0.071) 
constant 2.767 2.318 2.35 
(0.653) (0.131) (0.092) 
Adj-R2 0.399 0.417 0.489 
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observations 29 29 29 
6.3. Socially Optimal Investment in Human Capital 
Since both NL method and Augmented Solow approach suggest human 
capital investment does play a role in explaining economic growth, then 
what is the social optimal amount of human capital investment will 
generate great interests. Inspired by Lucas (1988), we estimate the 
efficient amount of human capital stock in each country by maximizing 
individuals' utility function: 
U(c, a) =f e-°` 11 
[c(t)'-' - 1]N (t) dt 
6 
(6.9) 
where the discount rate p and the coefficient of relative risk aversion 6 are 
both positive. The production function is still the Cobb-Douglas format. 
Y=AKa(UNh)-a =K+C (6.10) 
where A is the level of technology, K physical capital, N the total labour 
force, u the effort or time devoted to production and h rate of increase of 
human capital stock. h in Lucas (1988) plays two roles, one contributes to 
the labour productivity as an endogenous part of uN and the other plays 
an exogenous factor that may affect the level of technology. Here we only 
consider the endogenous effect to labour productivity for simplicity. 
Rebelo (1991) brings the idea that the increase rate of human capital is 
determined by the effort devoted to human capital production as well as 
the amount of physical capital investment. Therefore he considers the 
level of physical capital investment, when he estimates the effect of 
human capital stock to economic growth in the endogenous Lucas (1988) 
33 model. However the recent report from OECD shows mid income 
countries (generally with a high economic growth rate) experience sharp 
increase of student enrolment in upper secondary and higher education. 1 
Z7 
33 Education Trends in Perspective--analysis o( the world educaiton indicators 
2005 edition, UNESCO/OECD, Montreal, 2005 
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The article indicates 77 per cent increase in tertiary enrolments over the 
past decade in the middle income countries, compared to a 43 per cent 
increase in rich countries. Thereafter we assume the time path of h is 
related with the growth rate of physical capital K34 (instead of the level of 
physical capital) and the effort devoted to production u can be represented 
as 
u)h K 
(6.11) 
where 6 controls the level of human capital grows and also can be 
explained as the maximum growth rate that human capital can reach is 
K+ 
1) . The current value of Lagrange function for this optimum K 
problem can be written as 
L(K, h, 9,, 82, c, u) =N (c'-' -1)+01[AKa(uNh)'-" - Nc] 1-6 (6.12) 
+92[ö(K +1)(1-u)h] 
K 
with 01 and 02 can be viewed as the physical capital price and human 
capital price (Lucas, 1988). The first-order conditions for this equation are: 
c-or = el (6.13) 
Nh(1-a)8,: -1Ka(uNh)-a =6, ß(K + 1)h (6.14) K 
and the rate of changes of prices are given by 
BI =POI - 
öH 
= p91 _ aB, AK'-' (uNh)ý-a (6.15 ) 
cýK 
Bz = p6, -(1-a)01 1Ka(uNh)'uA7-0,, 5(K +1)(1-ii) 
(6.16) 
K 
Let K denote the growth of per capita consumption 
£ 
and X (`ý) is the 
c ýti 
exogenous growth rate of labour force. On a balanced path, physical 
Presumably high economic growth rate is related with a high physical capital 
increase rate. 
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capital grows at constant rate and so equation (6.10) implies N(t)c(t) K(t) 
is constant, by differentiating one gets 
K= 
+N=x+A (6.17 KcN 
Equation (6.13) yields 
/0, 
= -oK and equation (6.15) implies 
e= p-a4Ka-'(uNh)'-a (6.18) 
By equating these two equation, one can get 
p+0-x=aAKa-'(uNh)'-a h'-a-P (6.19) 
If assuming the growth rate of human capital v= h(t) / h(l), then 
v=8(ic+A+1)(1-u) (6.20) 
Differentiating (6.19) with respect to t by assuming consumption and both 
kinds of capital are growing at constant rates and the time allocation 
variable u(t) is constant yields the growth rate of consumption 
r 
K =V (6.21) 
Equation (6.21) means consumption grows at the same rate of human 
capital, which is also positively related with the growth rate of physical 
capital. The price change rate of human capital can be derived from (6.16) 
as 
e- 
e= p-ý(x+ + 
(6.22) 
z 
and from differentiating equation (6.14), we can also get 
e' 
e =ý -ter: 
(6.23) 
Differentiate equation (6.21), (6.20) to substitute u and K with other 
parameters, then delete 
e' 
from above two equations, provides the 
e, 
efficient rate of human capital growth: 
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". p-82-6-2 V=x= ý-cs (6.24) 
According to the restriction of v, which cannot exceed 6(1+K+i. ) (see 
equation 6.20), we get 
(P-1511 -9-A) 
8(1+x+A) (6.25) 
The coefficient of risk aversion 6 in Lucas (1988) has a minimum bound, 
whereas in this model there is a maximum bound for 6 (e. g. equation 
6.25). In other words, the model only applies for the intertemporal 
substitutability of consumption is not too low. Since the saving rate in 
China is extremely high, the assumption is reasonable. In order to work 
out v and u, we need to figure out the net savings rate s, which according 
to Lucas (1988) defined as 
S=K_ 
ß(ic+A) 
Nc+K p+aK 
(6.26) 
Based on the data collected by China's statistics yearbook and also the 
data we estimated above, the average growth rate of labour force a, during 
the period of 1994-2004 is 0.009, the average growth rate of consumption 
x is 0.041, the average growth rate of saving is 0.147 and ß equals 0.233. 
Equation (6.26) derives p+6x equals 0.079. Combining equation (6.21), 
(6.24) and p+6x yields an estimate for 5 of 0.067. This implies u=0.417. 
However substitute these parameters into our efficient human capital 
growth rate, equation (6.24) and assume cr=l, then concludes the efficient 
human capital growth rate is 0.054 and the time allocation to production u 
is 0.242, which is almost half of the observed value (table 6.3 lists the 
other possible values). If we devote more effort on human capital 
accumulation, the economy will enjoy 1.3 percentages higher of 
consumption growth than it does. The empirical results from our idealistic 
model imply there are still some room for human capital growth and the 
whole economy has not been overeducated. 
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Table 6.3 The optimal human capital investment 
6 v u. K. 
1 0.054 0.242 0.054 
2 0.047 0.336 0.047 
3 0.045 0.363 0.045 
6.4. Conclusion 
The regression results in section 2 show that using either NL models or 
Mankiw et al (1992)'s method, human capital does play an important role 
in economic growth. The contribution of individuals with upper secondary 
education to economic growth is around 15 percent in both models, but 
for the individuals with higher education is not significant for Mankiw et 
al (1992) model, which accords with the findings of Johnes (2006) for 
developing countries. The insignificance of individuals with higher 
education to economic growth may attribute to the size of this amount of 
people is too small35. Empirical evidence by other authors from other 
countries also uses individuals with secondary education to represent 
human capital. 
The estimation results from Lucas (1988)'s endogenous model show the 
whole economy has not been overeducated. In other words, the economy 
can absorb more educated individuals. However, there appears to be a 
conflict between the 20 per cent of individuals who report themselves as 
overeducated for their current job that we estimated in chapter 4 with the 
finding that the whole economy has not been overeducated that we 
calculated in the last section. The result is similar to the findings in USA. 
Duncan & Hoffman (1981) found there are around 40 percent individuals 
are overeducated, but Lucas (1988) estimated the whole economy is 
31 Indio iduals with higher education account for less than 1 percent of the whole population in the 
SOs. 
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insufficient on education investment. Although 20 percent graduates 
report they are overeducated, there are around 17 percent indi% 'duals think 
they are undereducated. In addition, education may have large social 
externalities not only in economic production, but also in other wider 
benefits (such as health, social behaviour, crime). Even if individuals are 
overeducated, the education investment for the whole society may still be 
insufficient. 
However we must be very careful in referring to the results of section two 
of the extended Lucas model, since we did not consider other important 
factors to economic growth. Table 6.1 and table 6.2 show that human 
capital, physical capital and population can only explain 40 to 50 percent 
economic growth, and that there exist other important factors which have 
not been explored by the model. Johnes (2006) explains that besides the 
factors we considered above, openness, performance of trading partners, 
political stability, landlock, institutions, etc are also critical to economic 
growth. A famous Chinese economist Yingqiu Liu said to The People 
Daily (24th, Nov., 2006) that there are three primary forces drive China's 
economic growth: structural reforms, opening-up policy and cheap labour. 
Therefore, the results solely in section two are not enough to guide 
education policy, more factors need to be considered in Lucas's model in 
future research in order to provide valuable suggestions. 
rso 
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
This thesis is mainly tackling the problem of education choices under 
uncertainty. Under this frame we discussed the optimal education choices 
under certainty by multinomial logit model, optimal education choices 
under uncertainty by B-S option model, the impact of a particular 
uncertainty (overeducation) on getting a graduate job and labour market 
wages and finally the socially optimal human capital investment. 
In order to evaluate the optimal choices model, we firstly describe four 
possible choices after compulsory education and their related utility 
functions. The optimal decision in each stage is derived by maximising 
individuals' life-time expected utilities after selecting the appropriate 
choice in each period conditional on the information set at that time and 
personal discount factor and the utility choices function could be solved 
by conditional logit model after regulating the disturbance term. The 
conditional logit model can tackle individuals' heterogeneity (such as 
discount rate, information set, non-pecuniary utility) very well, but not 
uncertainty. As analyzed in chapter 2 that there are three major 
uncertainties involved in each individual's education choices, it is vital to 
find out the influence of uncertainty on education choices. Then we 
analyzed the uncertainty and risks related with each choice to help 
determine the optimal education choice by decision trees as well as utility 
function conditional on the information set at time t. In order to solve the 
maximized utility function considering the uncertainty factor, we have to 
borrow from financial theory. We find investing on education is quite 
similar to buy a call option that one have the right to secure a level of 
qualification or not depending on the corresponding wages. Motivated by 
this idea, we treat the education investment as buying a series of European 
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call option and use the B-S option model to estimate the maximal cost that 
individuals could invest on education. 
The empirical evidence on the B-S model and multinomial logit model is 
provided in chapter 2. We first evaluate the ex-ante wages for each 
education choice conditional on their personal characteristics. The 
predicted wages are quite close to the realized wages in sizes and 
dimensions. Based on the estimated ex-ante wages, we estimate the wages 
multinomial logit model, utility multinomial logit model, wages B-S 
option model and utility B-S option model separately in order to find out 
the significance of non-pecuniary utility and uncertainty on individuals 
career move. The estimation results are quite close to the actual results, 
especially when we consider the effort costs and uncertainty. However, 
even if we consider these factors, the estimated results are still lower than 
the actual results. The results also suggest that volatility is not the main 
reason to stop individuals from being educated for technical qualifications 
but is the main factor to discourage individuals from attending academic 
qualification. Individuals who intend to acquire technical qualifications 
will put more weights on the non-pecuniary utility or the effort costs. 
In chapter 4, we model the determinants of getting a graduate level of job 
by pecking order theory. Based on this theory and three assumptions, we 
work out a threshold level q, °' , at time t 
for the minimum quality q;, of 
individual i to whom an offer is made of a level I>0 job. Through a 
survey data conducted by a project in June 2003, there are around 20 
percent graduates are believed they are overeducated in the China's labour 
market, with corresponding percentages for college graduate, bachelor, 
master and doctor of 12.9 percent, 21 percent, 36 percent and 42 percent 
respectively. The results suggest overeducation in China is more frequent 
among higher degree than among lower degree. The statistics for gender 
are quite interesting, namely male graduates are more likely to be 
overeducated than female graduates if equalizing other conditions. 
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Then our interests turn to test whether or not there is an equal rate of 
return on additional years of education, in terms of raising the probabilit`' 
of securing a job of a given level throughout the range from college 
diploma to PhD. Disaggregating the schooling variable reveals that it is 
the coefficients on additional years at the masters and PhD levels, 
particularly for males, which have the most significant effect on boosting 
an individual's position in the pecking order. 
Among all the affecting factors in both ordered probit model and ordered 
logit model, Party membership, family background, English skills and 
registration status play a significant role on securing a graduate level of 
job. Among which, the role of family background is quite interesting, 
which was represented by father's career rank and father's qualification. 
Parents belonging to the lowest social rank and with qualifications beyond 
the master's level all have a significant negative impact on their children's 
position in the pecking order. In terms of subject, only the graduates from 
computer & electronic program and language program are easily to find a 
matched job. 
The expected return to personal characteristics, subject of study, type of 
employment, working location and job levels is analyzed in chapter 5. The 
return is not equally distributed among education and graduates with 
master degree receives the highest rewards. University rank, English skills 
and gender in line with the findings of the determinants on getting a 
graduate level of job, all have a significant impact on earnings. Whereas, 
Party membership and class of degree do not have a significant positive 
effect on graduation wages in China. Relative to working in other sectors, 
working in the government, state-owned companies and education 
institutions tends to imply a lower wage level and with starting salaries in 
joint ventures significantly higher. In the context of subjects, the 
economic return and the probability to get a graduate job is quite different. 
Literature, physics, construction, art and medicine all have opposite signs 
of coefficients in the ordered probit model and OLS logwagcs regression. 
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In addition, two stylized facts on the wages to surplus education also hold 
in China. 
After analyzing the determinants of individuals' wages, one can work out 
the optimal education choices considering the risk of overeducation. Due 
to the sample limitation, we cannot work out individuals' exact education 
choices, but a relationship between average wages growth rate and the 
critical probability that individuals will be not be overeducated by setting 
the net present value equals to zero. According to our estimation, 
investing in master education is the most profitable investment and 
individuals will not be overeducated as long as the wages growth rate is 
larger than 2.3 per cent. 
Due to the externality of education, certain percentages of individuals' 
overeducation do not imply the whole economy was overeducated. The 
results in chapter 6 show human capital investment play an important role 
in China's economic growth by using both NL model and augmented 
Solow method, especially for upper secondary education. Due to the 
significant effect of human capital investment on economic growth, we 
develop the Lucas (1988) endogenous model of optimal social human 
capital investment in order to estimate the social optimal human capital 
investment in China. Based on the evidence from Education at a Glance 
2006 that those who have a high GDP growth rate also have a high speed 
increase on human capital investment, I consider the physical capital 
growth rate, when I model the human capital increase rate. The estimation 
results from this new social optimal human capital investment model 
show that China's human capital investment is insufficient indicating the 
whole economy has not been overeducated. In other words, the economy 
can absorb more educated individuals. 
In the thesis, we develop individuals' education choices model under 
uncertainty with strict restrictions, such as individuals are risk neutral, 
individuals' xvazcs satisfy a Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) with 
drift. h oNvever, individuals conic from poor family background may 
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attach a high discount rate to future uncertain return and their wages may 
not follow a drifted GBM process even if we control all the personal 
characteristics. Future empirical uncertainty studies may try to relax these 
assumptions. In addition, though B-S education choices method can take 
into account the wages stochastic process, it cannot evaluate the return to 
uncertainty. An accomplished ex-ante wages equation considering 
uncertainty factor need to be developed, which can estimate the return to 
systematic risks and specific risks. 
Though our Chinese graduate survey data that we analyzed in chapter 4 
and 5 record individuals' comprehensive information, it is only a cross- 
section data, which restricts our attention on the career mobility. Future 
researches can use panel data to discuss the overeducation rate overtime 
and the expected return when experience was considered. When we 
evaluate the social optimal human capital investment, we only consider 
the effect of physical capital, human capital and population, which 
explains around 40 to 50 percent economic growth. Other factors, such as 
openness, political stability, institutions, etc should be considered in 
determining the socially optimal level of human capital investment. 
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